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SUMMARY 
 
This submission consists of a collection of four papers. Each paper stands on its own 
and makes a specific contribution to knowledge. However, the four papers are also 
closely connected, each providing a building block for understanding how China’s 
economic rise has affected Vietnam’s industrial development. Taken together, these 
papers show that the conclusion reached on how China’s rise affects its neighbours 
depends fundamentally on understanding the changing dynamics over time. So as to 
unravel these dynamics, this collection focuses on the motorcycle industry and covers a 
period of a decade. At the beginning of that decade China’s economic rise seemed to be 
a disaster for Vietnam’s industrial development. By the end the decade, it turned out to 
have transformed Vietnam’s industrial development and production capabilities.  
 
At the heart of this intriguing dynamic is the competition between two models of 
industrial organisation. The first paper conceptualises the two contrasting models of 
industrial organisation that underlie the Japanese dominance and the Chinese catch-up 
in the Asian motorcycle industry. The second and third papers present the findings of 
the empirical research on Vietnam’s motorcycle industry covering a period of a decade. 
The second paper shows that China’s economic rise brought about repeated rounds of 
competition between the Japanese and Chinese models of industrial organisation 
attempting to gain supremacy in the third country market of Vietnam. The third paper 
shows that local component suppliers were able to build up considerable production 
capabilities in the course of the decade as the changes in industrial organisation created 
new learning opportunities for these suppliers. Drawing together the findings of the 
research, the fourth paper argues that the impact of China’s economic rise on the 
development of Vietnam’s motorcycle industry changed over a decade and that the 
changing impact can be explained in terms of successive changes in industrial 
organisation.  
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 INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW 
This submission consists of a collection of four papers. Each paper stands on its own 
and seeks to make a specific contribution to knowledge. However, the papers are also 
closely connected, each providing a building block for addressing the bigger question of 
how China’s economic rise has affected industrial development of its less developed 
neighbours. This has been the question driving my doctoral research throughout; and 
throughout I have sought to answer it by focussing on the motorcycle industry of 
Vietnam. I had the opportunity to study this industry before embarking on my doctoral 
research and then built on this earlier experience by conducting further empirical 
research, this time with clearer analytical frameworks and methodologies. This 
introductory overview introduces the debate I seek to contribute to, presents brief 
summaries of the four papers, and the overall conclusions.  
One of the most prominent developments in the global economy is the economic rise of 
China, driven primarily by the rapid development of its modern and diverse industrial 
sector. The impact of China’s rise has been felt globally via international trade. 
Particularly for China’s less developed neighbours, the threat of massive low-priced 
imports from China has emerged as one of the most serious concerns as they endeavour 
to develop their own industries. 
The four papers contained in this submission focus on a critical yet largely overlooked 
dimension of China’s economic impact on its neighbours: the dynamics of change.  
The existing literature has focussed primarily on the volume, direction, and composition 
of China’s trade. However, although trade is important, it is not sufficient for 
understanding how China’s rise affects industrial development of its neighbours. This 
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requires understanding the dynamics of market competition and industrial 
transformation within the neighbouring countries.  
So as to unravel these dynamics, the four papers focus on the motorcycle industry. In 
this industry, China achieved a phenomenal rise through the 1990s, even challenging 
the long-established position of major Japanese motorcycle manufacturers. The research 
presented here examines the experience of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry over a 
period of a decade – since the end of the 1990s. Early in the decade, the massive 
imports of low-priced Chinese motorcycles brought about severe damage to the nascent 
motorcycle industry in Vietnam. By the end of the decade, the competitive effects of 
this ‘China shock’ had transformed Vietnam’s industrial development and production 
capabilities. On the basis of historical evidence and recent empirical data, the four 
papers examine the dynamics of competition, organisational transformation and 
capability building that contributed to the changing impact of the China shock on 
Vietnam.  
The first paper provides the theoretical background. It looks into one of the key factors 
that explain the rise of the Chinese motorcycle industry and its impact on Vietnam: 
industrial organisation. By drawing on the theory of global value chain governance, this 
paper conceptualises the model of industrial organisation that has emerged in the 
Chinese motorcycle industry. The rise of Japanese motorcycle manufacturers since the 
1950s had been assisted by a model of industrial organisation prioritising quality. 
Chinese motorcycle manufacturers, by contrast, developed a distinctive organisational 
model prioritising low prices. This emerging model helped Chinese motorcycle 
manufacturers to attain remarkable levels of price competitiveness and thrive in the 
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low-income segment of the global motorcycle market that had remained largely 
unexploited by the Japanese industry leaders.  
The second and third papers show how China’s economic rise transformed Vietnam's 
motorcycle industry. Both papers cover the period of a decade starting in the late 1990s. 
While guided by theory, both papers concentrate on the empirical evidence for changes 
over time – which turned out to be substantial.  
The second paper focuses on the transformation of industrial organisation. At the 
beginning of the decade, Japanese motorcycle manufacturers were only starting to 
transplant their conventional model of industrial organisation. The China shock 
triggered repeated rounds of competition between the Japanese and Chinese models of 
industrial organisation as the respective lead firms attempted to gain supremacy over the 
Vietnamese market. The initial round of organisational adjustments in the early 2000s, 
emphasised in the existing literature, were found to be short-lived, while longer-lasting 
changes came only towards the end of the decade. At this stage, the two organisational 
models were adjusted to meet the competitive challenges and adapted to the Vietnamese 
environment. The result was increased organisational diversity. The two models were 
transformed into hybrid forms that retained the essential features of the original models 
yet incorporated key adjustments to meet the Vietnamese environment.  
The transformation of industrial organisation had a significant impact on the 
development of motorcycle component suppliers. The third paper therefore examines 
how the capability building trajectories of local suppliers evolved over time. At the 
beginning of the decade, Vietnam had an extremely limited pool of competent suppliers. 
Whilst the initial round of organisational transformation triggered by the China shock 
created new opportunities for local firms to enter into the production of motorcycle 
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components, supplier capability remained relatively rudimentary. After a period of slow 
learning, supplier learning trajectories entered a more dynamic phase towards the end of 
the decade. Not only is this phase different from the previous periods in terms of the 
levels of capabilities acquired by the suppliers, with high-performing ones even 
reaching basic innovative levels, but it is also distinct in that supplier learning came to 
be driven by mechanisms that are qualitatively different from the previous periods. 
These suppliers are the bedrock of Vietnam’s motorcycle industry today.  
The fourth paper synthesises the findings of the previous papers and presents the 
conclusions of the whole research project. Drawing on the empirical materials presented 
in the previous papers and complementing them with additional data, this paper 
discusses how the China shock affected the development of Vietnam’s motorcycle 
industry and elaborates two key contribution of the research to the literature on the 
impact of China's economic rise: showing empirically that China's impact changed over 
the period of a decade, and explaining why the impact changed over time. The paper 
argues that the competition between the Japanese and Chinese models of industrial 
organisation is central in explaining the shifting dynamics of market competition, 
formation of supplier capabilities, and lead firm performance. 
In summary, the key original contribution that this submission as a whole makes lies in 
showing the dynamics of change – in industrial organisation, capability building, and  
industrial development – triggered by the rise of China. By conducting in-depth 
empirical research covering a period of a decade, the four papers not only capture and 
give accounts of the dynamics of change over time but also show that these changes 
indeed have a profound influence on the judgement of key issues being addressed.  
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 PAPER I.  EXPLORING THE SOURCES OF CHINA’S CHALLENGES TO JAPAN: 
MODELS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION IN THE MOTORCYCLE INDUSTRY 
1. Introduction 
The rise of the Japanese motorcycle industry after World War II was truly remarkable. 
Starting almost from scratch and fuelled by the growing demand for an inexpensive 
means of transport, and the engagement of a few hundred manufacturers, motorcycle 
production expanded rapidly in the 1950s (Alexander 2008). This was followed by the 
consolidation of manufacturers into four major companies: with the launch of the highly 
acclaimed Super Cub, Honda rapidly emerged as a global industry leader; and three 
other firms – namely Yamaha, Suzuki, and Kawasaki – successfully followed suit 
(Otahara 2000a). As early as 1965, Japan emerged as the world’s largest producer and 
exporter of motorcycles, virtually driving previous industry leaders in Great Britain, 
Germany, and France out of business (Smith 1981; Wezel and Lomi 2009). Following 
expansion of exports and foreign direct investment (FDI), the four Japanese companies 
accounted for as much as 70% of global production in 1996.1 
However, as so often happens, history repeated itself: by the end of the 1990s, Japanese 
dominance was being challenged by the rise of China. In 1993, its motorcycle 
production surpassed that of Japan, the former emerging as the world’s largest 
motorcycle producer. By 2006, China accounted for as much as 33% and 49% of global 
motorcycle sales and production respectively.2 The huge Chinese market was 
dominated by copies or slightly modified imitations of popular Japanese models that 
                                                        
1 Inclusive of production by foreign firms in receipt of technology transfer from the four Japanese 
companies (Otahara 2000a: 2–3). 
2 The author’s estimation based on Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (2007). 
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were produced by local manufacturers and sold at approximately 30% to 70% of the 
price of the originals (Ohara 2005a: 69). Meanwhile, Japanese manufacturers – for 
virtually the first time in the long history of their overseas operations – only managed to 
capture a minimal share in the Chinese market. As of the end of the 1990s, about twenty 
foreign joint venture firms in China, ten of which were established by the four Japanese 
motorcycle manufacturers, together accounted for just 5% of the market (Ohara 2006a: 
21). Moreover, China’s challenge was not limited to the domestic market, as it expanded 
exports to Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America from the late 1990s onwards.3  
This paper addresses one of the critical factors that have sustained the prolonged 
dominance of Japanese manufacturers in the global motorcycle industry: industrial 
organisation. The substantial body of research on the Japanese automobile industry has 
shown how a distinctive model of industrial organisation characterised by long-term, 
trust-based supplier relationships has sustained product development and manufacturing 
performance (Smitka 1991; Clark and Fujimoto 1991; Nishiguchi 1994; Dyer 1996; 
Fujimoto 1999). Emerging research into the Japanese motorcycle industry suggests that 
a similar form of industrial organisation has contributed to the high level of 
manufacturing performance of this sector (Boston Consulting Group 1975; Ohara 2001, 
2006a; Otahara 2006).  
The phenomenal rise of the Chinese motorcycle industry since the 1990s raises a series 
of questions. How did it manage to challenge the established position of Japanese 
motorcycle manufacturers, which once seemed so unshakable? What form of industrial 
organisation enabled the Chinese to achieve their remarkable levels of price-based 
                                                        
3 China’s top ten motorcycle export destinations from 1998 to 2008 were Nigeria, the United States, 
Vietnam, Indonesia, Argentina, Japan, Turkey, Mexico, Germany and Brazil (the author’s calculation 
based on Global Trade Information Services, Inc. 2012).  
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competitiveness? Did they emulate the Japanese model of industrial organisation but 
apply it in a better way, or did they develop a distinctive model of their own?  
Specifically, this paper addresses the following research question: What form of 
industrial organisation enabled Chinese motorcycle manufacturers to challenge 
Japanese motorcycle manufacturers? It argues that rather than emulating the 
conventional Japanese model, Chinese motorcycle manufacturers developed a 
completely different form of industrial organisation. The resultant distinctive model 
enabled them to realise types of competiveness that differed significantly from those of 
the Japanese industry leaders, and allowed Chinese firms to thrive in a low-income 
portion of the global motorcycle market that was largely unexploited by the Japanese. 
The paper teases out the essence of the two contrasting models of industrial organisation 
that have emerged in Japan and China, and discusses their respective strengths and 
weaknesses, as well as trajectories of change, in an explicitly comparative manner. 
Primarily, the paper builds on existing empirical research into the Japanese and Chinese 
motorcycle industries. Conducted mostly by Japanese and Chinese academics, the bulk 
of such research has focussed on describing in depth the emerging patterns of industrial 
development, product development practices, and/or supplier systems in either or both 
of the two countries under study.4 In contrast, the present paper conceptualises the two 
models of industrial organisation, adopting a common theoretical framework and an 
explicitly comparative mode of analysis. Given that both models have evolved, the 
focus is on each of their conventional forms: the Japanese model in the 1970s up to the 
early 1990s, and the Chinese model in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the paper also examines 
                                                        
4 Existing empirical studies include Ohara (2001, 2004a, 2006b, 2006d), Otahara (2000a, 2000b, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2009a, 2009b), Hashino (2007), Demizu (1991, 2005), Tomizuka (2001), Otahara 
and Sugiyama (2005), and Alexander (2008) on Japan; and Ohara (2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 
2005b, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c), Ge and Fujimoto (2004, 2005), Matsuoka (2002), Sugiyama and 
Otahara (2002), and Otahara and Sugiyama (2005) on China. 
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their respective transformations in the 2000s on the basis of the literature as well as the 
author’s fieldwork in 2004, covering Honda and three of its major motorcycle 
component suppliers. The details of the interviews are provided in Appendix 1. 
Interviews cited in this paper are referred to by firm and interview codes as explained in 
Appendix 1. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
framework. Sections 3 and 4 respectively conceptualise Japanese and Chinese models of 
industrial organisation in their conventional forms. Section 5 compares the two models 
and discusses trajectories of change. Section 6 concludes the paper by summarising its 
main findings, and identifies and discusses areas for future research.  
2. Theoretical Framework 
This section develops a theoretical framework for describing and explaining different 
forms of industrial organisation, which is based on a revised version of Gereffi et al.’s 
(2005) theory of global value chain (GVC) governance. The section begins by 
introducing the concept of value chain governance, followed by a consideration of five 
dominant governance types. It then discusses the two key variables that determine value 
chain governance. The section concludes by presenting a revised framework that uses 
these two variables to explain the emergence of the five aforementioned types of value 
chain governance.  
2.1 Industrial Organisation: Meaning and Type 
An industry comprises (groups of) firms engaged in one or more value-adding function 
that is required to bring products to market – typically referred to as a value chain 
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(Sturgeon 2001). The literature on industrial organisation has evolved around the broad 
question of how the upstream to downstream functions surrounding a product are 
aligned to different (groups of) firms, and how relations between these firms are 
coordinated. Starting with the literature on large integrated corporations (Chandler 
1977) and transaction cost economics (Williamson 1979), through to theories on 
network forms of organisation (Powell 1990) and the GVC approach (Gereffi et al. 
2001; Schmitz 2004; Gereffi et al. 2005; Sturgeon 2008), the resultant large body of 
work has demonstrated the range of market and non-market mechanisms through which 
inter-firm relations are coordinated. These mechanisms – referred to by the GVC 
approach as types of value chain governance – are important because they influence 
competitive performance of industries and development prospects for local firms 
participating in value chains (Sturgeon 2002; Schmitz 2004).    
While there are myriad patterns of value chain governance, Gereffi et al. (2005) 
classified value chain governance into five dominant types, which were mapped onto a 
spectrum running from low to high levels of explicit coordination (Figure I-1). At one 
end of the spectrum is the arm’s-length market in which transactions are mediated by 
market forces. At the other end of the spectrum there is a hierarchy in which 
coordination takes the form of an internal command structure within a vertically 
integrated corporation. In between these two extremes, there are intermediate or 
network forms of organisation that are neither based on markets nor a hierarchy (Powell 
1990; Jones et al. 1997). In ascending order of explicit transactional governance, these 
are: 
 Modular chains, in which product standardisation reduces the frequency and 
intensity of interaction, as well as the level of mutual dependence between a lead 
firm and its suppliers   
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 Relational chains, which are characterised by complex and intense interaction 
between mutually dependent parties  
 Captive chains, in which a powerful lead firm makes extensive intervention and 
exercises control over smaller and dependent suppliers 
 
Figure I-1. Types of Value Chain Governance 
Degree of Explicit 
Coordination Type Description 
Low 
  Market 
Arm’s-length transactions mediated by market 
forces 
 
 
 
 
Network 
Modular 
Product standardisation enables firms to 
exchange complex information without intense 
interaction or mutual dependence 
 Types Relational 
Intense two-way interaction and mutual 
dependence 
  Captive 
Lead firms make extensive intervention and 
exercise control over dependent suppliers 
 
High  Hierarchy Vertically-integrated organisation 
Source: The author, based on Gereffi et al. (2005). 
 
2.2 Determinants of Value Chain Governance  
Why do different forms of governance such as those discussed above exist? And under 
what circumstances do particular governance forms emerge? The strength of Gereffi et 
al.’s (2005) formulation of GVC governance theory is that it provides a systematic 
device for answering these questions. Specifically, they seek to explain the dynamics of 
value chain governance in terms of three variables: (1) the complexity of information 
exchanged in a transaction; (2) the degree to which such information can be codified; 
and (3) the supplier’s capability level relative to the requirements of a transaction.   
This study follows the overall structure of this framework, but makes the following 
adaptations. First, for the sake of simplicity, the first two variables are grouped into one 
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broader category: the nature of product and process parameters exchanged in 
transactions.  
Second, whereas Gereffi et al. (2005) concentrate on the codifiability of parameters, this 
study focuses on the degree to which these parameters are standardised, a related yet 
distinct concept. This is because degrees of product and process standardisation 
constitute one of the essential factors that differentiate the Japanese and Chinese models 
of industrial organisation in the motorcycle industry.5  
Third, the present study’s framework incorporates lead firm capability in addition to 
supplier capability. Because the primary focus of Gereffi et al. (2005) is on the global 
value chains that are coordinated by major transnational corporations (TNCs), they 
implicitly assume that lead firms possess the sophisticated capability necessary to 
coordinate value chains. On the contrary, the present study does not take lead firm 
capability as a given in view of the fact that it addresses the organisational model 
emerging in a developing country context. Rather, it acknowledges that a lead firm may 
be constrained by a shortage of capability in its attempt to establish certain types of 
chain governance.  
Fourth, rather than narrowly focussing on relative levels of capability, that is, whether 
or not supplier capability meets the level required by lead firms, the present study 
highlights the various types of capability that different governance mechanism models 
impose on both lead firms and suppliers.  
                                                        
5 This adaptation becomes critical in formulating the conditions under which captive chains emerge. 
Whereas Gereffi et al. (2005) focus on the codifiability of parameters in the form of lead firm 
instructions, the non-standard nature of product and process parameters turned out to be critical in 
explaining why Japanese motorcycle manufacturers had instituted explicit governance mechanisms 
in coordinating transactions with their suppliers.  
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The basic structure of this adapted framework is shown in Figure I-2, in which value 
chain governance is determined by two variables: the nature of product and process 
parameters communicated in transactions; and the alignment of relevant capabilities 
within the industry. The following subsections examine the two variables individually.   
Figure I-2. Value Chain Governance: An Explanatory Framework 
 
Source: The author, adapted from Gereffi et al. (2005) and Langlois and Robertson (1995). 
 
2.2.1 The Nature of Product and Process Parameters 
The nature of product and process parameters determines the need for transactional 
governance. It is not the case that every transaction requires explicit coordination; the 
extent to which transactional governance is required depends primarily on the type of 
product being traded (in this case, motorcycle components). The specific focus will be 
on levels of complexity and degree of standardisation, both of which are influenced by 
factors such as technological innovation and changes in consumer demand.  
In respect of simple products, which also tend to be standardised, there is limited need 
for instituting explicit transactional governance: if components are simple and 
standardised, product/process parameters can be specified and communicated with ease. 
Supplier performance is easily observable in the form of delivered outputs and thus 
The nature of 
product/process 
parameters
The aligment of 
relevant capabilities  
within the industry
Value chain 
governance
Technological shift,  
changes in consumer 
demand, etc.
Acquisition of new 
capabilities by 
incumbents; entry of 
new firms
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detailed monitoring mechanisms are not required. Moreover, as standard products do 
not require transaction-specific investment, there is no need to implement safeguards 
against the risks of opportunism (Williamson 1979). Standard products can also be 
produced by a range of suppliers, sold to a variety of lead firms, or produced for stock 
and supplied as necessary (Gereffi et al. 2005).  
The need for coordination increases as products become complex and differentiated, 
that is, as they start to take on new demands beyond price level (Schmitz 2006; 
Humphrey and Schmitz 2008). Examples include differentiated components that are 
more difficult to design and/or manufacture; higher quality levels; tighter delivery 
requirements in terms of either frequency or punctuality; and additional functional 
requirements (e.g. suppliers take on design responsibilities in addition to 
manufacturing). Implementing new requirements such as these often constitutes an 
additional burden with regard to the communication of product and/or process 
parameters between the lead firm and its suppliers. It also necessitates additional 
mechanisms to ensure that parameters are adhered to, for example, detailed monitoring 
(Schmitz 2006). 
The need for explicit governance also depends on the extent to which parameters are 
standardised. On the one hand, non-standard parameters require explicit coordination 
because they incur additional coordination costs and transaction-specific investment in 
physical and/or human resources (Williamson 1979). This is particularly the case for 
products with integral design architecture. Because such products are characterised by 
complex mapping from functional elements to physical components and tightly coupled 
interfaces among interacting physical components, they call for fine-tuning between the 
whole product and its component parts if overall product performance is to be 
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maximised (Ulrich 1995; Baldwin and Clark 2000). Designing these products requires 
the coordination of detailed design tasks (Ulrich 1995), and their manufacture 
necessitates transaction-specific investment, both of which call for explicit governance 
mechanisms to be in place.  
On the other hand, even when the product is complex, industry-wide product and/or 
process standards may reduce the need for explicit governance (Gereffi et al. 2005). In 
industries that produce products with modular architecture, standards make it possible 
to communicate product and/or process parameters without intense interaction, which 
releases firms from being locked into particular trading relationships (Langlois and 
Robertson 1992, 1995).  
2.2.2 The Alignment of Relevant Capabilities  
The need for transactional governance, however, does not mean that such mechanisms 
can necessarily be implemented in practice. This is where the second variable of the 
alignment of relevant capabilities within the industry comes into play. Governance 
means that a given firm enforces parameters over other firms, a dynamic that demands 
the ability to wield power (Schmitz 2006; Sturgeon 2008). The relative power relations 
between a lead firm and its suppliers, in turn, are determined primarily by the types and 
levels of capability enjoyed by the respective parties (Sturgeon 2008; Schmitz 2006; 
Palpacuer 2000). 
A lead firm’s capacity to impose parameters on its suppliers usually stems from their 
core competencies in strategic value chain functions (Palpacuer 2000; Schmitz 2006). In 
capital-intensive sectors such as the automotive industry, such strategic functions 
typically include product development, marketing, and manufacturing of core 
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components. These functions often constitute the key sources of competitive advantage 
enjoyed by the lead firm because they require knowledge- and experienced-based assets 
that are difficult for others to imitate, and because they provide economies of scale for 
the firms that control these functions (Palpacuer 2000: 378).  
A lead firm’s control over strategic value chain functions matters because it tends to 
create two types of dependence on the part of the suppliers. First, lead firm control over 
strategic functions leaves suppliers with non-core functions (Palpacuer 2000), rendering 
them functionally dependent on the lead firm in marketing their products. Second, 
because dominance in respect of product, marketing, and/or branding often enables lead 
firms to gain a high degree of control over the market (Gereffi 1999; Kaplinsky and 
Morris 2000), they often overwhelm suppliers with huge purchasing power (Sturgeon 
2008), rendering them financially dependent.  
The size of orders takes on particular importance in industries in which product and 
process parameters are non-standard. Because non-standard products often impose the 
additional cost of product-specific investment in physical and human resources, a lead 
firm will face difficulty enforcing non-standard parameters on its suppliers unless orders 
are large enough to make production economically viable.6   
However, it is necessary to analyse lead firm competency in relative terms. Because 
power is relational, suppliers may also acquire it by building core competencies, that is, 
technical or service capabilities that are difficult to replace and become indispensable to 
the lead firm (Schmitz 2006; Sturgeon 2008; Palpacuer 2000). Suppliers can also gain 
the generic capability to assume responsibility for a bundle of functions, such as product 
                                                        
6 Sturgeon et al. (2008) corroborate this point in arguing that the concentrated structure of the car 
manufacturing industry helps each firm to impose its own idiosyncratic standards on suppliers.  
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design, process development, purchasing, and production, which enables them to serve 
a diverse pool of customers and switch customers if necessary (Sturgeon 2008). In 
contrast, where suppliers only possess capabilities that are easily substituted and/or are 
embedded in relations with specific customers, the lead firm retains the capacity to 
choose and replace suppliers, thus keeping supplier power under control (ibid.).  
2.3 The Revised Framework 
Table I-1 shows how the five governance types mentioned in Section 2.1 can be 
explained in terms of different combinations of the two variables outlined in the 
previous subsection. When product and process parameters are simple and standardised, 
market-based chains emerge. This type of chain makes limited capability demand of 
lead firm and suppliers alike, the minimum requirements being that they possess routine 
assembly capability and routine component manufacturing capability respectively. 
When industry-wide standards of compatibility enable complex parameters to be 
exchanged without explicit coordination, modular chains emerge whereby suppliers 
acquire generic manufacturing capacity and related service capabilities that enable them 
to serve multiple lead firms simultaneously. On the other hand, while the minimum 
requirement of the lead firm is routine assembly capability using mutually compatible 
components sourced from suppliers, modular chains enable it to focus on creation, 
penetration and defence of markets for its end products (Sturgeon 2002).  
As product and process parameters become complex and non-standard, three types of 
chain governance may emerge depending on the alignment of relevant capabilities. The 
first case is one in which the lead firm and its suppliers are equipped with 
complementary competencies that cannot easily be sourced elsewhere. Such a situation 
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gives rise to a relational chain whereby the lead firm and its suppliers are engaged in 
intense two-way interaction; the two parties are mutually dependent and the power 
relation is symmetrical (Gereffi et al. 2005).  
Table I-1. Types of Chain Governance and their Determinants 
  
Product/ 
Process 
Parameters 
Lead Firm Capability Supplier Capability 
Market Simple 
No specific requirements beyond routine manufacturing/assembly 
capabilities 
Modular 
Complex/  
Standard 
A minimum of routine assembly 
capability suffices. 
Lead firms usually focus on 
creation, penetration and 
maintenance of markets for end 
products. 
Generic manufacturing and 
related service capabilities. 
Relational 
Complex/ 
Non-standard 
Lead firms and suppliers possess complementary competencies that 
are hard to substitute. 
Captive 
Capacity to exercise dominance 
over suppliers, which usually 
stems from control over 
strategic chain functions. 
A minimum of the basic ability to 
engage in a narrow range of 
simple tasks is required. Suppliers 
develop capabilities in accordance 
with the lead firm’s interventions. 
Hierarchical 
Capability to conduct the 
value-adding functions in 
question. 
Supplier capability is withheld. 
Source: Adapted from Gereffi et al. (2005), Sturgeon (2002), Langlois and Robertson (1995), 
Sturgeon et al. (2008), Schmitz (2006), Sturgeon (2008), and Palpacuer (2000). 
The second case is characterised by substantial asymmetry in capability levels between 
a large, competent lead firm and smaller, less competent suppliers. Competence and 
power asymmetry lead to a captive chain whereby the lead firm engages in extensive 
intervention, such as active monitoring and technical assistance; while suppliers develop 
their capabilities – typically, in a narrow range of tasks – under the lead firm’s guidance 
(Schmitz 2004, 2006).  
The last case is one in which limited available external capability makes outsourcing 
18 
 
 
 
unfeasible, meaning that the lead firm is compelled to conduct the required function(s) 
in-house, that is, to create a hierarchy. A hierarchy may also result from cases of 
substantial asymmetry in competence levels (i.e. the second case discussed above) but 
where the lead firm is either unwilling or unable to engage in extensive intervention.  
3. The Captive Japanese Model 
The captive model of industrial organisation has been one of the key factors behind the 
prolonged leadership of Japanese motorcycle manufacturers since the 1960s. This 
section discusses the origins and distinguishing features of this model in accordance 
with the framework introduced in Section 2.  
3.1 Complex and Non-standard Parameters  
In the Japanese motorcycle industry, lead firms have traditionally organised relations 
with suppliers that reflected the nature of the product and process parameters they 
sought to enforce. Critical in this regard was the nature of the dominant design – the old 
yet highly successful Super Cub model. Over the five decades following its launch in 
1958, this model shaped product and process parameters in the industry.  
Up to the mid-1950s, two types of product prevailed in the Japanese motorcycle market, 
both of which were characterised by simple and standardised product parameters.7 One 
was represented by poor quality imitations of imported British and German models. 
Leading experts on the history of the Japanese motorcycle industry note that 
                                                        
7 Debate around the Japanese motorcycle industry up to the mid-1950s is based on the 
commentaries of Tomizuka (2001), Demizu (1991), and Alexander (2008). As Alexander (2008) 
points out, the nature of the product, mode of production, and form of industrial organisation at this 
time was surprisingly similar to the situation in the Chinese motorcycle industry in the 1990s.   
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domestically manufactured models of the period were mediocre in terms of engineering 
precision, quality and product performance, all aspects that largely failed to compete 
with foreign-made vehicles (Demizu 1991: 67; Tomizuka 2001: 100).  
The other type of product was the motorised bicycle, which, again, imitated models 
imported from Europe. Since such vehicles could be produced by simply attaching an 
external two-stroke engine to a bicycle (Otaraha 2000a), which itself had modular 
design architecture (Galvin and Morkel 2001), fine-tuning in terms of component 
integration was not required. Both types of product were produced by a large number of 
assemblers and suppliers that operated on an arm’s-length transaction basis (Demizu 
1991; Alexander 2008).  
Honda’s launch of the Super Cub in 1958 marked a major technological breakthrough. 
Unlike the copies of imported European motorcycles or motorised bicycles that had 
preceded it, the Super Cub was conceived and designed by Honda exclusively to meet 
the demand of small Japanese businesses to deliver goods (Pascale 1984; Otahara 
2000b). Featuring landmark technological innovations such as a four-stroke engine, 
overhead valves, an automatic centrifugal clutch, and an electric starter, the model 
recorded remarkable levels of capacity, speed and fuel efficiency that substantially 
exceeded world standard levels of the period (Demizu 1991). The safe and user-friendly 
appearance of the model, together with its affordable price also appealed strongly to 
Japanese consumers (Pascale 1984). Most notably, Honda designed the Super Cub by 
means of integral architecture so that all its components were customised to this 
particular model. Not a single Super Cub component was used in common with Honda’s 
other models (Otahara and Sugiyama 2005).  
This highly successful model not only led to the closure of nearly two hundred Japanese 
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firms engaged in the production of imitation motorcycles, but also enabled Honda to 
infiltrate and eventually dominate the North American and European markets 
(Christensen 2002; Demizu 2005). Fifty years on, the basic production technology 
remains unchanged (Ohara 2006b). Technological shifts observed in the automobile 
industry, such as standardisation of vehicle platforms and modularisation (Humphrey 
2000; Sako 2005; Takeishi and Fujimoto 2005), have so far not been implemented in the 
motorcycle industry (Ohara 2006b: 70). The Super Cub continues to be one of Honda’s 
most popular models produced globally8 and is used by other motorcycle 
manufacturers as a benchmark for the development of new products (Ohara 2006b). 
Considering the exceptionally high market shares this model has maintained in Japan 
and abroad over an extended period, the Super Cub may be seen as a typical example of 
a dominant design (Abernathy and Utterback 1978; Abernathy and Clark 1985; Teece 
1986).  
The emergence of the Super Cub as a dominant model significantly transformed the 
nature of innovation in the industry. Subsequently, Honda and the three other companies 
that successfully followed suit – namely, Yamaha, Suzuki and Kawasaki – opted to 
launch proprietary models incorporating new component technology, changes in 
specifications, and/or design modifications, aimed at improved product performance 
and/or adaptation to meet the consumer demand of Japanese and overseas markets 
(Demizu 1991; Otahara and Sugiyama 2005; Ohara 2006b). Every time new models 
were launched, motorcycle manufacturers renewed the designs of the whole vehicle as 
well as those of individual components (Otahara and Sugiyama 2005). Given the 
integral product architecture, incremental product innovations of this sort called for 
                                                        
8 Honda’s cumulative production of the Cub series reached 60 million units by 2008 
(http://world.honda.com/news/2008/c080521Cub-Series/, accessed 16 September 2010), which was 
roughly one-third of the company’s cumulative global production of motorcycles.  
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intricate fine-tuning between components (Ohara 2006d; Otahara 2009a). Thus, product 
parameters became complex and non-standard. 
The emergence of the dominant design also lent increasing importance to process 
innovation for incremental improvements in productivity (Abernathy and Utterback 
1978). Reflecting the integral design architecture, Japanese motorcycle manufacturers 
made themselves liable for provision to their consumers of a quality guarantee for the 
product system as a whole (Otahara 2009a, 2009b). Therefore, they took the lead in 
instituting their own engineering standards9 and ensuring that common targets for the 
achievement of high levels of quality, costs and delivery (QCD) were pursued 
simultaneously for all of the components of a product. Accordingly, process 
requirements also became complex and non-standard. 
3.2 Lead Firm Concentration of Capabilities 
The second key variable that determines the pattern of industrial organisation is the 
structure of relevant capabilities. With the closure of the hitherto numerous assemblers 
of imitation motorcycles and motorised bicycles, the Japanese motorcycle industry grew 
highly concentrated. By the 1970s, the four emergent major motorcycle manufacturers 
had gained dominance of the growing domestic market and, subsequently, global sales 
via exports and FDI (Otahara 2000a).  
Each of these four motorcycle manufacturers developed a pyramidal, hierarchical 
network of suppliers with the lead firm at the top of the pyramid (Figure I-3). As was 
the case in the car industry (Sturgeon et al. 2008), the need for customised components 
led each manufacturer to develop supply networks of its own and to enforce its 
                                                        
9 For example, the Honda Engineering Standard (HES) includes component dimensions, material 
specifications, and details of the requisite processing. 
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idiosyncratic product standards on the suppliers. Large market shares meant that 
manufacturers were able to place orders that were sufficiently large to sustain small 
suppliers.10 
Figure I-3. Hierarchical Organisational Model in the Japanese Motorcycle Industry 
 
Source: The author.  
These four powerful motorcycle manufacturers virtually monopolised capabilities in the 
industry. Equipped as they were with thorough knowledge of product development, 
production and marketing, they had the capability to conduct most core value chain 
functions in-house (Ohara 2006b). Particularly in the domain of product development 
and manufacturing, capabilities possessed by Japanese motorcycle manufacturers 
extended from the whole vehicle to most individual parts, even those outsourced to 
external suppliers.11 The only exceptions were a limited number of components 
requiring specialised product and production technologies that the motorcycle 
                                                        
10 In 1981, production volumes of Honda, Yamaha, Suzuki and Kawasaki in Japan were 2.9, 2.5, 1.5 
and 0.5 million units, respectively (Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 1996). 
11 As Japanese manufacturers imitated European motorcycle designs in the early years of their 
development, they sought to absorb both the overall product design and individual component 
technologies (Otahara and Sugiyama 2005).  
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                  and marketing
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23 
 
 
 
manufacturers did not possess, for example, clutches, carburettors, and tyres (Otahara 
2006). 
Moreover, the intrinsic core of the capability possessed by Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers was not confined to capability to conduct individual functions along the 
motorcycle value chain; even more important was their capability to integrate various 
value chain functions from product development to manufacturing and marketing. 
Indeed, effective use of market information for coordinated improvement in product and 
process engineering acted as an important channel for Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers to achieve incremental innovations that helped them to realise high 
quality, better manufacturability, and improved productivity.12  
The sophisticated capabilities possessed by Japanese motorcycle manufacturers meant 
that a relatively narrow range of tasks had to be outsourced. Value chains included two 
types of supplier with different capability requirements. At the heart of this supply 
network were suppliers that had acquired proprietary component technologies that lead 
firms did not possess. As discussed above, lead firms’ control over much of the 
component technology meant that such suppliers were extremely limited. These 
suppliers collaborated closely with the lead firm in the process of product development 
by undertaking detailed design of core components (Otahara 2006). The remaining 
suppliers, which were in the majority, were in the peripheral position of providers of 
non-core components. These firms were expected to provide external manufacturing 
capacity rather than complementary competencies, that is, the manufacture of 
                                                        
12 Ohara (2006d). Also corroborated by lecture by a former engineer of Honda Motor Co., Ltd. for 
the Asian Motorcycle Industry research project organised by the Institute of Developing Economies, 
6 August 2004.  
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components in accordance with drawings developed and supplied by a lead firm.13  
Most suppliers were closely aligned to one of the four major motorcycle 
manufacturers.14 Suppliers of core components in particular developed capital and 
personnel ties with manufacturers and constituted key members of their corporate 
groups referred to as keiretsu.15 Japanese motorcycle manufactures, with the exception 
of Kawasaki, also established supplier associations (kyoryokukai). For example, Honda 
developed supplier associations in two locations where its motorcycle factories were 
located.16 By organising suppliers located in these areas, including those of non-core 
components, Honda provided technical and managerial guidance in order to bring their 
competence up to the required levels (Otahara 2007).  
In short, the industry adopted a highly concentrated structure, with lead firms 
dominating core capabilities.   
3.3 Captive Governance 
The need for suppliers dedicated to providing a stable supply of large quantities of 
high-quality, customised components, combined with asymmetrical alignment of 
capabilities, resulted in captive governance. Under this form of organisation, the lead 
firm practiced a high degree of control and intervention over smaller and dependent 
                                                        
13 In the early years of its motorcycle operations, Honda was known for its dependence on in-house 
manufacturing of components as this tended to be more efficient than outsourcing to external 
suppliers (Otahara 2000b). As the company expanded production in Japan and overseas, it developed 
its supplier networks and expanded outsourcing. As of the 2000s, Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers outsourced 80% of components in terms of cost (Otahara 2006).  
14 There were also independent suppliers not affiliated to specific motorcycle manufacturers (Ohara 
2006b).  
15 For example, the Honda Group consisted of 57 member companies, including 23 component 
suppliers, sales firms, engineering firms, and a research and development (R&D) unit (IRC 2009).  
16 Interestingly, Honda is known for not having established a supplier association for its car business 
(Sako 1996); however, the company has two supplier associations in respect of motorcycle 
production: Yurin-kai in Kumamoto and Satsuki-kai in Hamamatsu (IRC 2009). 
25 
 
 
 
suppliers in order to encourage them to develop lead firm-specific competencies.  
For the suppliers’ part, entering into Japanese chain meant guaranteed long-term 
business. Suppliers could expect large orders over the long term because, once 
cemented, lead firm–supplier relations were maintained indefinitely other than in truly 
exceptional circumstances.17 Where supplier capabilities fell short of the required 
levels, lead firms provided various forms of assistance to bring them up to standard. 
This was particularly necessary in the early stages of industrial development when lead 
firms faced a shortage of suppliers with the ability to meet their requirements (Hashino 
2007).  
Lead firms also provided enabling conditions for suppliers by mitigating and absorbing 
the risks of customer-specific investment associated with designing and manufacturing 
customised components. Such risk was mitigated as competencies possessed by lead 
firms significantly reduced the failure rate of new product development projects (Ohara 
2004a). Risks were also absorbed because lead firms fully or partially bore the cost of 
customer-specific investment in developing prototypes, and manufacturing dies and 
moulds (Ohara 2001). 
The other side of the coin, however, was that suppliers were virtually locked into 
relations with particular customers and were under pressure to reach the goals and 
specifications set by lead firms. The lead firm typically informed suppliers of its 
business plans, as well as detailed instructions and specifications based on its own 
idiosyncratic product and process standards. Suppliers were even advised of the lead 
firm’s future product strategy at an early stage (Ohara 2001). Accordingly, suppliers 
were expected to invest in locations, machinery and human resources specific to their 
                                                        
17 As corroborated by data provided by Otahara (2006). 
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customer’s requirements; devote most of their resources and efforts to achieve goals and 
fulfil plans set by the former; and submit to close monitoring of their performance 
against lead firm requirements.  
Suppliers were also required to disclose detailed information to lead firms on their 
internal operations, extending to detailed cost data as the basis for joint problem-solving 
exercises in the quest for possible ways of reducing costs at source (Ohara 2001, 
2004a).18 Gains made from such joint efforts were in principle divided between the lead 
firm and the supplier in accordance with the rules of reasonable profit sharing (Ohara 
2001), as was the case in the Japanese car industry (Nishiguchi and Brookfield 1997). 
However, in effect, suppliers ceded their autonomy to independently negotiate the 
proportion of rent that had accrued from their own incremental process innovation, and 
sacrificed their ability to search for new customers. 
Over time, suppliers developed the narrow range of manufacturing capabilities 
necessary to process the components in accordance with lead firm specifications and 
requirements (Otahara 2006). Where suppliers acquired complementary competencies 
in component technology that the lead firm had to depend on, they began to collaborate 
closely with their customers in the development of new product designs. In such cases, 
lead firm–supplier relationships exhibited features of relational governance, that is, 
intense two-way information flow. Yet, the lead firm’s control over product and 
production technology in this industry meant that such instances were extremely rare; 
even in comparison with the country’s car industry (Otahara 2006) – a classic example 
of captive organisation (Sturgeon et al. 2008). The majority of the suppliers were in 
                                                        
18 These initiatives are often referred to as value analysis (VA) and value engineering (VE).  
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subordinate positions as suppliers of non-core components.19  
The captive model of industrial organisation was indeed one of the key factors behind 
the success of Japanese motorcycle manufacturers in launching proprietary models and 
manufacturing them to high standards. The model served Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers well in their attempts to conquer the world market – but only until the 
early 1990s; by then, they faced new challenges arising in the developing world (Ohara 
2006b). The details of these challenges and the subsequent trajectories of organisational 
change are discussed in detail in Section 5.  
4. The Market-based Chinese Model 
In the Chinese motorcycle industry, there has emerged a form of industrial organisation 
strikingly different from the conventional Japanese model discussed in the previous 
section. The present section conceptualises the Chinese model as it emerged in the 
1990s – the industry’s initial fast-growth phase. While the Chinese motorcycle industry 
consists of diverse players who cater for different sections of a huge market, the focus is 
on large indigenous manufacturers,20 both state-owned and private, which, at the end of 
the 1990s, accounted for roughly 60-70% of the market (Ohara 2006a: 27).  
                                                        
19 According to the survey of motorcycle component manufacturers in Hamamatsu – one of Japan’s 
two main centres of motorcycle production along with Kumamoto – conducted jointly by 
Hamamatsu Credit Association and the Research Institute for Shinkin Central Bank in 2003, 68.1% 
of the 119 respondents considered their bargaining power vis-à-vis their largest customers to be 
weak (Otahara 2006: 112).  
20 According to Ohara (2004a), these firms correspond to the second of the three categories of 
motorcycle manufacturer in China. The first consists of foreign-invested manufacturers that produce 
expensive proprietary models; and the third comprises indigenous small-size manufacturers that 
focus almost exclusively on assembling low-priced copies of foreign models by externally sourcing 
standardised components. Ohara (2004a: 27) notes that over time, the patterns of competition 
observed among motorcycle manufacturers in the first and third categories have tended to converge 
towards those that are evident among manufacturers in the second category.  
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4.1 Low-Quality and De Facto Standardisation 
As the discussion in the previous section demonstrated, a centralised form of industrial 
organisation long persisted in the Japanese motorcycle industry primarily because of 
integral product architecture. The Chinese succeeded in developing a new organisational 
model precisely because they succeeded in breaking such a constraint. However, this 
process did not follow the common route of industry standards being established by 
dominant firms or international organisations (Gereffi et al 2005; Galvin and Morkel 
2001). As will be explained in detail below, de facto standards of component 
compatibility emerged in the Chinese motorcycle industry endogenously as a result of 
uncoordinated actions by numerous firms within the sector.  
Unlike manufacturers’ proprietary models that prevailed in the Japanese motorcycle 
industry, those produced by Chinese companies in the 1990s were mainly low-quality 
and low-priced copies, or slightly modified imitations of a limited number of popular 
Japanese models. The designs of roughly a dozen of the latter, which had been 
introduced into a number of Chinese state-owned motorcycle manufacturers under 
technological licensing agreements in the 1980s, were widely shared and replicated by 
numerous newly emerging private manufacturers by the 1990s (Ohara 2001; Ge and 
Fujimoto 2004). Among such Japanese models, the most popular was again Honda’s 
highly renowned Super Cub, this and several other models becoming de facto standards 
in the Chinese industry. While the number of models registered with the Chinese 
authorities increased rapidly, reaching 18,000 by the end of 2000 (Ohara 2005b: 58), 
those marketed under either Chinese or imitated Japanese brands were mainly copies of 
a dozen most popular Japanese models, sometimes incorporating minor functional 
and/or cosmetic modifications. 
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Clearly, de facto standardisation of this sort occurred due to demand-side conditions 
specific to the Chinese market. First, it took place under weak protection of intellectual 
property rights (Ohara 2006a). Second, Chinese consumers prioritised low prices over 
quality.21 The fact that the Chinese authorities prohibited the use of motorcycles in 
large cities and on highways (ibid.) further reinforced this tendency.  
De facto standardisation and low quality requirements brought about corresponding 
changes in the nature of innovations, which were now limited in both degree and scope. 
As duplicative imitation of Japanese models became widespread, product development 
and marketing – which formed the intrinsic core of lead firm activity in the Japanese 
motorcycle industry – assumed little significance. In terms of product development, 
Chinese lead firms did not generally opt for the kind of whole product system renewal 
that had occurred in the Japanese motorcycle industry. Although many of the large 
manufacturers did engage in modifications to Japanese base models, these tended to be 
minor, usually consisting of changes in only one or two components or varying 
combinations of existing components (Ohara 2004a: 49). It also made little sense for 
firms to engage in extensive marketing or branding activities for products that were 
essentially imitations. In the domain of production, the low expectations of Chinese 
consumers meant that lead firms faced limited pressure to engage in quality 
improvement.  
The above changes in the nature of innovation substantially reduced the need for 
explicit coordination between the lead firm and its suppliers, although – as will be 
argued below – the need for coordination was not eliminated completely. Lead firm 
requirements on suppliers focussed predominantly on low prices; and because products 
                                                        
21 Ohara (2004a: 67) notes that many consumers in China do not care as long as motorcycles run. 
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basically followed de facto standard designs, limited fine-tuning between component 
specifications was called for. The lead firm and its suppliers could therefore engage in 
motorcycle assembly and component manufacturing respectively largely (but, as we 
shall, see not completely) without intense interaction. 
It should be noted that de facto standardisation must be distinguished from 
modularisation, their apparent similarity notwithstanding.22 Since the Chinese did not 
change the design architecture of motorcycles, full compatibility of components could 
only be guaranteed insofar as they were manufactured precisely in accordance with the 
original drawings of the Japanese base models. However, this has not been the case: as 
will be discussed in depth in Section 4.3, uncoordinated duplicative imitation in China 
has frequently produced components that are not strictly compatible. De facto 
standardisation in the absence of a shift in design architecture therefore needs to be 
differentiated from product modularity, which ensures full compatibility between the 
component modules comprising the product.  
4.2 Wide Distribution of Basic Manufacturing and Reverse Engineering 
Capabilities 
Up to the early 1990s, the Chinese motorcycle industry was dominated by a small 
number of large state-owned manufacturers such as Jialing and Qingqi, which until then 
had been consistently ranked as the largest in the country (Ohara 2006a). After the 
launching of market-oriented economic reforms in China in 1979, these state-owned 
manufacturers shifted their production from military armaments to motorcycles with the 
introduction of Japanese technology under formalised licensing agreements (ibid.). 
                                                        
22 The apparent resemblance has led several authors to describe on-going practices in the Chinese 
motorcycle industry as modular production (Matsuoka 2002; Pham Truong Hoang 2007). See Paper 
II for detailed discussion on this issue. 
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They subsequently laid the foundations of the industry by developing integrated 
production systems and supply networks, and training a large pool of engineers and 
managers (ibid.). 
De facto standardisation radically transformed the landscape of the Chinese motorcycle 
industry by significantly lowering the entry barrier for both manufacturers and suppliers. 
Instead of playing the role of integrators of various value chain functions (as was the 
case with their Japanese counterparts) lead firms could now purchase and assemble 
standard components readily available on the market. This meant that the minimum 
requirement of them was the capacity to assemble components. Likewise, suppliers no 
longer had to invest in equipment, human resources, or skills specific to individual 
customers; in order to operate as a motorcycle component supplier, simple reverse 
engineering capabilities in terms of reproducing existing components and routine 
manufacturing now sufficed.  
As a result of the engagement of a large number of companies – including many private 
firms that had hitherto operated in unrelated fields – in assembly and component 
production, the structure of the Chinese motorcycle industry became highly fragmented. 
The number of motorcycle manufacturers increased in the 1980s and 1990s, reaching 
140 in 1997 (Ohara 2001: 7). In 1999, the market shares of the largest 10 and 20 
manufacturers were 53.1% and 68.0% respectively (ibid.). The industrial structure was 
also fluid, as demonstrated by recurrent changes in the names of top companies (Ohara 
2006c). Jialing saw its market share decline throughout the 1990s until it accounted for 
only 6.7% of the total number of motorcycles produced in China in 2001 (Ohara 2004a). 
Meanwhile, newly emerging manufacturers rapidly expanded their production. From the 
mid-1990 onwards, numerous private firms also entered into the manufacturing of 
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motorcycle components, absorbing a large number of engineers, technicians and 
managers who had previously worked for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in mechanical, 
steel or chemical industries (Ohara 2004b). 
However, both motorcycle manufacturers and suppliers only possessed basic levels of 
technological capability. Many of the newly emerging private motorcycle manufacturers 
in particular had limited knowledge of overall product systems or individual component 
technology, and thus started operations by purchasing and assembling components 
available in the market (Ohara 2004b). For example, Zongshen, one of the three major 
private local motorcycle manufacturers based in the southwestern city of Chongqing – 
the main centre of motorcycle production in China, was established in 1992 by a 
ceramic engineer (ibid.).  
Whereas large state-owned motorcycle manufacturers had opted to develop supply 
networks of their own in the 1980s, lead firms and suppliers grew increasingly 
independent of each other in the 1990s, a tendency that led to the emergence of 
dispersed supply networks, meaning that suppliers were no longer tied to particular lead 
firms (Figure I-4). Ohara’s (2001: 17) interviews with eighteen suppliers of core 
components to the three major motorcycle manufacturers at the end of 1990s found that 
suppliers on average traded with 14.9 customers; and the largest customer on average 
accounted for just 40.5% of the sales of suppliers’ main products.23 Lead firms were not 
dependent on particular suppliers either, manufacturers normally maintaining multiple – 
usually three or more – suppliers of each type of component (Ohara 2001: 18). 
  
                                                        
23 Since this figure only represents suppliers’ main products, their overall dependence on the main 
customer was most probably much lower.  
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Figure I-4. Dispersed Organisational Model in the Chinese Motorcycle Industry 
 
Source: The author, with reference to Ohara (2001, 2006c).   
 
4.3 Arm’s-Length Transactions Mediated by Market Forces 
De facto standardisation and low quality requirements combined with the wide 
distribution of basic reverse engineering and manufacturing capabilities led Chinese 
motorcycle manufacturers to make extensive use of market forces in doing business 
with their suppliers. Many lead firms as well as suppliers engaged in arm’s-length 
transactions characterised by intense competition, frequent switching of partners on the 
basis of price, and low levels of explicit coordination. Specific patterns of transactional 
governance, however, varied according to the type of transaction. In this subsection, we 
examine how transactional governance worked in practice. 
Let us start with the simplest case, namely, instances in which Chinese firms simply 
replicated existing Japanese models. While such practice was typically seen among 
small- and medium-size manufacturers, large manufacturers often adopted this approach 
for a certain range of their products (Ohara 2005b). In these instances, de facto 
standardisation virtually eliminated the need for explicit coordination. Suppliers 
engaged in duplicative imitation of components independently of the manufacturer, who, 
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in turn, purchased standard components readily available on the market. The resulting 
pattern of transactional governance assumed an arm’s-length form in which many lead 
firms and suppliers competed intensely on the basis of price.  
However, as discussed in Section 4.1, de facto standardisation did not completely 
eliminate the need for lead firm–supplier coordination. The fact that integral design 
architecture was maintained meant that full compatibility of components could only be 
ensured insofar as they were manufactured precisely in accordance with the original 
drawings of the dominant models, which was frequently not the case. Since suppliers 
adopted different measuring methods and varying degrees of precision in reproducing 
design drawings of components available on the market, repeated duplicative imitation 
of a given dominant model often gave rise to components that were not compatible with 
each other (Ge and Fujimoto 2004). Non-compatibility problems were typically 
addressed in an ad hoc manner by making ex post adjustments (ibid.). Even such 
adjustments did not render components strictly compatible but was sufficient to make 
them assemblable. This means that Chinese firms compromised on product quality for 
the sake of reducing the need for explicit inter-firm coordination. 
Let us proceed to cases in which modifications were made to Japanese models – a 
practice typically observed among larger Chinese motorcycle manufacturers. Where 
changes were made to parts that functionally interact little with other components (such 
as plastic covers, tyres, speedometers, and shock absorbers), the story was essentially 
the same as the instances of duplicative imitation referred to above. Since the absence of 
coordination between adjacent components did not substantially affect the overall 
performance of a product, arm’s-length transaction with little explicit coordination 
prevailed, although ad hoc ex post adjustments were often necessary. Suppliers prepared 
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modified designs independent of their customers, intentionally keeping the interface 
with other components standardised so that they could be sold to a large number of 
unspecified customers (Sugiyama and Otahara 2002). In turn, manufacturers sought to 
purchase and assemble varieties of components that were available on the market 
instead of generating own-product concepts and basic product design (Otahara and 
Sugiyama 2005). 
Where modifications were made to core functional components that required 
coordination with related parts in order to yield superior product performance (e.g. 
engine components, carburettors, and silencers), the story was more complicated. In 
theory, such transactions required a flow of tacit information to facilitate fine-tuning 
between components as well as reconciliation of competing incentives to overcome the 
risks of customer-specific investment (Williamson 1979). However, in practice, the 
realities of market conditions in China, the limited capabilities of lead firms, and the 
lack of safeguards against the risks of opportunism prevented both lead firms and 
suppliers from committing themselves to the development of non-standard designs that 
adopted customised components.  
On the one hand, in a market where few consumers were willing to pay a high premium 
for sophisticated designs, consumer demand changed rapidly, and intellectual property 
rights were only weakly protected, lead firms investing in non-standard designs faced 
substantial risks. Instead of mitigating and absorbing the risks of model-specific 
investments, as had been the case with Japanese motorcycle manufacturers, they 
switched the risks to their suppliers by outsourcing the design and manufacture of 
mutually interacting components to more than one supplier without making a 
commitment to bear the cost of developing prototypes or investing in dies and moulds 
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(Ohara 2001).  
On the other hand, suppliers receiving orders for developing modified component 
designs faced the following two types of risk (Ohara 2001, 2004a). One was the 
possibility that the new product development project would fail (e.g. if it was terminated 
before the new model was launched, or if it was launched but production fell short of 
the minimum efficient scale). Given the volatile nature of the Chinese market and the 
weak sales capabilities of motorcycle manufacturers, such risks were substantial.24 The 
other type of risk to suppliers concerned the possibility that the manufacturer might 
adopt a competitor’s component design, a real possibility insofar as many lead firms 
engaged in the multiple sourcing of components (Ohara 2001).  
Faced with considerable risks, suppliers naturally avoided making customer-specific 
investment wherever possible. Instead of investing in customised dies and moulds, they 
often sought to utilise existing equipment to develop prototypes for modified 
component designs (Ohara 2001). While this served as a safeguard against the risks of 
non-purchase by the lead firm, the scope of the adjustments that could be made to 
existing component designs became increasingly limited.  
Suppliers also intentionally kept the shapes of interfaces between components 
standardised so that they would at least be assembled together with other standard 
components on the market (Ohara 2004a). This was intended to ensure that suppliers 
would be able to find alternative customers in cases of non-purchase, even if such usage 
failed to maximise overall product performance. Overall, even in terms of mutually 
                                                        
24 According to Ohara’s (2004a) interviews with 17 Chinese suppliers, 12 admitted that they faced 
substantial risk concerning the possible failure of product development projects. One of them 
described that only about two of the ten product development assignments it had secured from 
manufacturers had succeeded and generated profits while the remaining eight had failed. 
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interacting components, the degree of coordination remained generally limited and 
component designs were not necessarily bespoke to specific customers.  
In summary, arm’s-length, adversarial transactional relations largely mediated by market 
forces came to the aid of the Chinese motorcycle industry in its realisation of 
remarkable levels of price-based competitiveness. The organisational model, however, 
reached a turning point in the 2000s. Its background and ensuing transformation are 
discussed in the next section.  
5. Comparison of Models and Trajectories 
This section compares the two models presented in sections 3 and 4 respectively, and 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses as well as trajectories of change of each.   
5.1 Comparison of the Two Models  
Table I-2 compares the two organisational models. Under the conventional Japanese 
model, the lead firm engaged in centralised control and extensive intervention in 
governing its relationships with dependent suppliers. In turn, the suppliers were 
expected to endeavour to achieve the targets set, often by ceding autonomy.  
The strength of the Japanese organisational model lay in its capacity to develop 
proprietary products and manufacture them to a high quality standard. In the domain of 
product development, intense interaction involving extensive information sharing with a 
limited number of core component suppliers enabled the lead firm to develop 
proprietary models that were internally and externally coherent (Clark and Fujimoto 
1990). In terms of manufacture, the combination of tight control and generous 
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assistance practiced by powerful lead firms helped to extract superior productive 
performance from suppliers that were specialised in narrow manufacturing tasks. 
High-grade supplier performance in manufacturing (and design, for suppliers of core 
components) helped lead firms to launch proprietary models and manufacture them to 
high standards – a key source of their competitiveness. 
Table I-2. Comparison of Japanese and Chinese Models 
Feature Japanese  Chinese  
Nature of product/ 
process parameters Non-standard and complex Simple 
Product standards Idiosyncratic: determined by the lead firm 
Endogenously emergent as a result 
of de facto standardisation 
Overall industrial 
structure Concentrated and stable Dispersed and fluid 
Capability distribution Monopolised by the lead firm Basic capabilities widely distributed 
Degree and mechanism 
of coordination 
High: based on lead firm control 
and assistance Low: based on market forces 
Advantages 
High quality and incremental cost 
reduction 
Proprietary product designs with 
high levels of novelty 
Low prices 
Flexibility and speed in launching 
new products 
Disadvantages Rigidity (possible high costs) Long product development cycle Difficulty in product differentiation  
Source: The author.  
However, the Japanese model also suffered from inherent weaknesses. High quality 
often came at the expense of high costs, as long-term transactions tended to create 
rigidity in lead firm–supplier relationships.25 Even though incremental cost reduction 
via process improvement was an integral element of lead firm requirements of suppliers, 
limited competition between them and the high priority attached to quality standards 
meant that radical price reduction was not possible. This was particularly evident in the 
                                                        
25 According to a survey of motorcycle component manufacturers in Hamamatsu in 2003 (see 
footnote 19 for details), 52.5% of the 122 respondents had traded with their largest customers since 
establishment and another 44.4% had traded with their largest customers for a considerable length of 
time (Otahara 2006: 112).  
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case of keiretsu suppliers of core components, whereby manufacturers had close 
relations with suppliers via capital and personnel ties.  
The regular renewal of the whole vehicle – the Japanese approach to product 
development – also resulted in extended product development cycles and limited 
flexibility. As of the end of the 1990s to the early 2000s, it generally took a year for 
Japanese motorcycle manufacturers to develop new models and the development cycles 
were virtually fixed (Ohara 2001). While the Japanese policy of launching a limited 
number of highly sophisticated models generally worked well in a mature, less volatile 
market, its inability to promptly and flexibly make adjustments to product designs 
inhibited the adaptation of this model to a growing, volatile Chinese market in which 
consumer demand was in a constant state of rapid change.  
Above all, the strength of the arm’s-length model of Chinese industrial organisation lay 
in its capacity to achieve low prices. Low entry barriers for both manufacturers and 
suppliers assisted by de facto standardisation enabled a large number of firms to enter 
into production of motorcycles and components, spurring intense competition. The 
benefits of the arm’s-length model also extended to its speed in launching new models, 
typically ranging between two to three months as of the end of the 1990s (Ohara 2001). 
De facto standardisation of Japanese base models enabled independent suppliers to 
concentrate on design modifications and manufacturing without having to get locked 
into relations or interact intensely with specific customers. In turn, lead firms could 
experiment flexibly with different minor improvements by purchasing and assembling 
various components available in the market.  
However, the Chinese model suffered from limited capacity to achieve differentiation in 
product design and quality, the use of standard components resulting in a proliferation 
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of largely homogeneous products. To the extent that integral product architecture was 
maintained, repeated duplicative imitation adopting different measuring methods and 
varying degree of precision in reproducing design drawings of the Japanese models 
available in the market meant making compromises in respect of component 
compatibility and precision, while the ad hoc approach to dealing with 
non-compatibility problems only provided partial solutions. At the same time, given 
intense price-based competition and the difficulty of devising measures for monitoring 
product quality, suppliers had little incentive to improve product quality.  
5.2 Trajectories of Change 
While the discussion so far has focussed on the two organisational models in their 
conventional forms, the ways in which they were implemented evolved over time. This 
subsection considers trajectories of change, focussing on recent developments in the 
respective models.  
The two models generally converged in the 2000s, yet fundamental differences still 
remain. In terms of the Japanese system, changes occurred in the degree to which lead 
firms and suppliers were tied into particular relations. During the emergence of 
Japanese supply networks in the 1960s through to the mid-1990s, this organisational 
model was characterised by high levels of lead firm–supplier dependence. Because they 
required competent suppliers, lead firms explicitly sought to develop exclusive ties with 
them by organising supplier associations and providing technical, financial and 
managerial assistance to nurture small, less competent suppliers (Ohtahara 2007; 
Hashino 2007). As supplier competence increased over time, lead firm assistance 
gradually diminished. However, up to the 1990s, lead firms maintained tightly 
organised value chains with exclusive membership, and suppliers became increasingly 
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dependent on large, regular orders placed by their main customers (Otahara 2007).  
The Japanese model encountered a turning point around the end of the 1990s. The 
impetus for change came from a sharp decline in motorcycle production in Japan from 
over 7 million units in the early 1980s to 2.3 million – a level at which manufacturers 
found it difficult to place orders that were sufficiently large to sustain their suppliers26 – 
in 1999 (Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 1986, 2006). The declining production in Japan 
compelled Japanese motorcycle manufacturers to adjust their sourcing practices. For 
example, Honda started encouraging its suppliers to diversify their customer bases and 
become independent.27 While such a strategy was not intended to dismantle 
long-established supplier relations altogether, Honda started to expose incumbent 
suppliers to market forces by partially sourcing components from non-keiretsu suppliers 
in Japan as well as firms based in Southeast Asia.28  
As a result of these changes, tightly integrated networks started to dissipate. However, 
not all actors experienced these developments evenly. Lead firms sounded out new 
suppliers beyond their long-established networks, and this meant that the suppliers – 
even those with capital ties with lead firms – faced intense competition and pressure to 
reduce costs.29 The only exceptions were those equipped with proprietary component 
technologies for which substitutes were difficult to find.30 On the other hand, the 
progress of customer diversification among suppliers remained relatively modest. As of 
                                                        
26 1999 was the first year when the domestic production of Honda, the largest among the four 
Japanese motorcycle manufacturers, fell below one million to 846,000 units (Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 
2006).  
27 Interviews with Honda suppliers JJ2 #1 and JJ3 #1.  
28 Interviews with Honda suppliers JJ2 #1 and JJ3 #1. Lecler (1999) and Ahmadjian and Lincoln 
(2001) discuss similar changes in Japanese electronics and car manufacturers. 
29 In spite of enjoying capital relations with Honda, JJ2 and JJ3 faced much stiffer competition as 
they only possessed competencies that could be easily sourced (interviews with Honda suppliers JJ2 
#1 and JJ3 #1). 
30 JJ1 possessed complementary product technologies and continued to receive 100% of Honda’s 
orders (interview #1).  
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2003, 47.3% of 414 Japanese motorcycle component suppliers traded with only one 
manufacturer, whilst 15.5%, 12.8% and 24.4% traded with two, three and four 
manufacturers respectively (Otahara 2005: 21). Again, suppliers of core components 
having proprietary technology are in a relatively better position to explore new 
customers beyond their main clients.31   
Meanwhile, the Chinese model also met with a significant turning point in the early 
2000s. Again, the impetus for transformation came from changes in market demand, 
consumers beginning to seek out higher-quality motorcycles (Ohara 2006a, 2006c). The 
government also implemented stringent quality and environmental standards, and 
cracked down on the infringement of intellectual property rights (ibid.). As a result, the 
sales of low-quality but otherwise faithful copies of Japanese models seriously 
stagnated, and the Chinese market came to be dominated by better-quality products that 
incorporated more sophisticated functional and/or cosmetic modifications to Japanese 
base models, a trend that called for a higher degree of lead firm–supplier coordination 
(ibid.).  
Corresponding changes occurred in industrial structure and organisation. In contrast to 
the dispersed industrial structure of the 1990s, the industry was consolidated in the 
2000s under a smaller number of relatively large motorcycle manufacturers with the 
capacity to engage in research and development (R&D) for design modifications, and 
the manufacturing capability to achieve better product quality. The market data show 
limited changes in the names of the top companies between 2001 and 200532 (Ohara 
2006c).  
                                                        
31 According to the author’s calculation based on IRC (2009), as many as 17 of 42 suppliers 
(equivalent of 40% – substantially higher than the average ratio noted in the text) having direct 
capital relations with Honda traded with all of the four Japanese motorcycle manufacturers. JJ1 was 
a typical example of such suppliers (interview #1).   
32 These include Grand River, Lifan, Loncin, Zongshen and Sudiro Honda (Ohara 2006c).  
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As market requirements came to necessitate a higher level of coordination around 
product and/or process parameters, industrial organisation also started to shift away 
from the arm’s-length pattern towards one characterised by higher levels of lead firm 
coordination. Ohara’s (2006c) surveys from 2001 to 2004 confirm some signs that lead 
firm–supplier relations became characterised by closer interaction and mutual 
dependence. For example, transactions between major lead firms and their suppliers 
stabilised, with fewer instances of switching partners, and the former started to partially 
or wholly bear the cost of model-specific investment in dies and moulds. However, the 
same study suggests the limits of such transformation. Multiple sourcing persisted, 
albeit among a smaller number of suppliers; lead firms and suppliers engaged in limited 
systematic sharing of information; and lead firms still lacked the will and capacity to 
provide technical assistance to their suppliers (ibid.). This suggests that transactions 
continued to be mediated to a considerable extent by market forces.  
In summary, both Japanese and Chinese models underwent important transformations in 
the 2000s, primarily in response to changing market and competitive environments. 
However, fundamental differences between the two models remained to a considerable 
extent, as organisational transformation was constrained by the existing alignment of 
capabilities in each country. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper set out to enquire into the form of industrial organisation that enabled 
Chinese motorcycle manufacturers to challenge the dominance of Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers which had remained intact for nearly four decades. The above discussion 
has demonstrated that Chinese manufacturers did indeed develop a distinctive form of 
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industrial organisation that enabled them to attain types of competitiveness strikingly 
different from those of the Japanese industry leaders. Up to the early 1990s, the 
conventional Japanese model of industrial organisation proved resilient in serving the 
mature and sophisticated motorcycle markets of the developed world. Given intricate 
relations between the overall vehicle and components typical of products with integral 
architecture, a high degree of explicit coordination was required by lead firms to 
achieve incremental product and process improvements (Ohara 2006d). 
In contrast, the strength of the Chinese model lay in its capacity to achieve low prices, 
flexibility, and speed of adjustment. This paper has explained the emergence of 
arm’s-length linkages in the Chinese motorcycle industry in terms of two variables. The 
first was de facto standardisation of popular Japanese models, which progressed through 
endogenous, uncoordinated moves on the part of numerous assemblers and suppliers. 
Notably, this allowed dispersed, arm’s-length linkages to emerge even in the absence of 
changes to the integral design architecture.  
The second was the wide distribution of basic reverse engineering and manufacturing 
capabilities that had accumulated during the long history of industrial development in 
China. With its strength in the production of large quantities of low-priced imitations of 
popular Japanese models, the arm’s-length organisational model enabled Chinese 
motorcycle manufacturers to capture the lion’s share of the huge yet volatile domestic 
market, in which consumers prioritised low prices and where intellectual property rights 
were only weakly protected.  
By drawing on the emerging body of empirical research into the Chinese motorcycle 
industry, this paper has taken a first important step in conceptualising the distinctive 
form of industrial organisation emerging in China in explicit comparison with the 
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Japanese model. However, further research is necessary to explore the relevance of the 
model to other industries and settings. First, there is the question of whether such a 
model is specific to the motorcycle industry or whether it may be observed in other 
Chinese industries. The emerging body of research in the field seems to suggest the 
latter may indeed be the case, in showing that arm’s-length linkages between large 
numbers of lead firms and suppliers have prevailed in the mobile telephone handset, 
liquid crystal display (LCD) television, and car industries (Imai and Shiu 2011; 
Shintaku et al. 2009; Marukawa 2007).  
The case of the car industry deserves particular attention because, similar to the 
motorcycle industry, the Chinese approach to the de facto standardisation of existing 
products has given rise to loosely coordinated organisation in an industry in which 
integral product architecture has long acted as a major obstacle to breaking centralised 
organisation within developed country contexts (Sturgeon et al. 2008). The next 
important step in this line of research is to integrate the growing number of 
industry-level case studies to investigate whether there are indeed common Chinese 
patterns across industries. The organisational model conceptualised in this paper could 
well provide an appropriate starting point for such an attempt.  
Second, there is the question of whether the Chinese model can be transferred to 
different contexts. The existing literature shows that the Japanese model has not only 
been transplanted by the country’s lead firms via FDI but has also been emulated and 
adapted by Japan’s competitors (Cusumano and Takeishi 1991; Sako 1992; Helper and 
Sako 1995; Kaplinsky 1995; Posthuma 1995a, 1995b; Harriss 1995; Humphrey et al. 
1998). Whilst there have not been any serious attempts to tackle this question in relation 
to the Chinese model, the analysis in the present paper suggests a number of focal issues 
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for future research in this direction.  
Contrary to the case with the Japanese model, the limited degree of lead firm 
coordination inherent in the Chinese model implies that its transplantation abroad may 
not be driven primarily by the engagement of lead firms in FDI. In fact, the expansion 
of Chinese motorcycle manufacturers to locations outside China has thus far occurred 
mainly in the form of exports without long-term commitment to engage in local 
production (Ohara et al. 2003). This suggests that the possibility of the Chinese model 
being replicated outside the country depends largely on the distribution of basic reverse 
engineering and manufacturing capabilities in host countries, as well as their ability to 
demonstrate the entrepreneurial dynamism necessary to seize new business 
opportunities – both of which are the most striking features of Chinese industrial 
development.  
The most promising candidate for this line of research is probably Vietnam, which 
experienced massive inflows of Chinese motorcycle imports as early as the turn of the 
century (Fujita 2011). Further study is necessary to determine whether the Chinese 
model itself was transferred to Vietnam as a consequence and, if so, what impact this 
had on Vietnam’s industrial development.   
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 PAPER II. THE JAPANESE AND CHINESE MODELS OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANISATION: FIGHTING FOR SUPREMACY IN THE VIETNAMESE 
MOTORCYCLE INDUSTRY 
1. Introduction 
In the 1980s, the Japanese manufacturing industry was at the forefront of research on 
economic development and competitiveness. In an attempt to determine the sources of 
Japanese competitive advantage, researchers examined how the distinctive models of 
intra- and inter-firm organisation – characterised by lean production and trust-based 
supplier relations – contributed to the sustainment of superior product development and 
manufacturing performance (Smitka 1991; Clark and Fujimoto 1990, 1991; Nishiguchi 
1994; Dyer 1996; Fujimoto 1999; Lecler 2004). It is now acknowledged worldwide that 
the hierarchical, captive model of inter-firm organisation consisting of a powerful lead 
firm and closely aligned suppliers helped Japanese manufacturing firms to achieve 
superior product development and productivity performance; thus, establishing leading 
positions on major world markets, where consumers valued high quality, product 
differentiation, and fast product innovation.  
The influence of the Japanese model was not restricted to the domestic market. As 
Japanese firms expanded abroad via FDI, the original model was transferred and 
adapted to different country contexts. As Japanese and local firms engaged in rounds of 
organisational competition and adaptation in the host country environment, various 
hybrid forms of industrial organisation emerged, which resulted in increased 
organisational diversity (Cusumano and Takeishi 1991; Sako 1992; Helper and Sako 
1995; Guiheux and Lecler 2000; Ernst 2002; Sturgeon 2007). The Japanese model was 
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also adopted independently in both developed and developing countries by local 
producers seeking to improve the productivity of their operations (Kaplinsky 1995; 
Posthuma 1995a, 1995b; Harriss 1995; Humphrey et al. 1998). 
Two decades later, the global industrial landscape has changed. As the growth centres of 
the world’s leading manufacturers have shifted to developing countries, Japanese 
manufacturers face major challenges from Chinese firms, which have attained 
overwhelming cost advantages by means of a distinctive form of industrial organisation. 
The existence of a uniquely Chinese model of industrial organisation has not been 
recognised widely. In Paper I, based on the literature and my own analysis, I sought to 
establish the key features of the Chinese model of industrial organisation, which I found 
to be characterised by intense price-based competition between a large number of lead 
firms and suppliers engaged in arm’s-length transactions. Such an organisational model 
has enabled Chinese firms to attain remarkable levels of price-based competitiveness 
that challenge the Japanese industry leaders.   
Paper II investigates the new patterns of rivalry emerging out of the rise of the Chinese 
model of industrial organisation. It does so by examining what happens when the two 
models of industrial organisation, coming from Japan and China respectively, clash in a 
third Asian developing country that seeks to establish its competitive industry. Which 
model is more adaptable to local conditions? Is one superior to the other? Do they exist 
side by side? Does competition open up space for a distinctively different model of 
industrial organisation? How do firm responses vary over time? These are the questions 
that this paper seeks to address. 
Indeed, the aforementioned questions are at the forefront of research on economic 
development and competitiveness. There has long been a discussion on the relevance of 
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models of industrial organisation for the pace and patterns of economic development. 
This line of research asks: how important have models of industrial organisation been in 
their countries of origin; how relevant are they for other countries; can they be 
transferred; and, if so, what adjustments need to be made? These and similar questions 
were raised by a group of researchers in a special issue of World Development in 
1995.33 The overall conclusion reached was that research on industrial organisation 
needs to extend beyond models to analyse the trajectories of diffusion and adaptation 
(Humphrey 1995).  
However, although the importance of analysing trajectories of organisational change is 
widely recognised, this has rarely been done systematically. One of the major obstacles 
in this regard has been the lack of a conceptual device for systematically explaining the 
complex processes of organisational transformation, which are shaped by a myriad of 
factors – technological, strategic, institutional, and social. Nevertheless, recent 
theoretical development in the field of GVC governance perhaps offers a way forward 
(Gereffi et al. 2005).  
The present paper utilises an adapted version of Gereffi et al.’s (2005) framework of 
GVC governance to describe and explain the short- and medium-term dynamics of 
organisational adaptation arising from the clash of Japanese and Chinese models. In so 
doing, it seeks to highlight the challenges and tensions that firms might face in the 
process of organisational transformation, and how such problems could be overcome. 
In examining the clash of the Japanese and Chinese models in a third country context, 
the paper takes the context of Vietnam and examines the case of its motorcycle industry. 
                                                        
33 Special issue on ‘Industrial Organization and Manufacturing Competitiveness in Developing 
Countries’, Vol. 23 No.1. 
50 
 
 
 
The rationale for focussing on this sector is because the motorcycle industry is the one 
in which a direct clash between the two models is most prominent, and Vietnam was the 
first locality outside China in which they clashed head-on and fought for supremacy. It 
is now well known that the massive imports of low-priced Chinese motorcycles into 
Vietnam in the early 2000s had a huge impact on the Japanese industry leaders (Cohen 
2002). What is less well known is that there were repeated rounds of organisational 
adaptation triggered by the emergence of Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers inheriting 
the Chinese organisational model. The ensuing competitive adaptation of both Japanese 
and Chinese organisational models generated enormous industrial dynamism, eventually 
leading this latecomer developing country to emerge in a decade as one of the world’s 
major motorcycle producers.34  
This paper examines how the Japanese and Chinese models were transformed through 
competitive adaptation in Vietnam over a period of a decade. Specifically, it addresses 
the following main research question:    
How has the clash between Japanese and Chinese organisational models affected the 
organisational transformation of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry? 
This research question is explored through an examination of the Vietnamese 
motorcycle industry over the decade following the late 1990s. The focus is on two sets 
of value chains representative of the Japanese and Chinese models of industrial 
organisation respectively. Drawing on data collected at different periods from interviews 
and surveys of lead firms and suppliers, this study engages in an in-depth, longitudinal 
                                                        
34 Production of motorcycles in Vietnam began in 1996 (General Statistics Office 1999). In 2006, 
domestic production and sales recorded 2.1 and 2.4 million units, respectively, making the country 
the world’s fourth largest producer of and market for motorcycles after only China, India and 
Indonesia (General Statistics Office 2009; Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 2008).  
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analysis of how the two sets of value chains were transformed as the respective lead 
firms competed for supremacy in the Vietnamese market.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature, identifies research gaps, and elaborates questions and corresponding 
hypotheses derived from previous research. Section 3 presents the conceptual 
framework. Section 4 discusses the research methodology and operationalises the key 
concepts. Sections 5 and 6 comprise the empirical core of the paper, presenting analyses 
of the dynamic transformation of the Japanese and Chinese models of industrial 
organisation respectively in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry. Section 7 summarises 
the findings of the paper and discusses its contribution to the literature on organisational 
models and trajectories.  
2. Literature Review 
The purpose of this section is to review the existing literature of direct relevance to the 
research question explored in this paper. This covers three main strands of literature: the 
literature on models and trajectories of industrial organisation in general; the literature 
on Japanese and Chinese models of industrial organisation in particular; and the 
emergent literature on the Vietnamese motorcycle industry. Based on gaps identified in 
the course of this review, the section concludes by refining the research question and 
presenting resultant hypotheses.  
2.1 Industrial Organisation: From Models to Trajectories 
The 1980s and 1990s saw a flourish of research on industrial organisation. Spurred by 
the varieties of patterns by which industries were organised – from large and vertically 
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integrated business corporations to clusters of small, networked firms, or hierarchical 
networks consisting of a dominant lead firm and layers of smaller suppliers, researchers 
looked into the origins of different patterns and their implications for economic 
competitiveness (Chandler 1977; Dore 1983; Smitka 1991; Womack et al. 1990; Clark 
and Fujimoto 1991; Sako 1992; Nishiguchi 1994; Piore and Sabel 1984; Langlois and 
Robertson 1995; Sturgeon 2002). Those patterns recognised as particularly successful 
were codified into models of industrial organisation (Humphrey 1995). 
Research did not stop at codifying established practices into models but went on to 
analyse how such models were applied in practice. While a model essentially defines 
the key elements of successful experiences, “the experiences upon which the model is 
constructed continue to change” (Humphrey 1995: 151). Moreover, when models are 
transferred, the contexts in which they operate often differ markedly from those upon 
which the experiences were based.  
The existing body of research has looked into how models evolved over time in the 
country of origin in response to changes in external economic conditions, technological 
change, or competitive pressure (Lecler 1999, 2004; Lamming 2000; McCormick 2004; 
Sturgeon 2007), and how models transferred to different contexts have gone through 
processes of hybridisation, adaptation, or localisation (Cusumano and Takeishi 1991; 
Helper and Sako 1995; Guiheux and Lecler 2000). Very often the result was “neither a 
copy of the original model nor a replica of existing local patterns, but something 
different” (Westney 1999: 387). The varieties of country and industry experiences 
analysed in the literature clearly demonstrate the importance of going beyond models to 
analyse the trajectories of diffusion and adaptation (Humphrey 1995). However, 
although the importance of analysing trajectories is widely acknowledged, this has 
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rarely been done systematically.  
First, few previous studies have illuminated the actual processes by which organisations 
change. What they have done is either to compare the status of an organisation at a 
given point in time in a given setting – often after successful transformation has been 
completed – with the defining features of the original model; or to compare prevailing 
practices among different groups of companies, for example, firms of different 
nationalities located in a certain country or firms of the same nationality but located in 
different countries (Cusumano and Takeishi 1991; Sako 1992; Helper and Sako 1995).  
As a result, the actual processes of organisational diffusion and adaptation, which is 
where insights relevant for firms and policy makers originate (Humphery 1995), remain 
largely underexplored. With what timing and in what sequence do key features of the 
model change? What tensions and challenges do organisations face in the process, and 
how do they overcome them? Very little of the existing literature examines these issues.  
Second, there have been limited attempts to systematically explain why organisations 
evolve in the way they do. On the basis of the existing literature, there seems to be a 
broad consensus that the driver of organisational change typically comes from a lack of 
fit between the elements of organisation and the environment (Westney 1999). The 
problem with such a line of argument is that there has been no incisive debate on what 
precisely is meant by the ‘environment’.  
Existing empirical research mainly refers to the following three dimensions of the 
environment: (1) local market conditions, for example, producer competition and 
consumer preferences (Helper 1991; Lecler 1999, 2004; Humphery 2000; Sturgeon and 
Van Biesebroeck 2010); (2) competence levels and the existence or absence of a local 
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component supply base (Sadler 1994); and (3) institutional factors such as legal and 
regulatory environments, capital markets, employment systems, culture, and social and 
moral norms (Dore 1983; Sako 1992).  
However, given the lack of a systematic attempt to deconstruct the concept of the 
environment into a series of concrete, operational variables, we still do not know which 
factors are most important, how they interact with each other, or how they shape the 
processes of organisational change. Unless these questions are tackled, research can 
hardly be expected to pin down the fundamental factors that trigger (or impede) the 
transformation of industrial organisation. Thus, the mechanisms by which variables 
interact in shaping the processes of organisational transformation remain underexplored.   
The above two research gaps seem to stem at least in part from the lack of an 
appropriate theoretical framework for categorising the various forms of inter-firm 
organisation or explaining the circumstances under which they emerge in terms of a 
series of concrete, operational variables. Recent theoretical development in the field of 
GVC governance has made important contributions in this regard. This paper adopts the 
revised version of the GVC governance framework for conducting systematic analysis 
of trajectories of organisational change.  
2.2 Japanese and Chinese Models of Industrial Organisation in the Motorcycle 
Industry 
In studying industrial organisation, particularly illuminating are the industries in which 
contrasting models of industrial organisation coexist because interactions between 
different models often create new dynamics of organisational transformation.35 With 
                                                        
35 This seems to explain why the car industry, in which contrasting models of industrial organisation 
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the long dominance of the Japanese model and the rise of a new organisational model 
emerging from China, the motorcycle manufacturing sector became an example of such 
industries (Paper I). 
The Japanese model of industrial organisation was developed out of the need to 
effectively achieve incremental product and process improvements in a proprietary 
product. Since motorcycles had an integral product architecture, lead firms took the lead 
in fine-tuning component designs and providing a quality guarantee to their consumers 
for the product system as a whole (Otahara 2009a, 2009b). Accordingly, they adopted a 
combination of centralised control and generous assistance in governing long-term 
relations with a fixed group of suppliers, which were expected to endeavour to achieve 
performance targets set by the lead firms, often by ceding autonomy (Paper I).  
As Japanese manufacturers started to set up overseas production bases from the 1960s 
onwards, the organisational model established in Japan was replicated abroad. Lead 
firms sought to develop long-term relations with local suppliers. Where the local 
component supply base was lacking, this entailed provision of technical assistance to 
the suppliers.36  
Compared to the long-established prominence of the Japanese model, the rise of its 
Chinese counterpart is a recent phenomenon. This model emerged in the early 1990s, 
driven by a large number of indigenous motorcycle manufacturers producing low-priced 
imitations of Japanese models. Contingent on de facto standardisation of a few dozen 
popular Japanese models, large numbers of assemblers and suppliers, both of whom 
were equipped with limited levels of technological competence, engaged in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
have emerged in the US and Japan, has been studied so widely.  
36 This occurred not only in developing countries such as Thailand (Higashi 2006) and Indonesia 
(Thee 1997; Sato 2011) but also in developed countries such as Italy (Horiuchi 1998). 
56 
 
 
 
arm’s-length transactions. With its strength lying in low costs and flexibility, the 
arm’s-length organisational model enabled Chinese motorcycle manufacturers to 
capture the lion’s share of the huge yet volatile domestic market where consumers put 
priority on low prices and intellectual property rights are only weakly protected.  
The above summary of the existing literature suggests that we now know that the 
Japanese model of industrial organisation rose to prominence in the 1980s, and that it 
was transferred to both developed and developing countries – with manufacturers taking 
the lead in nurturing the pool of competent component suppliers demanded by this 
model. We also know that a second discrete model emerged in China. However, we 
know less about what is emerging out of the rivalry between the two models. Which 
model is superior? Which is more adaptable to third-country conditions; especially in 
the developing world, where the bulk of global motorcycle sales are concentrated 
(Fujita 2007)?  
Such an overarching enquiry can be deconstructed into a series of more specific 
questions. In terms of the Japanese model, the key question is whether it can meet the 
Chinese challenge. Whilst the Japanese model has exhibited extraordinary strength in 
catering to sophisticated customers in the developed world, can it be adapted to compete 
with the Chinese model in developing country markets? With regard to the Chinese 
model, there has thus far been no attempt to study whether it can be successfully 
transferred. What changes are required if it is to work in different contexts? This paper 
attempts to answer these questions.   
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2.3 The Dynamics of Organisational Adaptation: The Vietnamese Motorcycle 
Industry 
The Vietnamese motorcycle industry provides an excellent case through which to 
address the research gaps identified above. Vietnam was the first locality – after China 
itself – in which the Japanese and Chinese models clashed head-on. Because Vietnam is 
a new context for both models, neither has an advantage over the other; both must adapt 
to local Vietnamese conditions and fight for supremacy in this emerging market.  
On the basis of the existing research on the Vietnamese motorcycle industry (Fujita 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2011, 2012; Intarakumnerd and Fujita 2008, 2009; Pham Truong 
Hoang and Shusa 2006; Pham Truong Hoang 2007; Nguyen Duc Tiep 2006, 2007; The 
Motorbike Joint Working Group 2007), its development process can be broadly divided 
into three stages (Table II-1). In Stage I (mid-1990s to the end of the decade), only three 
Japanese and one Taiwanese motorcycle manufacturer engaged in domestic production 
of motorcycles. Following the Vietnamese government’s decision to launch an import 
substitution policy to promote the domestic production of motorcycles, Honda, Yamaha, 
Suzuki and Taiwan’s Sanyang established local factories (Fujita 2006). As their 
sophisticated products were priced substantially higher than what ordinary Vietnamese 
consumers could afford, motorcycle sales as a whole stagnated, but Japanese–brand 
motorcycles still accounted for the bulk of the market (Figure II-1). This small, 
protected market hardly attracted any scholarly attention at this stage. 
It was during Stage II (2000–2004) that the Vietnamese motorcycle industry attracted 
wide interest from businesses, researchers, and policymakers in Vietnam and abroad. In 
the early 2000s, massive volumes of low-priced imitations of Japanese-brand 
motorcycles were imported from China – a phenomenon often dubbed the ‘China shock’ 
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(Fujita 2007). Since the Vietnamese government had prohibited the import of assembled 
vehicles, Chinese imports arrived in the form of knockdown component kits that were 
assembled by more than 50 local firms (hereafter referred to as ‘local assemblers’). With 
prices as low as a third to a quarter of foreign-brand models, these imitations quickly 
penetrated the medium- and low-income consumer markets that had hitherto been 
unexploited by Japanese firms. The market expanded four-fold in the late 1990s, and 
local assemblers of Chinese motorcycles commanded roughly 80% of these extended 
sales (Figure II-1).  
Table II-1. Stages of Vietnamese Motorcycle Industrial Development 
Stage 
Market  
(units sold 
per year) 
Policy Foreign Motorcycle Manufacturers 
Local 
Assemblers 
Stage I: 
Start-up phase  
(late 1990s) 
Less than 
500,000 
Import substitution; 
encouraging FDI in 
domestic production. 
Foreign motorcycle 
manufacturers set up 
domestic production 
(Did not exist 
at this stage) 
Stage II: The 
China Shock 
& its 
Repercussions  
(2000-2004) 
Over 2 
million 
(2000–2001); 
reduced to 
1.5 million 
(2002–2004) 
(From 2002 onwards) 
Strengthened enforcement 
of import controls and 
local content rules;  
restrictions on motorcycle 
registration and expansion 
of production capacity by 
foreign manufacturers. 
Lost market shares 
(2000–2001); Honda 
Vietnam launches a 
low- priced model in 
2002, recovering 
market share. 
Emergence of 
more than 50 
local 
assemblers  
Stage III: 
FDI-led 
development  
(2005–2008) 
Over 2.5 
million 
Deregulation (local content 
rules, restrictions on 
motorcycle registration and 
capacity expansion 
abolished) 
Fully recovered 
market share; 
increased FDI in 
component 
manufacturing 
Consolidated 
into a smaller 
number of 
large 
assemblers 
Source: Fujita (2012: 114). 
 
The China shock provoked a series of reactions from incumbent producers and 
policymakers. As Vietnam became a symbol of an expanded Chinese threat that had 
already become apparent in China, Japanese companies initiated company-wide efforts 
to regain market shares. This culminated in the launching of a new, low-priced model by 
Honda Vietnam (HVN) in 2002. The new model, named Wave Alpha and priced at 
approximately one-third of its previous models, quickly gained popularity as the 
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low-quality of Chinese motorcycles had by now become apparent to Vietnamese 
consumers (The Motorbike Joint Working Group 2007).  
Figure II-1. Motorcycle Sales in Vietnam by Manufacturers 
 
Notes:  
(1) VMEP (Vietnam Manufacturing and Export Processing Co., Ltd.) is a 100% invested subsidiary 
of Taiwan’s Sanyang Motors.  
(2) ‘Local assemblers and others’ include imported motorcycles that are not enumerated under 
imported Honda-brand motorcycles (available only until 2005) and foreign-invested motorcycle 
manufacturers that are not independently enumerated (including Lifan Vietnam, a 
Chinese-invested firm). However, the former has amounted to only 45,700 units as of 2005, 
while the latter has accounted for a relatively minor share in the domestic motorcycle market 
(The Motorbike Joint Working Group 2007: 27, 33).  
Source: Fujita (2012: 115).  
The Vietnamese government responded by enacting a series of policy changes to restore 
order and promote the sound development of the industry. However, the uncoordinated, 
sudden, and often arbitrary ways in which policy changes were enacted – frequently 
running contrary to previously announced plans and/or discriminating against foreign 
motorcycle manufacturers (Fujita 2011) – created serious side effects.  
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First, restrictions on the importation and registration of motorcycles were introduced. In 
September 2002, the Vietnamese government suddenly announced that imports of 
motorcycle components for the year should be limited to 1.5 million units (Cohen 2002). 
This was followed by restrictions on motorcycle registration37 and limits on 
investments in expansion of production capacity by foreign motorcycle manufacturers38 
from 2003. Whilst these measures were intended to prevent the uncontrolled 
proliferation of motorcycles on Vietnam’s streets, the consequence was stagnation of the 
overall market growth, with annual sales of motorcycles declining from over 2 million 
in 2002 to less than 1.5 million in 2003–4 (Figure II-1).  
Second, in an attempt to encourage the development of local assemblers into fully 
fledged motorcycle manufacturers, the government stepped up the enforcement of local 
content rules, which hitherto had been circumvented by local assemblers,39 and 
instituted standards for motorcycle manufacturers, with the requirement that a minimum 
of 20% of local content had to be achieved by in-house manufacturing of key 
components.40 
Notably, some of the aforementioned policies were implemented in ways that explicitly 
favoured local assemblers. When the government suddenly introduced quantitative 
restrictions on component imports in September 2002, local assemblers received 
favourable allocation of import quotas, whilst insufficient quota allocation to HVN and 
                                                        
37 Circular 02/2003/TT-BCA by the Ministry of Public Security dated 13 January 2003 limited 
motorcycle registration to one vehicle per person. Decision 98/2003/QD-UB by the Hanoi People’s 
Committee dated 14 August 2003 prohibited new motorcycle registration in four central districts of 
Hanoi.  
38 Prime Minister’s Decision 147/2002/QD-TTg dated 25 October 2002. 
39 The local content rules were originally announced at the end of 1998 for implementation from the 
beginning of 1999 (Decision of the Ministry of Finance 1994/1998/QD-TTg dated 25 December 
1998). Its full implementation was delayed until the beginning of 2001 due to opposition from local 
assemblers (Ishida 2001).   
40 Prime Minister’s Decision No.38/2002/QD-TTg dated 14 March 2002. 
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Yamaha Vietnam (YVN) even drove these companies to temporarily suspend their 
production.41 From 2003 onwards, as noted above, the government restricted foreign 
motorcycle manufacturers from investing in the expansion of production capacity 
beyond the original proposals granted by the Vietnamese authorities upon the issue of 
FDI licences. This turned out to be damaging to foreign motorcycle manufacturers 
because the rapid expansion of the market in the 2000s had not been envisaged in the 
1990s. HVN, in particular, suffered because this policy hampered the company’s 
ambitions to use the Wave Alpha to regain lost market shares.  
A new phase of industrial development (Stage III; 2005–2008) began as the end of the 
policy turbulence brought about rapid, FDI-driven growth. Diminishing academic 
interest in the industry notwithstanding, this was in fact the time in which the most 
dynamic development occurred (Fujita 2011). In 2005, the Vietnamese government 
abandoned restrictions on motorcycle registration42 together with the policy that had 
prevented foreign motorcycle manufacturers from investing in additional production 
capacity.43 As a result, domestic motorcycle sales climbed to 2.8 million units in 2007, 
far exceeding figures during the China shock (Figure II-1).  
Japanese firms chose to satisfy the growing market in Vietnam via FDI for local 
production, following their conventional approach to the localisation of production in 
countries with large demands for their products.44 Accordingly, they actively invested 
                                                        
41 Of the total of 1.5 million motorcycle component imports permitted for the whole year, local 
assemblers were allocated 900,000 units whilst foreign motorcycle manufacturers only received 
600,000 (Cohen 2002).  
42 Circular No. 17/2005/TT-BCA of the Ministry of Public Security dated 21 November 2005 
rescinded legislation limiting motorcycle registration to one vehicle per person and only in the 
locality for which each held household registration. 
43 Official document No. 1854/VPCP-HTQT issued by the Government Office on 11 April 2005. 
44 From its early years, “to explore the world market, to produce where the demand is” has been at 
the core of Honda’s mission (http://www.honda.co.jp/50years-history/009.html, accessed 2 October 
2011). 
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in expansion of production capacity, capturing an increasing share of this fast-growing 
market. In the meantime, local assemblers lost their market share but still held roughly 
one-third of the sales as of 2006 (Figure II-1); surviving by catering to low-income 
consumers in the rural areas where Japanese-brand models had still not penetrated. 
Of the three stages of development, the existing literature on industrial organisation 
focuses almost exclusively on Stage II, the period immediately following the China 
shock. Previous studies have emphasised the major changes that both HVN and local 
assemblers implemented to their sourcing practices immediately after the initial clash. 
Pham Truong Hoang (2007), Mishima (2007), and Otahara (2009a) all argue that HVN 
responded to the China shock by significantly diversifying its component sources to 
include non-Japanese suppliers in Vietnam and even local suppliers in China. Pham 
Truong Hoang (2007) also analyses the manner in which local assemblers responded to 
policies requiring local sourcing and investment in in-house manufacturing of 
components. On the basis of case studies of four assemblers, he argues that they shifted 
away from arm’s-length supply systems towards those based on long-term, trust-based 
relations with suppliers.45 
Nevertheless, the above discussion on the stages of Vietnamese motorcycle industrial 
development suggests that analysing the short-term impact of the China shock may not 
be sufficient for an understanding of the dynamics of the competitive adaptation of the 
two models. First, the existing literature acknowledges that the reactions of HVN and 
local Vietnamese assemblers were devised as emergency measures to cope with the 
                                                        
45 The four case studies nevertheless indicate varieties of ways in which local assemblers responded 
to market and policy challenges: maintaining arm’s-length linkages, vertically integrating component 
manufacturing, and spurring cooperative relationships with suppliers (Pham Truong Hoang 2007). 
However, the author does not discuss which of these patterns is dominant, a shortcoming that is 
probably due to a failure to provide the reasons as to why the four assemblers were selected in the 
first place. In any case, this research did not include the two assemblers that the present study refers 
to as A1 and A3 – firms it found to be increasingly dominant in Stage III.  
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immediate competitive threat (to HVN) and policy requirements (for local assemblers). 
It remains to be seen whether these adaptations prove to be sustainable in the longer 
term.  
Second, the period immediately following the China shock was one of policy turbulence. 
Such a distorted and arbitrary legislative environment hardly enabled firms to 
implement long-term, sustainable adaptations to their sourcing practices. Given that the 
period of turmoil was immediately followed by a more stable phase (Stage III), it is 
essential that an analysis of industrial organisation in the Vietnamese motorcycle 
industry should be extended to cover this period. However, no previous studies have 
done this.  
The temporal aspect of observation also raises the question of what factors cause 
industrial organisation to evolve. Virtually all of the previous studies cited above 
assume, explicitly or implicitly, organisational patterns are determined by that lead 
firms depending on the characteristics of the products they produce – whether design 
architecture, prices, or quality levels. Accordingly, their focus has been exclusively on 
the lead firms, whilst suppliers – the other key actor in the value chains – have been left 
out of the analyses.  
In Japanese chains, it was the need for radical cost reduction that compelled HVN’s 
adjustment to sourcing practices (Mishima 2007; Otahara 2009a). In respect of local 
assemblers, the need to raise product quality and policy requirements eventually led 
some assemblers to invest in in-house production of components and/or to adopt 
long-term, trust-based relations with their suppliers (Pham Truong Hoang 2007). 
Owing to its almost exclusive focus on product characteristics, research has hitherto 
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overlooked the very essence of industrial organisation, that is, power relations between 
firms, which in turn are determined by the nature and levels of capabilities possessed by 
the respective parties (Sturgeon 2008; Palpacuer 2000; Humphrey and Schmitz 2008). A 
lead firm has the capacity to enforce particular types and levels of requirement on 
suppliers. However, such capacity has its limits because some suppliers may acquire 
power as they accumulate new competencies that are difficult to replace or explore new 
customers (Schmitz 2004; Sturgeon 2008). The relative power relations of lead firms 
and suppliers are central to research on the dynamics of industrial organisation but no 
previous studies have analysed them.  
2.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In view of the research gaps identified above, this paper will examine the evolutionary 
dynamics of the Japanese and Chinese models of industrial organisation in the 
Vietnamese motorcycle industry. It addresses the following overarching research 
question: 
How has the competition between Japanese and Chinese organisational models 
affected the organisational transformation of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry? 
For the purpose of analysis, this question is divided into two sub-questions.  
Sub-question 1: How did the Japanese and Chinese organisational models evolve in 
Vietnam? 
The literature suggests that the two models converged within a few years of their direct 
clash, as Japanese motorcycle manufacturers expanded their component sources to 
include non-conventional sources for the purpose of spurring competition between 
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suppliers, and local assemblers developed long-term, trust-based relations with their 
suppliers. 
Hypothesis: The two models converged within a few years of their initial clash in 
Vietnam. 
The second sub-question is concerned with explaining the organisational transformation 
that eventually occurred.  
Sub-question 2: What factors drove the organisational transformation of the Vietnamese 
motorcycle industry?  
Existing empirical research emphasises that the nature of the products, which the lead 
firms adjust in order to cope with competitive pressure, is the key variable in explaining 
the dynamics of an organisational model. 
Hypothesis: Organisational transformation is explained primarily by product 
characteristics determined by the lead firm.  
3. Conceptual Framework and Operationalisation of Key Concepts 
For the purpose of analysing the dynamics of organisational transformation in the 
Vietnamese motorcycle industry, this paper adopts the revised version of Gereffi et al.'s 
(2005) framework of GVC governance presented in Section 2, Paper I, in which value 
chain governance is explained in terms of two operational variables: the nature of 
product and process parameters exchanged in transactions and the alignment of relevant 
capabilities within the industry. For the purpose of empirical analysis, indicators have 
been developed for the key concepts (Table II-2). Given the lack of quantifiable 
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indicators for key variables, the analysis of trajectories focuses primarily on the 
direction of change in the status of the key variables over time, for example, an increase 
or decrease in the degree of complexity of product parameters. 
Table II-2. Operationalisation of Concepts 
(a) Determinants of Governance Types 
Key Concepts Indicators 
Nature of 
Product/ 
Process 
Parameters 
Level of 
Complexity  
General product characteristics (e.g. price levels) 
The way in which the lead firm specifies product/process 
requirements to suppliers 
Level of  
Standardisation  
General product features (e.g., whether product designs are 
proprietary or standardised) 
The way in which the lead firms specifies product/process 
requirements to suppliers 
Structure of 
Relevant 
Capabilities 
within the 
Industry 
Lead Firm 
Capability 
Whether or not the lead firm engages in key functions, e.g. product 
development, marketing, and production of core components 
The scale of orders placed to suppliers 
The capacity to switch suppliers 
Supplier 
Capability 
Changes in the number of suppliers, and types and levels of 
capability possessed 
(For new suppliers) Suppliers’ experience prior to entry into 
respective value chains  
(b) Governance Types 
  Pattern of Dependence Coordinating Mechanism 
Types of Data 
Required 
Lead firm: availability of 
alternative sources of 
components  
Suppliers: number of 
customers; percentage of sales 
to respective lead firms; size of 
orders 
Mechanisms used to communicate 
product/process parameters and ensure 
that they are met 
Markets 
Neither side is dependent on the 
other 
Limited communication of information 
beyond price levels 
Modular 
Communication of complex parameters 
without intense interaction enabled by 
industry-wide standards 
Relational Mutual interdependence  Intense two-way exchange of information 
Captive Small suppliers dependent on a large lead firm 
Lead firm takes the lead in sharing of 
long- and short-term targets; 
performance monitoring; regular sharing 
of information on products and 
processes; provision of 
technical/financial assistance 
Hierarchy Vertically integrated corporation Firm’s internal command 
Source: The author, with reference to Palpacuer (2000), Schmitz (2006), Sturgeon (2008), Kaplinsky 
and Morris (2000), and Sako (1992). 
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The indicators of supplier capability require further explanation. Drawing on the 
technological capability (TC) literature (Lall 1992; Bell and Pavitt 1995), this study 
focuses on the type and level of capability possessed by suppliers. With regard to type, 
reflecting the capability requirements that the Japanese and Chinese organisational 
models impose on suppliers, the key distinction is between new product introduction 
(product development and design) and production. The latter is further divided into the 
equipment-related and production management dimensions (Sato and Fujita 2009). In 
terms of level, the focus will be on whether suppliers starting at routine operation for 
the domestic market (operational level) can progress to the level at which they are able 
to maintain stable and continuous operations that fulfil the requirements of foreign 
customers (assimilative level), and further to level at which suppliers are able to make 
minor yet original improvement to the existing products or production activities 
(adaptive level) (ibid.).  
4. Methodology 
This section explains the methodology adopted in the empirical research project, that is, 
the retrospective case study method, criteria for selection of cases, and methods of data 
collection and analysis.  
4.1 Research Design: Retrospective Case Study  
In order to analyse the decade-long dynamics of change in industrial organisation, this 
paper adopts the retrospective case study method (de Vaus 2001; Glick et al. 1995; 
Tuma and Hannan 1984). In the present context, this method involves tracing the 
processes of organisational transformation by observing the sequence of historical 
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events occurring in specific sets of value chains with several intervals. Table II-3 
provides a summary of the overall case study design. In an attempt to illuminate how 
and why the Japanese and Chinese models of industrial organisation were transformed 
in the Vietnamese context over time, this study analyses two sets of value chains 
representative of the Japanese and Chinese models in Vietnam respectively. Each of 
them are analysed by means of an embedded case study design, which combines the 
analysis of the overall context with that of embedded subunits (Yin 2003). In 
accordance with the conceptual framework presented in the previous section, the focus 
is on the lead firm(s) and its/their main first-tier suppliers. 
Table II-3. Case Study Design 
  Japanese Model Chinese Model 
Cases HVN chains Vietnamese–Chinese chains as a whole 
Case 
Study 
Design 
Embedded case study design 
Analysis of context: Analysis of 
HVN value chains as a whole 
Analysis of embedded subunits: 
HVN as the lead firm, and major 
Japanese (keiretsu and 
non-keiretsu) and Vietnamese 
suppliers 
Embedded case study design 
Analysis of context: Analysis of the local 
motorcycle assembly industry as a whole 
Analysis of embedded subunits: 
(Stage II) Four major lead firms (Assemblers A1, 
A2, A4, and A5) and their Vietnamese, Taiwanese, 
and Korean suppliers  
(Stage III) Five major lead firms (Assemblers A1, 
A3, A4, A5, A6) and their Vietnamese, Chinese, 
Taiwanese and Korean suppliers 
Data 
Sources 
Context: interviews with Honda’s 
various units in Vietnam, Thailand 
and Japan; published and 
unpublished statistics; company 
website 
Embedded cases: interviews, 
factory visits, company websites, 
reports, newspapers 
Context: published and unpublished Vietnamese 
government statistics; reports; newspapers 
Embedded cases: interviews, factory visits, 
questionnaire surveys, company websites  
Source: The author. 
The transplanted Japanese model is represented by value chains independently 
developed and governed by HVN for the following reasons. First, HVN remained the 
single most important motorcycle manufacturer in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry 
throughout the period of investigation (Figure II-1). Second, among Japanese 
motorcycle manufacturers in Vietnam, HVN was the hardest hit by the China shock but 
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also reacted with the most fundamental adjustments. By contrast, YVN’s consistent 
focus on the high-end market limited direct Chinese competition (Fujita 2005); and 
Vietnam Suzuki (VNS)’s market shares were too small for the China shock to have an 
observable impact (Figure II-1). 
The case study of HVN’s value chain combined investigation of the overall context and 
that of embedded subunits including HVN as the lead firm, and major Japanese and 
Vietnamese suppliers. A total of 11 Japanese and 10 Vietnamese suppliers were 
purposefully selected as embedded subunits on the basis of the following criteria. First, 
cases were limited to suppliers of components that usually had model-specific designs, 
which, therefore, required close coordination between lead firms and suppliers. These 
included suppliers of metal and plastic components, dies, and moulds. Second, for the 
purpose of highlighting structural changes within the chains, cases were selected based 
on the requisite level of diversity: keiretsu and non-keiretsu suppliers among Japanese 
suppliers; state-owned and private companies among Vietnamese suppliers; and 
suppliers that had joined HVN value chains at various stages of industrial development. 
Third, an attempt was made to ensure that a sufficiently large number of cases were 
covered. The study ultimately selected 10 out of a total of 18 Vietnamese suppliers and 
11 out of a total of 26 Japanese suppliers operating in HVN's value chain as of 2007.46  
The Chinese model is represented by Vietnamese–Chinese chains developed by local 
Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers.47 Unlike the analysis of the Japanese model, the 
focus is not limited to those value chains developed by specific lead firm(s) because 
their small size, repeated entry into and exit from the market, and the emergence of a 
                                                        
46 These include Vietnamese suppliers V1-9 and V13 and Japanese suppliers J1-11. 
47 Lifan Vietnam, the only Chinese-invested motorcycle manufacturer, was not selected on account 
of its small market shares and its focus on engine production rather than motorcycle assembly (The 
Motorbike Joint Working Group 2007: 27).  
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shared supply base serving the local motorcycle assembly industry at large (see Section 
6.2) calls for coverage of Vietnamese–Chinese chains as a whole.48  
Analysis of the Chinese model also combines that of context and embedded subunits. 
The former relies on analysis of the local motorcycle assembly industry as a whole. In 
respect of the latter, six local assemblers were selected from lists of those operating as 
of 2000 and 2006 respectively49 according to the following criteria. The first one was 
the critical case criterion, in which priority was given to assemblers that were 
sufficiently large in terms of the scale of production.  
Second, selection was based on two types of replication logic in case study research: 
literal replication (predicting similar results across cases) and theoretical replication 
(predicting contrasting results but for predictable reasons) (Yin 2003). Since assemblers’ 
product strategies and performance started to diverge at a late stage of industrial 
development, cases were selected to include assemblers adopting different product 
strategies and sourcing practices. On the basis of the author’s previous research (Fujita 
2006), the key distinction was between one group of assemblers that concentrated on 
the production of low-priced imitations of Japanese-brand motorcycles, and another 
group that prioritised quality improvement, and the development of own designs and 
brand names often at the expense of higher prices.  
Third, cases were selected so as to make use of data obtained from the author’s previous 
fieldwork, and accessibility to assemblers for additional rounds of fieldwork. Since data 
                                                        
48 The distinction between Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese chains is similar to the contrast drawn 
by Sturgeon and Lee (2005: 35) in reference to supplier networks in the automotive sector whereby 
Toyota’s supplier network competes with that of General Motors’ and the electronics industry, in 
which strategic outsourcing by groups of lead firms has led to the rise of a shared supply network. A 
striking feature of the present case is that contrasting supplier networks have emerged within a single 
industry.    
49 The 2000 list was provided by the Vietnamese Ministry of Industry, and the 2006 list was 
provided by the General Statistics Office.  
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from previous fieldwork only included information on three assemblers (A1, A4 and 
A5), attempts were made to incorporate additional embedded case assemblers that were 
known to have played major roles in stages II and III. Assembler A2, which in 2000 had 
had the largest turnover of 51 local assemblers,50 and assemblers A3 and A6, which 
were found to be expanding sales in Stage III, were added as embedded cases.  
As a result of the selection process, the author ended up with six assemblers (A1-6) as 
embedded subunits. Assemblers A1, A2 and A3 belonged to one category of assemblers 
concentrating on the production of low-priced imitations of Japanese-brand motorcycles. 
Assemblers A5 and A6 were typical examples of the other category of assemblers 
prioritising the development of own designs and brand names and quality improvement. 
Assembler A4 fell somewhere in between the two categories. 
Suppliers were also analysed as embedded subunits in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain. 
Data were obtained for a total of 24 suppliers of different nationalities (5 Chinese, 7 
Taiwanese, 1 Korean, and 11 Vietnamese).51 Attempts were made to ensure that cases 
included suppliers playing key roles in value chains developed by both of the 
aforementioned emergent groups of assemblers.  
4.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
In an attempt to analyse the trajectories of organisational transformation over the decade 
from the late 1990s, this study combined three main sources of data. The first dataset 
derived from the author’s previous fieldwork conducted in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 
2005. Since the industry in question had undergone dramatic transformation involving 
                                                        
50 Based on the list of local assemblers provided by the Vietnamese Ministry of Industry. 
51 These include Chinese suppliers C1-5, Taiwanese suppliers T1-7, Korean supplier K1 and 
Vietnamese suppliers V13-23.  
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many entries and exits, high staff turnover, and the frequent personnel changes typically 
observed in foreign affiliate, the present study would not have been possible without 
data from these previous rounds of fieldwork. Although they were driven by different 
research questions, they provided a great deal of information on lead firm production 
strategies and sourcing practices, lead firm–supplier relations, and the development of 
suppliers’ capabilities.  
Data obtained in previous rounds of fieldwork were compiled in the form of interview 
recordings, transcriptions, and notes (mainly from Vietnamese companies); interview 
notes (mainly from Japanese, Taiwanese, Korean, and Chinese companies); 
questionnaire surveys; notes taken during factory visits; company brochures and 
presentation materials; and other materials provided by firms. The present study 
therefore commenced with the interpretation and coding of existing materials in 
accordance with the operationalised indicators presented in Section 3. 
Second, additional rounds of fieldwork were conducted specifically for the present 
study in order to collect data on new developments after 2005 and, wherever possible, 
to obtain retrospective data on earlier years. The basic strategy was to follow up with 
lead firms and suppliers approached in previous fieldwork, but attempts were also made 
to incorporate those that had not been included in the earlier studies but had come to 
play important roles in Stage III.52 Additional interviews with HVN and local 
assemblers, as well as their key suppliers, were also conducted between 2007 and 2009.  
The fieldwork study of local assemblers requires further explanation. A major challenge 
was the difficulty in accessing assemblers for additional rounds of fieldwork (A3, A4, 
                                                        
52 Examples include local assemblers A3 and A6, and suppliers J10, J11, C1, V7, V9, and V16. 
Information on newly-emerging companies was obtained from newspapers and interviews with firms 
and industry experts.  
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and A6 agreed to be interviewed whilst A1 and A5 refused). The challenges were 
addressed by the following measures. One was to conduct questionnaire surveys of local 
assemblers in collaboration with the Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam Academy 
of Social Science in 2007, to which A1, A3, A4, A5 and A6 agreed. Another was to 
access a former employee. Since access could be made to the former procurement 
manager (2002–4) of assembler A2, a series of interviews was conducted to obtain 
information on the company in the early 2000s.  
In order to complement limited amount and quality of data on local assemblers, the 
author also interviewed Taiwanese, Korean, Chinese and Vietnamese suppliers that had 
worked closely with these local assemblers over the years. The former transpired to be 
easier to access and became precious sources of information on Vietnamese–Chinese 
chains. Towards the last stage of the fieldwork, the author presented the main lines of 
argument on Vietnamese–Chinese chains to these suppliers and other industry experts 
and asked for their feedback. This exercise helped to confirm the validity of arguments 
and indicate where adjustment was necessary.  
The third source of data was that on local supplier capability which was collected for a 
different part of this research project focussing on trajectories of supplier capability 
formation (Paper III). Of the 21 suppliers covered in Paper III, data for 18 of them were 
revealed to be suitable for the present study.53 In-depth interviews were conducted with 
these 18 suppliers to identify the types and levels of capability acquired by such firms in 
Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese chains at different stages of industrial development.  
The full list of firms interviewed and surveyed and questionnaire forms are included in 
                                                        
53 The remaining three were second-tier suppliers to Japanese motorcycle manufacturers, which 
were beyond the scope of this study.  
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Appendices 1 and 3 respectively. Interviews cited in this paper are referred to by firm 
and interview codes as explained in Appendix 1.  
In addition to interviews and questionnaire surveys, this study also made use of the 
following additional data sources: published and unpublished statistics, Vietnamese and 
Japanese newspapers, reports and research papers on the industry, and presentations and 
lectures given by representatives of firms analysed as embedded cases.  
All the fieldwork materials were coded and tabulated using the indicators presented in 
Section 3. The following sections will present the results of the analysis as a synthesis 
of insights obtained from various levels of analysis. While individual firm-level case 
reports had been prepared in the course of the analysis, the details of the individual 
cases will be included only where necessary.  
5. The Emergence and Transformation of the Japanese Model in 
Vietnam 
Sections 5 and 6 present the empirical analyses of the transformation of Japanese and 
Chinese organisational models respectively in Vietnam. Each is structured in 
chronological order, with subsections running from earlier to later stages of industrial 
development. Each subsection begins by discussing the features of the two determinants 
of industrial organisation – namely, the nature of the product and the alignment of 
relevant capabilities – in the respective value chain at each stage of industrial 
development. It then goes on to analyse the form of industrial organisation that emerged 
under the prevailing conditions.   
Section 5 focuses specifically on how Honda, the leading global motorcycle 
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manufacturer, transferred its conventional organisational model to Vietnam, and how it 
was transformed in the short- and the medium-term after its clash with the Chinese 
model. The discussion proceeds in the following order: 
 Stage I: the industry’s start-up phase, designed to observe the status of the 
transferred Japanese model before its clash with the emergent Chinese model  
 Stage II: the period of the China shock and its repercussions, designed to observe 
the immediate response of actors in Japanese chains to the direct clash with the 
Chinese model  
 Stage III: the period of FDI-led development, designed to observe the medium-term 
impact of the clash with the Chinese model and the situation after unstable policy 
conditions impeding organisational adjustments were cleared  
5.1 Stage I: A ‘Foster Parent’ Variant Emerges 
The empirical analysis of the Japanese model begins with the assessment of Honda’s 
relations with its suppliers in the early years of its operation in Vietnam when the 
market was small and the local component supply base was underdeveloped. The 
following subsections examine how the company attempted to cope with the initial 
challenges and assess the key features of the emerging form of industrial organisation. 
5.1.1 The Need for Explicit Coordination: Non-standard Designs and High 
Quality 
Upon launching local production in Vietnam, Honda basically sought to replicate the 
conventional product strategy it had perfected in Japan and earlier overseas investment 
locations: launching its own sophisticated models developed at home and 
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manufacturing them locally to high quality standards. In the 1990s, HVN launched two 
models in Vietnam, both of which carried proprietary (and thus non-standard) designs 
developed at the company’s R&D headquarters in Japan.54 One was adapted from an 
existing model produced in Thailand, and the other was developed exclusively for the 
Vietnamese market, carrying components customised to this particular model. The 
company also instituted its own component quality standards to be applied at its 
production bases in Asia.55  
Not only were product/process parameters idiosyncratic, they were also complex. 
HVN’s emphasis at this stage was clearly not on price competitiveness, the two models 
launched in the 1990s being priced as high as US$2,000.56 This reflected not only high 
quality levels but also a lack of scale economies, dependence on imported components, 
and monopoly rents.57 Unsurprisingly, sales stagnated as price levels were far above the 
reach of ordinary citizens; while the limited number of consumers who could afford the 
high prices opted for Honda-brand motorcycles imported from Thailand that were 
priced at broadly similar levels (Nguyen Tran Que and Hoa Huu Lan 1998). However, 
this did not lead HVN to adjust its product strategy at this stage.  
HVN’s emphasis on the non-price dimensions of competitiveness was confirmed by its 
suppliers. Detailed drawings provided by the company specified detailed product and 
process parameters (interviews with V1 #2, #4; V2 #1; V3 #1). As will be discussed in 
more detail below, none of the suppliers interviewed by the author were asked to reduce 
their prices at this stage.  
                                                        
54 This discussion of models launched in the1990s is based on an interview with HVN #2. 
55 Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun (Nikkei Business Daily) Newspaper, 25 May 1999. 
56 The prices were US$1,990 and US$2,044 respectively (Nguyen Duc Hien 2004: 234). 
57 A Vietnamese government inspection in 1998 found that HVN had earned profits of 
US$18,154,000 – or US$221 per vehicle sold (calculation by the author) – in the company’s second 
full year of operation (Ha Huy Thanh et al. 2003: 332).  
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Apparently, Honda made limited effort to adapt its product strategy to the demands of 
Vietnamese consumers. After all, Vietnam was still a small, emerging market and the 
only major competitors were Honda-brand motorcycles imported from Thailand. 
Stagnating sales notwithstanding, the company was not compelled to seriously 
reconsider its product strategy.   
5.1.2 Misaligned Capability/Power Structure 
As one of the world’s leading manufacturers of motorcycles since the 1960s, Honda 
enjoyed product and branding leadership that had remained unchallenged for decades. 
The company also controlled virtually all key value chain functions, including product 
development, designs of all components other than a limited number of core items, 
marketing, and branding (Paper I). As of the late 1990s, the company’s operations in 
Vietnam focussed on production, while product development and design were 
undertaken in Japan.  
Yet, even such product, technological and marketing leadership transpired to be 
insufficient for HVN to gain control over the Vietnamese market. As stated above, since 
its products were out of the reach of ordinary Vietnamese consumers, motorcycle sales 
stagnated in the 1990s (Figure II-1). The fact that it was the single largest motorcycle 
manufacturer in Vietnam notwithstanding, HVN’s production in the 1990s remained 
small (Figure II-2); indeed, far lower than 300,000 units per year – the level generally 
recognised by Japanese manufacturers of motorcycle components as the minimum scale 
needed for efficient production (Mishima 2007). 
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Figure II-2. HVN’s Annual Motorcycle Production 
 
Source: Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (various years).  
The Vietnamese government demanded that foreign motorcycle manufacturers expand 
local sourcing of components.58 To meet this requirement, Honda adopted its 
conventional approach of sourcing from the following two types of suppliers (interview 
with HVN #1), both of which transpired to be in short supply in Vietnam. First, 
Japanese suppliers – especially members of the Honda Group (keiretsu) – were 
preferred because of their proven record of manufacturing competence in serving Honda 
in Japan and abroad. However, despite indications that Honda explicitly or implicitly 
asked keiretsu suppliers to establish production bases in Vietnam notwithstanding 
(interviews with J6 #1; J7 #1), few of them did so because the country was still regarded 
as risky investment location (JETRO 1996; Ichikawa 2001) and the anticipated size of 
orders was too small.  
                                                        
58 Circular of the State Committee for Cooperation and Investment 1536/UB-VP dated 11August 
1994.  
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Second, Honda also sought to mobilise relatively large, well-established local 
companies. However, given the underdeveloped status of Vietnam’s mechanical 
industries at this stage,59 only four such firms were initially admitted into HVN’s value 
chain (Table II-4). Even though they were relatively large and well-established by 
Vietnamese standards, none of them had previous experience of manufacturing 
machinery components or serving foreign customers. This is evident from Table II-5, 
which shows production capabilities possessed by Vietnamese suppliers in Japanese 
chains including three of the four suppliers that were admitted into HVN’s chains in the 
1990s (V1, V2 and V3).  
Table II-4. HVN’s Local Sourcing 
  1998 2001 2004 2007 
Local Content Ratio 44% 52% 83% 90% 
Total Number of Suppliers in Vietnam 16 20 43 58 
Japanese Suppliers 12 15 18 26 
  of which members of Honda Group 5 6 6 11 
Taiwanese and Korean Suppliers 0 0 12 14 
Vietnamese Suppliers 4 5 13 18 
  of which members of VEAM 0 0 1 3 
Note: VEAM (Vietnam Engine and Agricultural Machinery Corporation) is a state-owned business 
group that contributes 30% capital to HVN. 
Source: The author’s interviews with HVN (#1, #2, #3). Suppliers belonging to the Honda Group 
and VEAM were respectively enumerated by the author on the basis of Toyo Keizai Inc. (2009) and 
VEAM's website (http://www.veam.com.vn/?act=thanhvien, accessed 1 August 2012). 
Consequently, HVN’s value chain remained underdeveloped. As of 1998, the local 
content ratio was only approximately 44% (Table II-4), which included components that 
HVN manufactured in-house, the majority of parts being necessarily imported, mainly 
                                                        
59 This is evident from remarks made by experts who visited local Vietnamese companies engaged 
in processing metal, plastic and rubber products in 1995. Having visited nine major local companies, 
they remarked, “Visiting…local companies for the first time, we were surprised to find that their 
levels were far [lower] than the component manufacturers we have known and have instructed [in 
other Asian countries] in the past. We have come to think that instructing these companies will 
require a great deal of patience and new ideas” (JETRO 1996: 1). 
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from Japan. In 1998, HVN’s supply networks in Vietnam only consisted of 16 first-tier 
suppliers: 12 Japanese companies, 5 of which belonged to the Honda Group,60 and 4 
local firms.  
Table II-5. Production-related Capabilities Acquired by Vietnamese Suppliers in 
Japanese Chains 
  Before Stage I Stage I Stage II Stage III 
V1 Production of household plastic items Operational (n/a) Adaptive 
V2 Production of bicycle components Operational Operational - assimilative 
Assimilative- 
adaptive 
V3 Production of household metal items Operational Operational Assimilative 
V5 Production of household plastic items Operational Operational- assimilative 
V6 Production of wire harnesses for export to Japan Assimilative Adaptive 
V7 Production of machinery components for SOEs Operational Assimilative 
V8 (not yet established) Assimilative 
V9 Production of machinery components for SOEs Operational 
V13 Production of machinery components for SOEs Operational Assimilative 
Notes:  
(1) n/a = data not available. 
(2) For the period prior to entry into a Japanese chain (the unshaded area), main lines of business 
are shown. 
(3) For the period after entry into a Japanese chain (the shaded area), the level of equipment-related 
and production management capabilities acquired by each supplier is shown. In case levels of 
the two types of capabilities differed, the lowest and highest levels.  
Source: The author’s interviews with suppliers, compiled based on Paper III.  
In short, Honda’s global leadership in product, technology and branding 
notwithstanding, the company had yet to establish sufficient market power to exert 
control over the albeit limited number of suppliers that possessed low levels of 
manufacturing competence.  
5.1.3 The Lead Firm as a Generous Provider of Assistance  
Limited lead firm control over the market combined with Vietnam’s dearth of 
                                                        
60 Suppliers J2, J6 and J10 even enjoyed direct capital investment from Honda’s Thai affiliate. 
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component suppliers to constrain HVN in its attempts to exercise dominance. The result 
was a ‘foster parent’ variant of the captive model, whereby the lead firm relied primarily 
on the assurance of long-term orders, and the provision of technical and financial 
assistance to induce the suppliers’ commitment to meet its requirements.  
The key features of the emerging organisational model are evident from the pattern of 
lead firm–supplier dependence. On the one hand, the need to increase local contents in 
accordance with government requirements, combined with the difficulty of finding 
alternative domestic sources of components, meant that HVN was dependent to a great 
extent on its incumbent suppliers. Given non-standard product parameters and demand 
below the minimum level required for efficient production, orders were commissioned 
straight to a fixed group of suppliers.  
On the other hand, supplier dependence on HVN varied (Table II-6). Even with modest 
orders, Japanese suppliers were largely dependent on HVN as they had no other major 
customers. This was particularly the case with regard to members of Honda Group, who 
invested in Vietnam specifically with the aim of doing business with Honda.61 By 
contrast, local Vietnamese suppliers typically maintained the output of their traditional 
products. This was the practice of all of four Vietnamese suppliers interviewed by the 
author that entered the HVN value chain in the 1990s; while business with HVN 
accounted for a relatively minor proportion of their sales (Table II-6).  
As stated above, in order to induce suppliers’ commitment to achieve its targets, HVN 
played the role of a ‘foster parent’ – a generous provider of assistance. The company’s 
extensive use of assistance at this stage is evident from the author’s interviews with 
                                                        
61 Three of the four Honda Group suppliers interviewed by the author explicitly mentioned that they 
invested in Vietnam with the aim of serving Honda (interviews with J2 #1, #2; J6 #1; J7 #1). No 
information was available on the remaining supplier (J3). 
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Table II-6. Suppliers’ Dependence on HVN 
(a) Japanese Suppliers 
Name 
Honda 
Group 
Start of 
Trans- 
actions 
Components 
Ranking by Turnover Dependence on HVN and Changes in the Volume/Content of Orders 
2002 2006 Stage I Stage II Stage III 
J1 * 1997 
Steel/ 
aluminium 
components 
2nd 
(reorganised 
into J10) 
100% dependent 
on HVN. 
100% dependent on HVN. Orders for 
increased variety of components and 
types of processing required.  
(Reorganised into supplier J10 in 2005.) 
J2 * 1997 Silencers 3rd 3th 
100% dependent 
on HVN. 
100% dependent on HVN and its 
suppliers. Orders for increased variety of 
components. 
100% dependent on HVN and its suppliers. 
Further increase in variety of components. 
J3 * 1997 Brake system 7th 7th 
Highly 
dependent on 
HVN. 
Highly dependent on HVN but started 
exporting components to Japan.  
Dependent on HVN for 52% of sales while 
exports increased to 23%. Increased orders 
for sophisticated components from HVN. 
J4   1997 
Dies and 
moulds 
(not included) 
(bankrupt in 
2004) 
(n/a) 
Highly dependent on HVN but traded 
with VNS, YVN and manufacturers of 
consumer electronic products.  
(Bankrupt in 2004.) 
J5   1997 
Plastic 
components 
 
(not included) 
 
(not included) (n/a) 
Dependent on HVN for 40% of sales but 
traded with YVN and consumer 
electronics manufacturers. 
Dependence on HVN decreased to 20%. 
Increased production of electronic 
components. 
J6 * 1998 
Shock 
absorbers 
4th 1st 
Almost 
completely 
dependent on 
HVN 
Highly dependent on HVN but also 
supplied limited quantities to YVN and 
VNS. Lost orders for certain types of 
components upon the launch of the Wave 
Alpha but recovered them within a few 
years. 
Dependent on Honda for 95% of sales 
(including HVN for 85% and exports for 
10%). Orders for increased variety of 
components. 
J7 * 1998 
Electronic 
components 
5th 2nd (n/a) Dependent on HVN for 65% of sales. (n/a) 
J8   1998 
Plastic 
components 
(not included) (not included) 
Many customers 
in other 
industries 
Many customers in electronics and other 
industries. 
(n/a) 
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Table II-6. Continued     
Name 
Honda 
Group 
Start of 
Trans- 
actions 
Components 
Ranking by turnover Dependence on HVN 
2002 2006 Stage I Stage II Stage III 
J9 
 
2001 
Aluminium 
components 
(not included) (not included) (n/a) (n/a) 
90% of sales in 2006 from motorcycle 
components, including supply to HVN and 
YVN. Volume and variety of orders from 
HVN reduced by 2008. 
J10 * 2004 
Steel/ 
aluminium 
components 
(not yet 
established) 
4th 
(not yet 
established) 
100% dependent on HVN and its 
suppliers. 
100% dependent on HVN and its suppliers. 
J11 * 2005 Transmission 
(not yet 
established) 
35th 
(not yet 
established) 
(not yet established) 100% dependent on HVN and its suppliers. 
(b) Vietnamese Suppliers 
Name 
VEAM 
Member 
Start of 
Trans- 
actions 
Components 
Ranking by Turnover Dependence on HVN and Changes in the Volume/Content of Orders 
2002 2006 Stages I to II Stage III 
V1   1997 
Plastic 
components and 
moulds 
(not 
included) 
(not 
included) 
Dependence on HVN increased from 
16% in 2001 to 41% in 2002. 
Dependent on HVN for 40% of sales in 2008. Orders for high-precision 
components and moulds since 2006. Orders from buyers in other 
industries also increased. 
V2   1997 
Metal 
components 
(not 
included) 
13th 
Dependence on motorcycle 
components increased from 22% in 
1998 to 85% in 2003 (mostly HVN). 
Dependent on motorcycle components for 87% of sales in 2008. 
Increased volume and variety of orders from HVN and its suppliers. 
V3   1997 
Metal 
components 
12th 
(not 
included) 
Dependent on motorcycle 
components for 60% of sales in 2001 
(mostly HVN). 
Dependent on HVN for 50–60% of sales. Volume of orders increased 
but concentrated on components requiring relatively simple processing. 
V4   1997 
Metal stamped 
components 
(not 
included) 
(not 
included) 
Dependence on HVN increased from 
30–40% in the 1990s to 70% in 2002. 
Volume and variety of orders 
increased. 
Dependence on HVN reduced to 40–45% in 2008. Volume and variety 
of orders not increased while supplier expanded transactions in other 
products. 
V5   2000 
Plastic 
components  
(not 
included) 
(not 
included) 
Dependent on motorcycle 
components for less than 10% of 
sales in 2002 (mostly HVN). 
Dependence on HVN increased to 40% in 2007. Orders falling by 2008 
and concentrated on components requiring relatively simple processing. 
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Table II-6. Continued     
Name 
VEAM 
Member 
Start of 
Trans- 
actions 
Components 
Ranking by Turnover Dependence on HVN and Changes in the Volume/Content of Orders 
2002 2002 Stages I to II Stage III 
V6 
 
2001 Wire harnesses 
(not 
included) 
(not 
included) 
(n/a) 
Dependent on HVN for 40% of sales in 2008. Volume and content of 
orders unchanged. 
V7 * 2001 
Metal engine 
components 
(not 
included) 
(not 
included) 
Dependent on HVN for 42% of sales 
in 2002. 
Dependent on HVN for 60% of sales in 2008. Orders increased, 
including processing for high-precision engine components. 
V8 
 
2004 
Dies and 
moulds 
(not 
included) 
(not 
included) 
(not yet established) Dependent on HVN for virtually 100% of sales in 2008. 
V9 * 2005 
Metal engine 
components 
(not 
included) 
(not 
included) 
(not yet started transactions with 
HVN) 
Dependent on HVN for one-third of sales in 2008. Orders increased, 
including processing for high-precision engine components. 
V13 * 2004 
Metal 
components 
(not 
included) 
45th 
(not yet started transactions with 
HVN) 
Dependent on HVN for 80% of sales in 2008. Orders increased in 
volume and variety. 
Notes: 
(1) ‘Ranking by Turnover’ indicates placement of respective suppliers among all registered motorcycle component suppliers included in lists provided by the General 
Statistics Office.  
(2) ‘Not included’ indicates that the supplier was omitted from the list, which typically occurred when suppliers were registered under other industries because their 
main product lines were not motorcycle components. 
Source: The author’s interviews. 
85 
 
 
 
suppliers. For members of the Honda Group, patronage took the form of financial 
support. This was a means by which HVN could reward its suppliers for taking the risk 
of investing in the equipment and/or training required specifically for serving Honda; 
given that the company was unable to provide suppliers with what they most wanted: 
large and stable orders. Two of the four Honda Group suppliers interviewed (J2 and J3) 
pointed out that HVN had applied preferential prices for the first few years so that they 
could gain a quick return on their investments. As a result, supplier J3 recorded a profit 
as early as the second year of operation (interview #1), and supplier J2 completely 
eliminated its losses by the early 2000s (interview #2). 
For local Vietnamese suppliers, patronage took the form of technical assistance. Without 
the provision of such help over an extended period, it was virtually impossible for local 
Vietnamese companies to meet HVN’s requirements. All of the four Vietnamese 
companies selected by HVN as first-tier suppliers upon the launch of its local 
production were interviewed by the author at different times. They had all received 
technical assistance, typically in the form of repeated visits of experts to their factories 
over a few years to provide advice and suggestions (interviews with suppliers V1 #1; 
V2 #1, #2; V3 #1, #2; V4 #1). 
For its part, HVN made relatively limited use of its ability to impose demanding 
requirements on its suppliers – a key feature of the captive model. While HVN’s quality 
stipulations constituted a challenge to most local suppliers, they were given ample time 
to study procedures and strive to reach the requisite standards (interview with V2 #1). 
The small volume of orders also meant that delivery requirements were loose, a factor 
that is evident from the author’s interview with supplier J3, one of the Honda Group 
suppliers. 
86 
 
 
 
In those days [the 1990s], when we could not make the delivery deadline specified 
by HVN, our local staff even requested them to adjust their production timetable. 
Now [at the time of the interview i.e. 2004] it is difficult to imagine that such a 
practice was going on.       (J3 #1) 
In summary, HVN’s differentiated, proprietary products called for explicit governance 
mechanisms. Even though HVN remained the sole coordinator of its value chain, the 
limited volume of orders and an underdeveloped local component supply base 
constrained it in the establishment of its dominance in terms of imposing challenging 
targets on its suppliers. The outcome was that HVN adopted the role of a ‘foster parent’ 
in attempting to nurture the capabilities of its suppliers. Moreover, in the absence of 
major competitors, HVN was not compelled to reconsider its strategies at this stage. 
5.2 Stage II: Partial Transformation of the ‘Foster Parent’ Variant 
This subsection considers Honda’s short-term response to the new challenges posed by 
the China shock. Faced with the need to spur price-based competitiveness, HVN sought 
to adjust its organisational model but such an attempt only produced limited progress at 
this stage. The following examines the factors that drove HVN’s organisational 
adjustment as well as those that impeded it, and discusses the form of industrial 
organisation that emerged out of the adjustment.  
5.2.1 Impetus for Transformation: Radical Price Reduction 
The impetus for organisational change came from a radical shift in emphasis of HVN’s 
product strategy from non-price to price-based competitiveness. When the Vietnamese 
market began to be flooded with massive numbers of low-priced imitation motorcycles, 
for the first time, Honda realised the huge unexploited demand at the bottom end of 
low-income markets like Vietnam. This led Honda to initiate a company-wide effort to 
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develop a low-priced model in an attempt to prevent the entry of Chinese motorcycles 
into Southeast Asia, where the Japanese company had held market leadership for 
decades (Higashi 2006; Sato 2011). In collaboration with the R&D headquarters and 
mother factory in Japan and production base in Thailand, Honda’s regional R&D base in 
Thailand developed a low-priced model with exceptional acceleration (Ohara et al. 
2003; Ohara 2006b). Priced at approximately one-third of HVN’s existing models,62 the 
Wave Alpha was launched in Vietnam in January 2002.  
The launch of this low-priced model had significant impact on parameters imposed on 
suppliers. On the one hand, the complexity of parameters was reduced. Price reduction 
targets demanded by HVN upon the launch of the Wave Alpha on four of the Honda 
Group suppliers of core components interviewed by the author ranged between 40% and 
50% (Table II-7), which was far beyond the targets achieved by routine incremental 
improvements in productivity.  
In the meantime, in order to achieve such a radical cost reduction, Honda reduced its 
product specifications to the levels considered necessary for the Vietnamese market. For 
example, the maximum driving speed applied in defining product and process 
parameters for the Wave Alpha was set at 80 kilometres per hour. Even though this was 
much lower than standard levels applied to Honda’s other overseas markets, it was 
considered sufficient for use in the Vietnamese context where traffic congestion 
prevented motorcycle use at higher speeds (Amano and Shintaku 2010: 799).  
 
                                                        
62 Upon its initial launch, the price of the Wave Alpha (US$719) was 36% of the official price of 
HVN’s most popular model, the Super Dream, in 2000 (US$1,990) (Nguyen Duc Hien 2004: 234). 
This was followed by the launch of a low-priced model in Thailand in June 2002, the Wave 100.  
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Table II-7. Responses of Honda Group Suppliers to the Launch of the Wave Alpha 
Name 
Price Reduction 
Margin 
Requested by 
HVN 
Supplier’s Response to HVN’s 
Requests Results 
J2 40% 
Priority was to avoid loss of orders. 
The supplier decided to accept 
HVN’s targets before actually 
coming up with ways of meeting 
them.  
The supplier won orders for all 
existing types of component.  
J3 50% 
Priority was to avoid loss of orders, 
even if the supplier initially incurred 
losses.  
The supplier won orders for all 
existing types of component. It 
later came up with ways to 
achieve cost reduction. 
J6 (n/a) 
The supplier made internal attempts 
at cost reduction and suggestions for 
specification changes to HVN.  
The supplier only won orders 
for 3 of 16 existing types of 
component. 
J7 40% 
The supplier provided quotations in 
accordance with the extent of cost 
reduction it could achieve.  
The supplier lost orders for one 
of two existing types of 
component but won orders for 
other components as it was able 
to meet HVN’s target price. 
Source: The author’s interviews (J2 #1; J3 #1; J6 #1; J7 #1). 
On the other hand, the non-standard nature of parameters was maintained. With the aim 
of reducing product development costs, Honda made extensive use of component 
designs utilised in its existing models (Ohara et al. 2003) rather than renewing the 
whole vehicle system – the conventional Japanese approach to product development 
(Paper I). However, the Wave Alpha was still non-standard in the sense that component 
designs were customised to Honda.     
In summary, HVN’s priority shifted from quality to price reduction. The company’s 
product and process parameters were still non-standard but less complex than in the 
previous stage, and thus could be communicated between the lead firm and its suppliers 
with relative ease.  
5.2.2 Lead Firm Attempts at Realigning Capabilities 
The shift in HVN’s production strategy was accompanied by corresponding changes to 
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the structure of the company’s value chain. In order to reduce component procurement 
costs, HVN sought to substantially expand sources in Vietnam and abroad (interview 
#2). Apart from the need to exploit new sources of lower-priced components, expanding 
local sourcing became a priority, as this enabled HVN to save on import tariffs and to 
conform to the local content stipulations implemented by the Vietnamese government in 
the early 2000s. Increasing the number of suppliers – especially those with high levels 
of price-based competitiveness – was also expected to put competitive pressure on 
incumbent suppliers.63 
Since one could hardly expect Japanese FDI in component manufacturing to increase 
immediately (Ichikawa 2001), HVN inevitably had to depend on non-conventional 
component sources in expanding local supply. The remarkable increase in HVN’s local 
content ratio from 52% in 2001 to 83% in 2004 (Table II-4) was achieved primarily by 
incorporating non-Japanese suppliers into the company’s value chain. As Honda 
engaged in an extensive search for suppliers in Vietnam by mobilising experts from 
Japan,64 numerous Taiwanese, Korean and Vietnamese suppliers were admitted into the 
company’s value chain (Table II-4). Another noteworthy development was that HVN 
sought to import components for the first time from China. Upon the launch of the 
Wave Alpha, HVN sourced 27 types of component from local Chinese companies 
servicing Honda’s joint venture motorcycle manufacturer in China (interview #2).  
While the above developments might look impressive, the key question is the extent to 
which such adjustments changed the alignment of relevant capabilities and power 
                                                        
63 This effect is clearly illustrated in an interview with Japanese keiretsu supplier J2 #1 in 2002. 
Noting that Honda was engaged in an extensive search for new suppliers, the general director 
commented that the price-based competitiveness of local suppliers would pose a real threat to 
Japanese companies.   
64 The search for potential suppliers conducted in the years 2001–2 was the most extensive in 
HVN’s history to date, covering as many as 80 companies (interview with HVN #4). 
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relations between lead firm and suppliers. Apparently, HVN hoped to achieve two aims 
simultaneously: to enhance its purchasing power, and to spur price-based competition 
between suppliers. Both conditions had to be met if HVN were to exploit market forces 
whilst maintaining its non-standard product and process parameters. However, this 
strategy only achieved partial success at this stage because the company was prevented 
from realigning the necessary structure of capabilities to achieve these aims.  
On the one hand, by reducing prices, HVN sought to rapidly expand its sales volume, 
which would not only enable the lead firm and its suppliers to realise economies of 
scale but also allow HVN to exercise purchasing power over its suppliers. Indeed, this 
seemed a likely scenario in 2002.65 However, HVN’s ambitions were blocked by a 
series of restrictions introduced by the Vietnamese government from 2002 onwards on 
motorcycle registration and the capacity expansion of foreign invested motorcycle 
manufacturers (as discussed in Section 2.3). The resultant slow growth of the market as 
well as HVN’s inability to invest in expansion of production capacity meant that the 
company’s annual production increased modestly. In fact, it had only reached some 
400,000 units by 2004 – above the 300,000-unit minimum level required for 
economically viable non-capital-intensive production but barely sufficient for the lead 
firm to exercise purchasing power over suppliers.  
On the other hand, HVN’s attempt to increase the number of suppliers was aimed at 
breaking its dependence on incumbent suppliers and spurring competition between them 
as well as new ones. Again, this strategy was thwarted by the limited manufacturing 
                                                        
65 A few Japanese suppliers noted that in 2002 they had been requested by HVN to prepare for rapid 
capacity expansion (interviews with J2 #1; #2; J4 #1), which clearly demonstrates HVN’s ambitions 
before quantitative restrictions on imports of components were imposed (Section 2.3). Also, when 
HVN’s annual production exceeded one million units in 2007, the company’s administrative 
manager noted, “We could finally achieve what we had endeavoured to achieve for a long time” 
(interview HVN #3). 
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capabilities of newly admitted suppliers together with the aforementioned small 
purchase volume. While some Taiwanese suppliers had good track records of supplying 
components to Honda in Taiwan (interview with HVN #2), only one of the four 
Vietnamese suppliers interviewed by the author and admitted to HVN’s value chain in 
Stage II had ever served foreign customers (Table II-5).  
The shortage of supplier capability had to be dealt with by lead firm intervention in the 
form of technical assistance. However, as will be discussed below, quality problems 
recorded by several suppliers – those in China in particular – were so serious that HVN 
was eventually compelled to stop placing orders with them (interview #2) – the sort of 
decision Honda makes only in truly exceptional circumstances (interview #3). By 2004, 
only a few types of components – as opposed to 27 upon the initial launch of the Wave 
Alpha – were imported from China (interview with HVN #2).  
In the meantime, the radical price reduction targets announced by HVN upon launching 
of the Wave Alpha compelled the incumbent suppliers – including those belonging to 
Honda Group – to take urgent measures to reduce production costs. All such suppliers 
interviewed by the author, both Japanese and Vietnamese, eventually achieved HVN’s 
price reduction targets with their own cost reduction efforts.66 For instance, supplier J6 
won contracts for only three out of the sixteen types of components upon the initial 
launching of the Wave Alpha, but because of significant productivity improvements, 
company won back contracts for all of the remaining thirteen types of components by 
2004 (interview #1). 
                                                        
66 Examples of measures taken by interviewed suppliers to achieve targets include the localisation 
of imported components and materials; productivity improvement in plant operations; and 
downward adjustments to product and/or process specifications (subject to Honda’s approval) 
(interviews with J2 #1; J3 #1; J6 #1). 
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In short, HVN’s attempt at realigning capability within its chain with the aim of 
achieving substantial cost reduction was only partially successful at this stage; first, 
because government policy impeded HVN in expanding production; and second, 
because supplier capabilities took time to develop. 
5.2.3 The Constant Struggle to Introduce Market Forces 
As a result of the partial realignment of capabilities, the emerging pattern of 
transactional governance was shaped by a tension between the need to achieve radical 
price reduction – which called for increased use of market forces – and absence of the 
capability alignment required for the effective functioning of market forces. 
HVN’s attempts at making use of market forces may be clearly observed in the 
company’s ordering procedure upon the launch of the Wave Alpha, orders being no 
longer commissioned straight to a fixed group of suppliers but based on competition 
determined by price. Prior to the launch of the new model, HVN announced radical 
price reduction targets and asked for quotations from an increased number of suppliers 
(interviews with J2 #1; J3 #1; J7 #1). Table II-7 summarises the responses of four 
incumbent suppliers, all of which had direct capital relations with Honda. They were 
thus compelled to meet a price reduction target ranging between 40% and 50% or risk 
losing orders. In this regard, in 2004, the general director of supplier J6 recalled: 
“[Upon launching of the Wave Alpha,] we received pressure [from Honda that they] 
would switch to Taiwanese, Korean, or Chinese suppliers if we could not achieve the 
target prices” (interview #1). In August 2002, the general manager of supplier J2 indeed 
admitted that the decision was whether to accept the cost reduction target presented by 
Honda or to lose orders (interview #1). 
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However, responses varied. Suppliers J2 and J3 strove to meet targets on the 
understanding that they would be obliged to sacrifice profits or even incur losses during 
initial years. On the other hand, suppliers J6 and J7 gave up supplying some of the 
components for which they were asked by HVN to provide quotations. The fact that 
even supplier J6, with which Honda had direct capital and personnel relations, won 
orders for only 3 out of the 16 types of component that the company had previously 
supplied to HVN illustrates the lead firm’s determination to trade with the cheapest 
available source regardless of nationality or keiretsu ties.67 This marked an important 
shift away from Honda’s conventional sourcing practices. Indeed, suppliers were 
expected to independently come up with measures to meet the stringent targets imposed 
on them, financial support previously granted to such suppliers having been terminated 
by this stage.   
Although the above changes in HVN’s ordering practices might look impressive, the 
new alignment of lead firm and supplier capabilities prevented the sustained operation 
of price-based competition, a situation that eventually led to the revival of previous 
patterns of dependence. First, HVN’s limited purchase volume meant that dual sourcing 
was not feasible: to the extent that non-standard component designs were maintained, 
parts could be simultaneously sourced from more than one supplier only when the size 
of production was sufficiently large to allow each of the suppliers to exploit economies 
of scale. HVN regarded this threshold to be the annual production of one million units 
(interviews #3, #4), an output level that, as discussed above, had not been reached by 
the end of Stage II.  
                                                        
67 An important point to note is that most of the components adopted in the Wave Alpha carried 
designs previously developed for Honda’s pre-existing models (Ohara et al. 2003). The fact that 
suppliers had not participated in component design processes is likely to have been a key 
consideration behind the sourcing approach adopted for this particular model.  
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Second, as noted in Section 5.2.2, the limited manufacturing capability of newly 
admitted suppliers posed a serious constraint to HVN’s attempts to use them to spur 
competition between suppliers. This, combined with the efforts of incumbent suppliers 
to meet HVN targets, resulted in the revival of the traditional mutual dependence 
between the lead firm and its old suppliers.  
Third, limited supplier capabilities also forced HVN to continue to act as a ‘foster 
parent’ or provider of technical assistance. New entrants were offered technical 
assistance in the form of periodic monitoring and joint problem-solving exercises 
(interviews with V5 #1; V7#1); although the time frame of assistance was found to be 
generally shorter than it had been in respect of suppliers entering HVN value chain in 
the 1990s, the former – as discussed above – extending for between one and two years, 
while the latter was approximately six months (interviews with V5 #1; V7#1).  
The above findings show that the magnitude of short-term adjustment was not as 
substantial as the existing literature suggests after all. While HVN’s response to the 
China shock did include a number of radical changes to conventional sourcing practices, 
they were largely emergency measures intended to deal with immediate needs. Within a 
few years, it became apparent that the existing capability structure constrained the 
sustained functioning of market forces, the result being the revival of traditional patterns 
of dependence and persistence of lead firm assistance. 
5.3 Stage III: Transformation into an ‘Institutionalised Competition’ Variant 
As the industry entered the phase of rapid FDI-led development, fundamental changes 
took place in HVN’s value chain. The company’s attempts to introduce market forces 
into transactional governance, which had only partially succeeded in the previous stage, 
95 
 
 
 
culminated in what the present study refers to as an ‘institutionalised competition’ 
variant of the captive model. This variant of the captive organisation systematically 
combines the advantages of long-term, close relations with a fixed group of suppliers 
and the benefits of market forces with the aim of extracting constant performance 
improvement out of suppliers. The following subsections describe and explain the 
transformation of HVN’s value chain during this most dynamic stage; analysis that no 
previous study has explicitly attempted.  
5.3.1 Shifting Market Demand: The Increasing Complexity of Parameters 
The third stage of industrial development was characterised by increasing sophistication 
of consumer demand. As a result of rising levels of income and serious quality problems 
experienced with Chinese motorcycles in the early 2000s, urban Vietnamese consumers 
began to aspire to a better quality of motorcycle, while demand for low-priced 
imitations was limited to low-income consumers in rural areas (The Motorbike Joint 
Working Group 2007).  
In response to the changing market landscape, Honda implemented a number of 
important adjustments to its product strategy. First, the complexity of product 
parameters increased. Reflecting the growing market, the number of new models 
launched by HVN increased substantially by Stage III (Table II-8). In order to respond 
to the increasing sophistication of consumers, HVN launched a greater number of 
models that adopted new component technologies, higher precision levels, and/or 
renewed external styling (interview with HVN #4). These changes were reflected in 
price levels: HVN models launched between 2006 and 2008 were priced between 
US$932 and US$1,564 – higher than the increased price of the Wave Alpha (US$807) in 
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2007.68 
Table II-8. New Models Registered by Year 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
HVN 2 1 5 6 9 17 27 35 102 
Local Assembler A1 28 11 4 28 105 112 191 66 545 
Local Assembler A2 19 15 0 10 8 8 15 0 75 
Local Assembler A3 10 1 5 25 43 56 112 8 260 
Local Assembler A4 8 6 4 8 23 16 9 9 83 
Local Assembler A5 19 9 4 7 8 21 15 3 86 
Local Assembler A6 0 1 2 5 10 12 10 1 41 
Source: The author, from data obtained from the Vietnam Register (http://www.vr.org.vn), accessed 
6 January 2009. 
Second, process parameters also grew more complex. HVN’s emphasis shifted from the 
one-off radical price reduction in the previous stage to incremental yet continuous 
improvement in overall QCD levels. Of these three criteria, the highest priority was 
attached to quality levels. Asked about the company’s focus in 2007, HVN’s manager 
remarked:  
[Of QCD], quality is the most important. Since Vietnamese consumers demand very 
high levels of quality, we need to keep on paying close attention to [our] quality 
levels…We emphasise quality at source. That is, we ask suppliers to guarantee 
quality levels within their production processes.   (HVN #3) 
It is worth emphasising that HVN began to demand that suppliers ensure quality at 
source. This was in sharp contrast to the company’s standards in Stage II, when it 
tolerated defects in components imported from China so long as price advantages 
outweighed the cost of inspecting 100% of the parts (interview with HVN #2). However, 
such preoccupation with quality does not mean that price was no longer important. 
Unlike the one-off cost reduction in the early 2000s, suppliers were now requested to 
achieve incremental cost reductions of 5% every year (interview with HVN #5). With a 
                                                        
68 Prices quoted in various issues of Oto-Xe May (Automobiles and Motorcycles). 
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growing volume of orders (see below), delivery deadlines also became increasingly 
tight, most Japanese and some Vietnamese suppliers being required to implement ‘just 
in time’ delivery several times a day.69  
In terms of degree of standardisation, the non-standard nature of product parameters 
was maintained. However, since approximately 2004, the company’s regional R&D 
base in Thailand started to make extensive use of common component designs for 
internal parts across models to be launched in Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam 
(interview with Honda R&D Southeast Asia #1). Whilst this marked a significant move 
away from the Honda’s conventional approach to the renewal of most component 
designs when launching new models, the fresh approach enabled the company to 
develop large varieties of models at low cost, while realising economies of scale in 
manufacturing (ibid.).  
In short, HVN’s product and process parameters became increasingly complex, 
extending to non-price dimensions and demanding in terms of requisite levels. While 
component designs continued to be specific to Honda, the use of common parts across 
models laid the foundations for the realisation of economies of scale in manufacturing 
and lead firm purchasing power over suppliers.  
5.3.2 Full Realignment of the Capability Structure 
Whilst shifting demand certainly influenced the direction and degree of organisational 
transformation, even more important was the driver for change coming from within the 
value chain: the shifting alignment of capabilities. This occurred partly as a result of 
HVN’s active attempt to create the necessary conditions for transforming its ‘foster 
                                                        
69 The frequency of deliveries in 2007–2008 ranged between 5–8 times a day (interviews with 
suppliers J2 #2; J3 #3; J6 #2; J10 #1; V1 #3). 
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parent’ model of industrial organisation, and partly as a result of incidental changes in 
Vietnamese government policy that were beyond the company’s control.  
On the one hand, the policy changes discussed above led to significant expansion of the 
market as a whole, as well as HVN’s market shares in particular. As the government 
abandoned a series of legislation that had repressed the overall market growth, sales of 
motorcycles increased rapidly, even exceeding levels during the China shock (Figure 
II-1). Japanese lead firms expanded their shares as they were released from constraints 
on expansion of production capacity. HVN’s annual production in particular exceeded 
one million units by 2007 (Figure II-2). This was an important landmark because such 
purchase volume not only exceeded the minimum efficient scale even for components 
requiring capital-intensive production processes, but also called for the dual sourcing of 
each type of component (interviews with HVN #3, #4). Accordingly, HVN started to 
exercise huge purchasing power over its suppliers.  
On the other hand, the number of suppliers in Vietnam as well as their overall capability 
levels increased remarkably. First, as a consequence of the rapid market expansion, FDI 
from component suppliers with established records of serving Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers increased, including Honda Group suppliers that had previously been 
hesitant to invest in Vietnam. Of the total of 38 investment licences granted to Japanese 
motorcycle component manufacturers between 1992 and 2007, as many as 20 projects 
were licensed between 2004 and 2007.70  
Second, as a result of HVN’s attempts to mobilise and nurture local suppliers from the 
late 1990s, the capability levels of Vietnamese firms improved substantially. This is 
                                                        
70 Calculated by the author using data provided by the Ministry of Planning and Investment of 
Vietnam, which is available in tabulated form in Fujita (2008). 
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clear from the author’s in-depth case studies of HVN’s first-tier Vietnamese suppliers 
(Table II-5). By Stage III, most of the suppliers had reached the assimilative level whilst 
some even progressed to the adaptive level for one or more dimension of their 
production activities. Such improvement in the production-related capabilities of local 
suppliers is corroborated by the assessment of HVN managers. In 2009, the company’s 
procurement manager remarked that, with a number of exceptions, local Vietnamese 
suppliers were generally able to meet its requirements without the hands-on technical 
assistance (interview #5).  
As a result of the increased number of suppliers in Vietnam and their improved 
capability levels, HVN’s local content ratio and number of suppliers increased rapidly, 
with the former reaching 90% and the latter reaching 58 by 2007 (Table II-4). However, 
even more significant were the structural changes within the value chain. Having 
obtained the ability to switch suppliers, HVN reorganised its value chain, adopting 
differentiated approaches to the following three different groups of suppliers – with 
emphasis on what HVN manager referred to as “group suppliers” (interview #5).  
The first group consisted of Honda group (keiretsu) suppliers. Among the embedded 
cases, J2, J3, J6, J7, J10 and J11 belonged to this category. Having proprietary 
component design and/or manufacturing competencies that Honda relied upon, their 
parent companies in Japan had developed a long-term association with the former 
mediated by capital and personnel relations.  
The second group was Honda’s joint venture partner, Vietnam Engine and Agricultural 
Machinery (VEAM) Corporation, a state-owned business group consisting of more than 
20 member companies, traditionally specialising in the production of diesel engines and 
agricultural machinery. Among the embedded cases, suppliers V7, V9, V13, and V14 
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belonged to this business group. Although VEAM members did not possess 
complementary competencies, HVN started to attach growing priority to them as an 
integral part of its extended corporate group (interview #5). Apart from direct capital 
ties, high levels of manufacturing competence relative to other local suppliers, a sense 
of trust that had been built through long-term relations as a joint venture partner, and the 
executive with a good understanding of Japanese management practices and willing to 
expand business with Japanese companies also account for HVN’s preference to 
outsource key components to VEAM members (interview with HVN #5).   
The third group consisted of suppliers of non-core components, of all nationalities. 
These suppliers were expected to provide external manufacturing capacity. Suppliers J4, 
J5, J8, J9, V1–6 and V8 fell under this category.  
Suppliers belonging to the first two groups received increasing priority in Stage III. 
They not only accounted for nearly half of suppliers newly admitted into HVN’s value 
chain between 2004 and 2007 (Table II-4) but also began to receive a mounting 
proportion of HVN’s expanded orders. Indeed, Honda Group suppliers received 
increasing orders not only for core- but also non-core components that had previously 
been subcontracted to Group 3 suppliers.71 In localising the production of 
high-precision engine components, HVN designated two VEAM suppliers (V7 and V9) 
to undertake the initial processing of these components (interviews with HVN #4, #5). 
In addition to the shifting alignment of supplier capability, progress in Vietnamese trade 
                                                        
71 In addition to Table II-6, the following case provides a clear illustration. After J10 – 100% owned 
by Honda – was established in 2005 to manufacture a large variety of components, supplier J9 – a 
Japanese non-keiretsu provider of non-core components – was requested to supply sub-components 
to J10 instead of directly to HVN as the company had done previously. Supplier J9 lost further 
orders for sub-components after 2007 as supplier J10 started to manufacture them in-house 
(interview with J9 #1).  
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liberalisation provided HVN with potential access to overseas sources of suppliers, 
although they remained an unused option at this stage. As part of the country’s bid to 
become a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Vietnam had dismantled 
local content rules by the end of 2003, and, in accordance with the tariff reduction 
schedule under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area 
(AFTA), Vietnam reduced its tariffs on most motorcycle components imported from 
ASEAN-6 countries from 50% in 2005 to 5% in 2006.72  
Although the high levels of HVN’s local content ratio after 2006 are an illustration of 
the company’s preference to source the bulk of its motorcycle parts locally, the company 
now had the option of importing components at competitive prices from Thailand and 
Indonesia – the two countries with the most advanced automotive component supply 
bases in Southeast Asia.73 Moreover, with the expectation that trade liberalisation under 
the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area would progress in the not-too-distant future, Honda 
was eager to make a second attempt at sourcing components from China. Its 
procurement manger emphasised that limited manufacturing capabilities possessed by 
suppliers in China – the main reason for the failure of the first trial upon the launch of 
the Wave Alpha – had improved to a considerable extent by 2008 (interview with HVN 
#4).  
To sum up, the distribution of lead firm and supplier capabilities changed substantially 
as a result of both HVN’s active attempts to realign capabilities within the industry and 
                                                        
72 ASEAN-6 includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. While 
motorcycle components had long been excluded from Vietnam’s tariff reduction schedule for AFTA, 
the Vietnamese government announced a schedule for these items for the first time at the end of 
2004 (Government Decree 213/2004/ND-CP dated 27 December 2004). 
73 Thailand has established itself as the hub of the Southeast Asian automotive industry (Lecler 
2002; Higashi 2006). With the largest motorcycle market in Southeast Asia and a longer history of 
industrialisation, Indonesia is also more advanced than Vietnam in terms of the development of the 
component industry (Sato 2011).  
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incidental policy changes. With its huge purchasing power and accumulating supplier 
capability, HVN gained the capacity to reorganise its suppliers in accordance with its 
requirements. 
5.3.3 An ‘Institutionalised Competition’ Variant Emerges 
The shifting capability alignment enabled HVN to implement organisational 
adjustments to meet changing product and process requirements. The result was a form 
of organisation referred to as an ‘institutionalised competition’ variant of the captive 
chain. Key changes in transactional governance were three-fold.  
First, the level of supplier dependence on HVN increased substantially regardless of the 
type of supplier. The large volume of orders meant that suppliers were increasingly 
dependent on HVN for their sales. By Stage III, this was the case not only with Honda 
Group suppliers but also local Vietnamese suppliers. Local suppliers like V2, V3, V7, 
V8, and V13 depended on HVN and its related companies for between 50% and 100% 
of their sales (Table II-6).  
Second, HVN’s provision of technical assistance diminished and was substituted with 
less generous forms of lead firm engagement with suppliers: collaborative initiatives for 
achieving incremental productivity improvement, referred to as value analysis (VA) and 
value engineering (VE);74 systematic monitoring of supplier performance; and joint 
problem-solving exercises in the cases of troubles (interviews with HVN #4, #5). All 
three of the aforementioned groups of suppliers were subject to stringent QCD 
performance targets, which were incrementally upgraded every year (ibid.). Since most 
                                                        
74 VA and VE refer to activities designed to obtain the best value of a component by analysing its 
function and cost. In Japanese manufacturing industries, these techniques have been widely applied 
by lead firms and suppliers as joint problem-solving exercises aimed at mutual gain (Asanuma 1989; 
Sako 1992; Nishiguchi and Brookfield 1997).   
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suppliers were more or less capable of reaching such targets, technical assistance 
beyond systematic monitoring and troubleshooting was offered only selectively with 
regard to strategically important targets. Group 2 suppliers became strategic targets as 
they were subcontracted high-precision engine components calling for sophisticated 
production-related capabilities (ibid.).  
Third, HVN’s made use of what this study refers to as ‘institutionalised competition’ 
among a pool of carefully selected suppliers.75 This form of competition is 
distinguished from market competition in arm’s-length organisation in that (1) the scope 
of competition is limited to those suppliers that pass a careful selection process, the lead 
firm essentially maintaining long-term relations with each of them; and (2) selection of 
suppliers is not based principally on price but rather on comprehensive ratings of QCD 
performance, the assessment of VA and VE proposals submitted by suppliers, and the 
lead firm’s policy on the allocation of business shares76 (Sako 1992; Asanuma 1989).  
In practice, the implications of institutionalised competition varied according to type of 
supplier. Those of non-core components (Group 3) faced increasingly intense 
competition, and since alternative sources could be found for them, HVN retained the 
capacity to actually switch suppliers. Moreover, even after a contract was awarded, 
HVN sought to maintain supplier diligence by adjusting its order volume dependent on 
QCD performance (interview #5). Supplier V2 remarked that the company had to think 
carefully in submitting quotations to HVN as it had approximately ten competitors all 
bidding to supply the lead firm (interview #2). Among suppliers of plastic components, 
                                                        
75 “Institutionalised competition” is a term coined by Sako (1992); Richardson (1993) alludes to 
“parallel sourcing”; while Fujimoto (1999) refers to patterns of supplier competition in the domain 
of product development in the Japanese automobile industry as “development competition”. Similar 
practices are also discussed by Asanuma (1989).   
76 Asanuma (1989) does not discuss what lead firm “policy” specifically means, but HVN’s 
emerging priorities in terms of Honda Group and VEAM suppliers are typical examples.  
104 
 
 
 
V1 was in receipt of increasing orders for high-precision parts and moulds, while V5 
still focussed on relatively simple components and faced diminishing orders (interviews 
with V1 #2, #4; V5 #2).   
By contrast, the substantive degree of competition faced by suppliers in first two groups 
was apparently weaker. To the extent that HVN opted to expand local sourcing, it had to 
depend on these suppliers as there were no domestic alternatives equipped with similar 
levels of capability to supply core components to the required standards. Moreover, with 
regard to Honda Group suppliers, the fact that the manufacturer had long depended on 
the component design capabilities of parent companies in Japan or affiliates in Thailand 
certainly remained a key consideration in HVN’s sourcing decisions. As of 2008–09, 
Honda Group members and VEAM suppliers continued to receive orders from HVN for 
100% of the components they specialised in (interviews with HVN #4, #5; J2 #2; J3 #2; 
J6 #2; J10 #1; J11 #1).  
However, there were indications that even these suppliers were beginning to experience 
growing competition. By Stage III, HVN had started to solicit quotations even for core 
components from multiple sources – typically suppliers in China – with the aim of 
applying pressure to the candidates (interview #3). Indeed, all Honda Group suppliers 
interviewed by the author between 2007 and 2009 expressed concern about growing 
competition with overseas suppliers, including subsidiaries of their parent companies 
located in other Southeast Asian countries. For example the general director of supplier 
J3 noted that the company was stepping up its efforts to reduce costs in the face of 
competition not coming only from Thailand and Indonesia but also from China in the 
longer term (interview #2). And the general director of J2 remarked: “So far HVN has 
only asked for quotations from us, but they tell us that they will buy from whichever 
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source offers the lowest price; we face intense price-based competition” (interview #2).  
In short, the shifting capability alignment enabled HVN to fully adjust its value chain to 
meet changing product requirements. The result was an ‘institutionalised competition’ 
variant of the captive organisational model, which not only combined the benefits of 
long-term, collaborative relations with suppliers and the advantage of market forces, but 
also incorporated adaptations to meet market, industrial and policy conditions prevailing 
in Vietnam. The preferential sourcing approach in respect of the VEAM Corporation 
and the soliciting of quotations from companies located abroad are examples of such 
modifications.  
5.4 Summary and Discussion 
The in-depth empirical analysis in this section shed light on the dynamic transformation 
of HVN’s value chain over a decade from the late 1990s. In terms of the first 
sub-question, it was argued that the seemingly radical organisational shift immediately 
after the China shock emphasised in the existing literature transpired to be short-lived, 
while a more dynamic and longer-lasting organisational transformation occurred in the 
medium term. By this time, HVN’s value chain had been transformed from a ‘foster 
parent’ variant of the captive model into an ‘institutionalised competition’ variant – a 
hybrid organisational form that systematically combined the conventional advantages of 
long-term relations with suppliers and the benefits of market forces. In the end, Honda 
managed to weather challenges emanating from China by modifying its organisational 
model rather than transforming it into something different.  
With regard to the second sub-question, the empirical analysis demonstrated that the 
nature of the product was not sufficient to explain the trajectory of organisational 
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transformation. While HVN was quick to adjust its product strategy, the functioning of 
the market forces it had intended to introduce was constrained by the existing alignment 
of lead firm and supplier capabilities. HVN’s production volume was critical in 
removing this obstacle. By lowering prices, it sought to increase its scale of production 
but this happened only after the Vietnamese government reversed its restrictive policy 
towards foreign motorcycle manufacturers.  
When HVN’s production was finally permitted to expand, it started to exert huge 
purchasing power over its suppliers. As an increasing number of foreign firms were 
attracted to the growing market, supplier capabilities also started to accumulate. An 
important point to note is that even though some suppliers could not be substituted 
domestically, the capabilities they possessed were not indispensable to HVN in the 
sense that there were regional alternatives. This explains why the accumulation of 
supplier capabilities did not result in a shift to a relational chain. Rather, it was the 
combination of HVN’s huge purchasing power and growing supplier capabilities – but 
not complementary competencies – that allowed HVN to exploit institutionalised 
competition to extract constant improvement in manufacturing performance out of its 
suppliers.  
On the whole, the analysis in this section has demonstrated that the Japanese 
organisational model in its original form was not readily adaptable to the emerging 
Vietnamese market. Although HVN was quick to adjust its product strategy in response 
to the China shock, and actively sought to realign the capability structure in order to 
create conditions conducive to the effective functioning of the market forces it intended 
to introduce, these attempts failed to produce immediate results. This is because the 
government introduced policies that explicitly discriminated against foreign motorcycle 
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manufacturers, and supplier capabilities took time to be nurtured or realigned. It was 
eventual incidental policy change as well as medium-term progress in accumulation of 
supplier capabilities that laid the foundations for the dynamic transformation of the 
Japanese model in Stage III, a shift that enabled HVN to establish itself as an 
increasingly dominant actor in the Vietnamese market. 
6. The Emergence and Transformation of the Vietnamese–Chinese 
Chain in Vietnam  
This section turns the focus to the Chinese organisational model. Rather than being 
transplanted by a major TNC – as had been the case with the Japanese model – the 
Chinese model emerged spontaneously in Vietnam in the early 2000s, as Chinese 
exporters of motorcycle components, Vietnamese assemblers of imported components, 
and component suppliers of different nationalities independently reacted to growing 
business opportunities. Local Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers emerged as lead firms 
that initially assembled imported Chinese components, but gradually expanded local 
sourcing as the government stepped up its enforcement of local content rules. 
In an attempt to examine the dynamic trajectories of organisational transformation, the 
analysis now focuses on the second and third stages of Vietnamese motorcycle 
industrial development: 
 Stage II (2000–2004), when the Chinese model emerged in Vietnam  
 Stage III (2005–2008), when the model was transformed as lead firms and suppliers 
reacted to challenges posed by Japanese motorcycle manufacturers 
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6.1 Stage II: The Emergence of Market-based Chains  
The empirical analysis begins by examining the features of the Chinese model as it 
emerged in the early 2000s. Taking account of the dispersed structure of this sector of 
the industry at this stage, the emphasis is on sector-level analysis, which is 
complemented by analysis of embedded cases of several relatively large assemblers.  
6.1.1 Minimal Coordination Requirements: Low Quality and De facto 
Standardisation 
The types of motorcycles produced by local Vietnamese assemblers were strikingly 
different from the Japanese-brand vehicles that had prevailed in the domestic market, 
the product and process parameters of the former being highly standardised and simple.  
First, the high level of standardisation requires elaboration. The existing literature on 
Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers points out that modularisation allowed arm’s-length 
networks to prevail in this sector (Pham Truong Hoang 2007; Nguyen Duc Tiep 2006; 
The Motorbike Working Group 2007). However, the present study found otherwise. 
Rather than transforming motorcycles from integral to modular design architecture, 
Chinese manufacturers used several popular Japanese models as de facto standards for 
duplicative imitation of the external configuration (Ohara 2001; Ge and Fujimoto 2004) 
– the phenomenon that this paper refers to as the de facto standardisation of Japanese 
models. As argued in Paper I, standardisation of this sort is at best partial because full 
compatibility of components can only be guaranteed insofar as they are manufactured in 
precise accordance with the original Japanese base model drawings. This was not the 
case in China, where uncoordinated duplicative imitation gave rise to components that 
were not strictly compatible.  
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The present study found that a similar situation prevailed in Vietnam in the early 2000s. 
In this period, de facto standardisation centred on an even smaller number of Honda’s 
popular models than in China. The author’s interviews of motorcycle retailers in Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City in August 2002 found that the overwhelming majority of 
products imitated two of Honda’s most popular models, Dream and Wave, most of them 
featuring C100 or C110 engines with Chinese brands.77 Embedded cases of assemblers 
also confirmed de facto standardisation of a limited number of Japanese models. As of 
the early 2000s, all three assemblers for which detailed data were available (A1, A2 and 
A4) produced imitations of Dream and/or Wave (interviews and/or factory visits at A1 
#1; A2 #1; A4 #3).  
As had been the case in China, de facto standardisation of Japanese models in Vietnam 
failed to ensure component compatibility because duplicative imitation took place not 
on the basis of a single, detailed drawing but was invariably the result of uncoordinated, 
repeated duplication of products available on the market, many of which themselves 
carried minor modifications to original designs (Pham Truong Hoang 2007), with 
varying yet generally low levels of precision (interviews and/or factory visits at V15 #1, 
#2; V18 #1; V19 #1).  
The second feature is simple product and/or process parameters. This was confirmed by 
the lack of lead firm requirement beyond price level. The two embedded assemblers for 
which detailed interview data are available (A2 and A4) only specified the names of 
base models or provided samples for replication at best, and neither provided detailed 
drawings or specifications in terms of precision levels, materials, or production 
                                                        
77 The most ubiquitous imitation brands (e.g. ‘Hongda’) and/or popular Chinese brands such as 
Loncin, Lifan and Zongshen were displayed on engine covers (the author’s field visits, and 
interviews with motorcycle retailers in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi in August 2002).  
110 
 
 
 
processes (interviews with A2 #1; A4 #3). These findings are corroborated by the 
author’s interviews with suppliers, as they were not offered the sorts of detailed 
lead-firm specifications discussed in the previous section. Suppliers of engine parts 
explicitly stated that they adopted a single preconfigured design for all their customers 
(interviews with V17 #1; V19 #2; T6 #1), while suppliers of other components were 
typically provided with samples for replication (V15 #2; V23 #1; T7 #2). 
Rather, the focus of assemblers was overwhelmingly on cost. From 2000 to 2001, the 
prices of their products ranged between US$445 and US$565,78 which was roughly a 
quarter of the official price of HVN’s most popular model, the Super Dream (U$S1,990) 
in 2000 (Nguyen Duc Hien 2004: 234). It was also much lower than the price of the 
Wave Alpha (US$719), the budget model that HVN launched in 2002. The average 
price of motorcycles produced by the case assemblers in 2004 was US$470 (Table II-9).   
In summary, de facto standardisation and emphasis on price-based competitiveness 
significantly reduced the need for explicit coordination. However, to the extent that de 
facto standardisation failed to ensure full component compatibility, the need for 
coordination could not be eliminated completely. 
6.1.2 Dispersed Structure, Limited Capabilities 
 
To begin with, the Vietnamese–Chinese chain had a fragmented structure consisting of a 
large number of assemblers and a moderately large number of suppliers, both of which 
were small in scale and possessed limited capability. None of these firms held sufficient 
capability to exercise power over others.  
                                                        
78 ‘The unpredictable fever’ (Saigon Times Weekly dated 17 November 2001); ‘Glut of imported 
motorbikes sparks worries about congestion, accidents’ (Viet Nam News dated 14 December 2001). 
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The overall structure of assemblers in the early 2000s can be confirmed on the basis of 
official statistics as well as embedded cases. As of May 2002, 51 Vietnamese 
motorcycle assemblers were in operation.79 Forty-one such firms assembled less than 
40,000 units in 2000, while the largest firm (A2) accounted for just 8.8% of the total 
turnover of all local assemblers. They had limited knowledge of products and/or 
production processes: of the 51 assemblers registered as of 2002, only 7 had initial 
investment in own-production capacity (Ha Huy Thanh et al. 2003: 335). 
None of the embedded case assemblers, which were known to be among the largest in 
the early 2000s, had manufacturing experience prior to starting motorcycle production 
(Table II-9). Their focus on the assembly of imported or purchased components also 
meant that they did not take on product development, design, manufacturing of key 
components, marketing, or branding.  
Based on official statistics, the total number of suppliers participating in the 
Vietnamese–Chinese chain in 2002 is estimated to be about 50.80 However, it is 
suspected that the actual figure was much larger as hundreds of companies entered into 
the production of relatively simple motorcycle components for local assemblers.81 With 
the exception of Taiwanese firms – most of which were specialised providers of 
components already incorporated into Taiwanese and/or Japanese chains (Chen and Jou 
2002) – suppliers in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain possessed limited design and/or  
                                                        
79 Data provided by the Ministry of Industry of Vietnam. While this number is smaller than the 
number of assemblers in China – where Ohara (2006a: 22) notes there were 154 motorcycle 
manufacturers in 2003 – it can still regarded as very large given the much smaller size of the 
Vietnamese market.  
80 The author’s estimate based on a list of firms producing motorcycle components in 2002 provided 
by the General Statistics Office, excluding Japanese, Taiwanese, and Vietnamese companies that 
were known to have participated in the Japanese chain.    
81 Nguyen Duc Hien (2004: 238), citing the report by the Economic and Financial Committee of the 
National Assembly in 2001, notes that around 550 firms produced motorcycle components.  
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Table II-9. Profiles of Local Assemblers Selected as Embedded Case Studies 
Assembler  A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
Stages for which detailed data are available  Stages II and III Stage II only Stage III only  Stages II and III Stages II and III Stage III only 
Experience prior to entering into motorcycle assembly 
Trading consumer 
electronics 
Diverse (trading, 
tourism, real 
estate, etc.)  
n/a 
Trading 
(motorcycles and 
other products) 
Trading 
(motorcycles and 
other products) 
Motorcycle 
dealer 
Market share 
2000 
% 8.5% 8.8% 3.8% 1.9% 1.3% (not on the list) 
Ranking 3rd 1st 5th 17th 31st (not on the list) 
2006 
% 23.1% 1.8% 8.3% 1.6% 5.1% 2.8% 
Ranking 1st 17th 4th 19th 7th 9th 
Annual production (units) 
2000 148,000 107,900 72,450 23,731 34,600 (not on the list) 
2007 300,000 (n/a) 95,000 24,000 20,469 30,000 
Average price of motorcycles 
(US$) 
2004 365 451 * (n/a) 439 622 (n/a) 
2007 310 (n/a) 279 373 745 497 
Number of new models 
registered 
2001–04 71 44 41 26 39 8 
2005–07 474 31 219 57 47 33 
Local content ratio (%) 2003 (n/a) (n/a) (n/a) 85 80 (n/a) 
Number of suppliers 2007 100 (n/a) 55 60 80 48 
Notes:  
1) n/a = not available 
2) ‘Market share’ denotes the percentage of the market and rank of respective suppliers of all registered Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers included in lists 
provided by the Ministry of Industry (for 2000) and the General Statistics Office (for 2006).  
3) ‘Number of new models registered’ denotes the number of new models registered with the Vietnam Register for sales in the domestic market.   
4) * The A2 average price is for 2003, while the data for all other assemblers are for 2004. 
Sources: 
1) Turnover: Ministry of Industry (for 2000) and the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (for 2006).  
2) Number of new models registered: The author, based on data from the Vietnam Register (http://www.vr.org.vn), accessed 6 January 2009. 
3) All other data obtained from the author’s interviews and questionnaire surveys conducted in collaboration with the Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam 
Academy of Social Science.   
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manufacturing capabilities.  
Virtually all Vietnamese suppliers selected as embedded cases were companies 
previously engaged in the small-scale production of replacement components, bicycle 
parts, or household metal and plastic products for the domestic market, and they only 
acquired rudimentary capabilities in Stage II (Table II-10).   
Table II-10. Capabilities Acquired by Vietnamese Suppliers in Vietnamese–Chinese 
Chains 
  Before Stage I Stage I Stage II Stage III 
V13 Machinery components for SOEs Operational (Prd) (Shift to other chains) 
V14 Machinery components for SOEs Operational (Prd) (Shift to other chains) 
V15 Bicycle components Operational (Prd/Eq) (Shift to other chains) 
V16 Bicycle components Adaptive (Prd) 
V17 Trading  Operational (Eq/PM) (Shift to other chains) 
V18 Bicycle components Operational (Prd/Eq/PM) (Shift to other chains) 
V19 Bicycle components Operational (Prd/Eq) (Shift to other chains) 
V20 Replacement components Operational (Prd/Eq) Operational (Prd/Eq) 
V21 Trading 
 
Operational (Prd/PM) 
V22 Trading Operational (Prd/PM) (Shift to other chains) 
Notes: 
(1) For periods prior to entry into or after exit from the Vietnamese–Chinese chain (the unshaded 
area), main lines of business are given. 
(2) For periods after entry into the Vietnamese–Chinese chain (the shaded area), the level of new 
product introduction and production-related capabilities acquired by each supplier in 
Vietnamese–Chinese chain by the respective stage is shown.  
(3) Types of capability are abbreviated as follows: Prd = new product introduction capability; Eq = 
equipment-related capability; PM = production management capability. 
Source: The author’s interviews with suppliers, compiled on the basis of Paper III.  
Unlike the Japanese chain, assembler–supplier relations in the Vietnamese–Chinese 
chain were fluid. Table II-11 shows several suppliers that received orders from local 
assemblers over short periods of time ranging from a few months to a few years (T1, 
V13, V14, and V19). This table also indicates that the majority of suppliers  
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Table II-11. Suppliers’ Dependence on Local Assemblers   
Supplier 
Entry 
into V-C 
chain 
Types of 
Components 
Ranking by 
Turnover 
Transactions with Case 
Assemblers 
Number of Customers, Patterns of Dependence 
2002 2006 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 Stage II Stage III 
Suppliers that expanded transactions with Group 1 assemblers in Stage III 
V16 2000 Silencers 
not 
included 
53rd X   X     X 
Traded with 30 local assemblers in 
2002, accounting for 80-90% of the 
local sales. 
Traded with 20 local assemblers in 2008, accounting 
for 50% of the total sales. 2006 was the peak year. 
A1, A3, A6 among five largest customers.  
V20 1997 Silencers 27th 116th X    X     X 
Traded with a total of 46 companies between 1997 and 2008. As of 2008, had 3 customers, 
accounting for 10% of sales.  
V21 2004 
Shock 
absorbers 
not 
included 
not 
included 
X      X   X (Not yet established)  
Traded with 10 local assemblers in 2009, accounting 
for 95% of sales. During the peak year, had 50 
customers. 
C1 2001 
Plastic 
covers, 
frames, 
lights 
not 
included 
6th & 
38th 
X   X X X X (n/a) Traded with 43 local assemblers in 2007. A1 largest. 
C2 2002 Clutches 
not 
included 
24th X         X 
Traded with 24 companies in 2004, 
accounting for 50% of sales. A1 and A6 
among largest. 
Sales to local assemblers accounting for 56% of 
sales (number of local assemblers unknown). A1 
among largest. 
C3 2002 Frames 
not 
included 
62nd     X       (n/a) 
Traded with 19 local assemblers in 2008. A3 largest. 
No products/customers other than motorcycle 
components/local assemblers. 
C4 2003 
Electric 
components  
not 
included 
60th       X   X 
Traded with 30 assemblers in 2004. A4 
and A6 among largest.  
Traded with 50 assemblers in 2008. 
Suppliers that had shifted from Vietnamese–Chinese chains to Japanese chains by Stage III 
T1 1999 
Stamped 
components 
not 
included 
9th 
&11th 
(n/a) 
Traded with local assemblers only 
during 1999–2001. No transactions with local assemblers in 2007. 
T2 1998 
Shock 
absorbers 
not 
included 
17th (n/a) (n/a) 
Traded with more 10 local assemblers in 2007, 
accounting for 25% of sales.  
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Table II-11. Continued 
Supplier 
Entry 
into V-C 
chain 
Types of 
Components 
Ranking by 
Turnover 
Transactions with Case 
Assemblers 
Number of Customers, Patterns of Dependence 
2002 2006 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 Stage II Stage III 
T3 1997 
Electric 
components  
not 
included 
21st X   X      X (n/a) 
Traded with 16 local assemblers in 2005, accounting 
for 10% of sales. Only A6 placed regular orders in 
2009. 
T4 2004 
Electric 
components  
not 
included 
25th (n/a) 
Expanded sales to local assemblers in 
2002–2003. Accounted for one-third of 
sales in 2004. 
Traded with 4 local assemblers in 2008, accounting 
for less than 1% of sales.  
T5 2000 Silencers 
not 
included 
33rd           X  
Traded with local assemblers only 
during 2000–2004. Accounted for less 
than 5% of the total sales. A6 among 
the main customer. 
(n/a) 
K1 1999 Switches 9th 46th     X    X X 
Traded with local assemblers in 2004, 
accounting for 50% of sales. Six 
relatively large customers. 
Traded with 10 local assemblers in 2008, accounting 
for 5% of sales. A6 among main customers.  
V13 2000 Bearings 
not 
included 
45th X  X         
Traded with local assemblers only 
during 2000–2003, accounting for 
20-30% of sales. 
No transactions with local assemblers in 2008. 
V14 2003 
Engine 
components 
not 
included 
not 
included 
(no transactions with any of the 
six assemblers) 
Traded with 3 local assemblers only in 
2003, accounting for 10% of sales. 
No transactions with local assemblers. 
V15 2001 
Aluminium 
die-cast 
components 
not 
included 
not 
included 
(no transactions with any of the 
six assemblers) 
(n/a) 
Traded with 5 local assemblers in 2008, accounting 
for 20% of sales. Maintained long-term transactions 
with 5 customers.  
V17 2001 Clutches 
not 
included 
not 
included 
X      X X   
Traded with very large number of 
customers in 2001, accounting for 100% 
of sales. A1, A4, and A5 among main 
customers. 
No transactions with local assemblers in 2008. 
Suppliers that had shifted from Vietnamese–Chinese chains to other products/industries by Stage III 
V18 1997 
Steel 
components 
20th 
not 
included 
(n/a) Traded with a total of 36 companies between 1997 and 2006, accounting for 100% of sales. 
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Table II-11. Continued 
Supplier 
Entry 
into V-C 
chain 
Types of 
Components 
Ranking by 
Turnover 
Transactions with Case 
Assemblers 
Number of Customers, Patterns of Dependence 
2002 2006 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 Stage II Stage III 
V19 1999 
Engine 
components 
not 
included 
98th X      X     
Traded with 10 assemblers in 2002, 
accounting for 60% of sales. 
The number of customers reduced to 2-3. Share of 
local assemblers in total sales 5-7% in 2008. 
V22 2000 Chains 
not 
included 
not 
included 
X            
Traded with two local assemblers in 
2000–1, accounting for 50% of sales.  
Traded with 10 local assemblers in 2009, accounting 
for 30% of sales.  
V23 2002 
Wire 
harnesses 
51st 
not 
included 
 
X 
          
Traded with 12 local assemblers in 
2004, accounting for 20% of sales. No 
main customer could be identified. 2002 
was peak year. 
No transactions with local assemblers in 2008. 
Suppliers for which developments after Stage III is unknown 
T6 2001 Hubs 6th 
not 
included 
(n/a) 
Traded with very large number of 
customers in 2004, accounting for 42% 
of sales. Neither total number of 
customers nor main customers could be 
identified. 
(n/a) 
T7 (n/a) Chains 
not 
included 
66th         X   (n/a) 
Traded with 30 local assemblers in 2005, accounting 
for 12% of sales.  
C5 2002 
Plastic 
covers 
not 
included 
133rd (n/a) 
Traded with 10 local assemblers in 
2004. 
(n/a) 
Notes:  
1) Nationality of suppliers can be identified by initial letters of supplier codes as follows: C = Chinese; T = Taiwanese; K = Korean; V = Vietnamese. 
2) ‘Ranking by turnover’ indicates placement of respective suppliers among all registered motorcycle component suppliers included in the lists provided by the General 
Statistics Office.  
3) ‘Not included’ indicates that the supplier was omitted from the list, which typically occurred when suppliers were registered under other industries because their main 
product lines were not motorcycle components.  
4) ‘Transactions with case assemblers’ indicate whether the respective supplier conducted business with the respective assembler at any time.  
Source: The author’s surveys and interviews. 
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simultaneously traded with a large number of assemblers. Suppliers V16, V17, V20, K1, 
and T6 specifically emphasised that they had no main customer even though they traded 
with some of the largest local assemblers.  
In summary, the Vietnamese–Chinese chain consisted of a large number of assemblers 
and a fairly large number of suppliers, both of which were small in scale and possessed 
limited capabilities. Inter-firm relations were fluid and none of them exercised power 
over others.  
6.1.3 Arm’s-Length Linkages in Need of Coordination 
The discussion in Section 6.1.1 showed that although standardised and simple 
parameters prevailed in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain, the requirement for explicit 
coordination was not eliminated entirely. Specifically, the following two types of 
coordination requirement remained:  
 Coordination needs around product parameters remained to the extent that de facto 
standardisation only partially ensured component compatibility.  
 Low quality requirements notwithstanding, even lower levels of supplier 
manufacturing competence resulted in coordination needs around process 
parameters.  
The following examines how assemblers and their suppliers coped with these 
coordination needs via in-depth examination of the three assemblers for which detailed 
data could be obtained: A1, A2 and A4. 
Some assemblers opted for vertical integration. Assemblers A1 and A4 conducted 
in-house manufacturing of components in cooperation with Chinese and Taiwanese 
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partners respectively. Although investment in in-house manufacturing was often made 
in response to the government policy (see Section 2.3), the fact that it was a costly 
option for those with small production capacity notwithstanding, these assemblers 
explicitly noted the advantages of the practice. In this regard, assembler A4 noted: 
We want to produce low-price but good-quality motorcycles for [our] customers. 
Therefore, we face many difficulties in sourcing components locally – the quality is 
not stable. So, we need to produce some components even though it is not efficient 
and drives up costs.        (A4 #1)  
Asked to compare sourcing components from China, sourcing locally, and 
manufacturing them in-house, a manager of assembler A1 responded:  
Manufacturing components in-house is the best option – in terms of advantages in 
both cost and quality. The key is that we endeavour to increase the quality of our 
products.         (A1 #1)  
Implicit in the above comment is that this company saw no possibility of implementing 
mechanisms for imposing its quality requirements on external suppliers.  
However, even with these assemblers, in-house manufacturing was typically limited to a 
few types of component only. In the main, lead firms engaged in arm’s-length 
transactions with their suppliers in the sourcing of the majority of components.  
First, two assemblers interviewed by the author (A2 and A4) explicitly noted that they 
adopted a trial-and error approach, switching suppliers whenever they found one to be 
unsatisfactory. This is evident from remarks made by the former procurement manager 
of assembler A2, the largest assembler in 2000: 
Back in the early years [2000–2001], the number of suppliers was limited and thus 
it was difficult to switch suppliers. However, we still tried different suppliers in 
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search of those that were stable – in terms of quality, payment, prices and delivery. 
          (A2 #1)  
Second, a lack of explicit governance is also evident from the ordering procedure.82 
Given the very small scale of production, local assemblers placed orders on an ad hoc 
basis.83 Transactions typically began with the assembler providing the supplier with 
either a sample for replication or very simple component specifications (e.g. type of 
component, type of base model, and/or colour). The supplier then provided the lead firm 
with a sample together with a price quotation. If the lead firm accepted both the sample 
and the price, the two parties signed a ‘basic contract’, which normally lasted for a year 
but did not bind the assembler in terms of either volume or frequency of orders.  
Clearly, arm’s-length transactions of the sort discussed above failed to provide solutions 
to coordination needs around product and process parameters. However, although the 
problem of low quality could simply be left unresolved, the lack of component 
compatibility posed a serious problem because assemblers were often faced with 
components that could not be assembled. These instances were typically dealt with by 
ad hoc, ex post adjustments by suppliers with the sole intention of making the 
components assemblable. Suppliers were often asked by customers to modify 
components once delivered as they were incompatible with adjacent parts (interviews 
with V13 #1; V15 #2; K1 #2). Nevertheless, such piecemeal modifications fell short of 
full component compatibility, leading to products that were inferior in quality and 
performance to original models.  
In short, limited lead firm and supplier capabilities resulted in a situation in which 
                                                        
82 Unless otherwise noted, the description of ordering procedure in this paragraph is based on 
interviews with assemblers A2 #1; A4 #4 and suppliers V13 #1; V15 #2; V17 #1; V19 #2; V23 #1; 
T6 #1; T7 #1. 
83 Even in assembler A2, which recorded the largest turnover in 2000, the average size of each order 
was only 100–200 units (interview #1). 
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coordination issues arising from the shortcomings of de facto standardisation were left 
unattended. Market-based transactions characterised by ad hoc coordination achieved 
low prices but at the expense of low quality.  
6.2 Stage III: Emergence of Coordination from Below 
This section analyses the responses of local assemblers to fresh challenges in a new 
stage of industrial development: the rapid growth of foreign motorcycle manufacturers 
combined with increasing sophistication of market demand. Since the sector began to 
take a concentrated structure, the analysis starts by briefly discussing the overall 
structure of the industry and then proceeds to detailed analyses of a limited number of 
the largest assemblers and their key suppliers.  
6.2.1 Meeting the Japanese Challenge: Two Contrasting Approaches  
As the new stage of industrial development commenced, local assemblers were faced 
with fresh challenges. First, HVN’s penetration of the middle-income market now posed 
a real threat as it actively invested in production capacity expansion after 2005 (Section 
5.3.2). Second, the upward shift in consumers’ preferences discussed in Section 5.3.1 
put pressure on local assemblers to increase the quality of their products. Having 
experienced serious quality issues with Chinese motorcycles, Vietnamese consumers 
were no longer willing to accept low prices at the expense of poor quality. 
Local assemblers responded to the new challenges with two distinct approaches.84 One 
group of assemblers focussed on producing a larger variety of models carrying imitated 
                                                        
84 This finding was initially derived from the author’s in-depth analysis of a small number of 
assemblers (Fujita 2006) but it was corroborated by interviews with suppliers operating in the 
Vietnamese–Chinese chain, particularly C1 #2, #3; K1 #3; T3 #2; V16 #2; and V21 #1. 
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designs at low costs, targeting the low-income rural market that the Japanese 
manufacturers had not penetrated. Another group of assemblers prioritised the 
improvement of product quality, developing own product designs and/or brand names, 
even if this should be at the expense of higher prices.  
The two contrasting approaches can be observed in the embedded cases of the five 
assemblers for which detailed data are available for Stage III (Table II-9). Assemblers 
A1 and A3 belong to the former category. They are similar in that they kept product and 
process parameters simple and standardised, specifying few requirements beyond price 
level. A number of suppliers explicitly noted that assemblers in this category – A1 in 
particular – specified limited quality requirement (C1 #2, #3; V16 #2; V21 #1). The low 
prices of their products are also an indication that their target was low-income 
consumers. As Table II-9 shows, the average price of these assemblers’ products in 2007 
was less than half that of the Wave Alpha, US$801.  
These assemblers continued to capitalise on Japanese designs as de facto benchmarks. 
However, unlike the case in Stage II, these assemblers started to make minor (largely 
cosmetic) modifications to several key components. Alterations to plastic covers and 
frames, which affected the external appearance of the motorcycle, were of particular 
importance (interviews with assembler A4 #4; supplier C1 #2, #3).  
The above approach to the modification of de facto standard models enabled these 
assemblers to achieve a remarkable expansion of product variety, as well as speed and 
flexibility in launching new models. This is most clearly observed in assemblers A1 and 
A3. Table II-8 shows that the number of new models registered by these assemblers 
increased rapidly after 2005. By this stage, assemblers exploited not only Honda’s two 
most popular motorcycles but also a much larger range of Japanese models – including 
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new ones launched after 2005 – as de facto standards for duplicative imitation 
(interviews with supplier C1 #2, #3). Moreover, they launched a large number of new 
products by mixing and matching components with minor modifications (interviews 
with suppliers C1 #3; K1 #2, #3). Supplier K1, which simultaneously traded with HVN 
and local assemblers, described the strength of this group of assemblers as the flexibility 
and speed with which they were able to adjust product strategy: 
[They] are sensitive to market information. They try to obtain information on 
Honda’s future models using their connections with the Ministry of Industry, and 
replicate these products in advance. To cope with the regulations on intellectual 
property, they combine different types of components. Honda cannot change its 
product strategy quickly, but [local assemblers] can change [product strategy] 
within a week.       (K1 #2) 
Assemblers A5 and A6 belonged to the latter category of assemblers. Unlike those in the 
other group, notable changes were observed in their products. The complexity of 
product and process parameters increased as these assemblers attached priority to 
quality. Suppliers to these assemblers noted that – although by no means on the scale 
exacted by Japanese manufacturers – they were more demanding in terms of quality, for 
which they were willing sacrifice economy of price (interviews with C1 #2; T3 #2; V21 
#1). Accordingly, the average prices of their products were higher than those of the 
assemblers in the former category (Table II-9). Product parameters also grew less 
standardised as these assemblers sought to develop their own designs and brands.85 
Assembler A6 in particular had adopted customised designs for some of its models by 
2007, for the manufacture of which suppliers were provided with design drawings 
together with samples (interviews with assembler A6 #1 and A6’s supplier, T3 #2).  
                                                        
85 Institute for Industry Policy and Strategy (2007: 39) also notes A5 and A6 are among those 
assemblers that invest in own-product designs and brands.  
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Assembler A4 fell between the two categories, in that it did not opt to develop 
own-product designs or brands and kept product parameters standardised. However, the 
company did seek to increase the quality of its products, resulting in higher prices than 
those of assemblers A1 and A3 (interview with A4 #4).  
In short, two discrete groups of local assemblers emerged in Stage III, each of which 
adopted a different product strategy. Yet, the question remains as to which of the two 
came to represent the dominant actor within the industry. This puzzle is addressed in the 
next subsection. 
6.2.2 Consolidation of Assemblers and Rise of Supplier Capabilities 
In Stage III, the local assembly sector of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry was 
substantially restructured, assemblers being consolidated into a small number of large 
companies. By 2006, the number of active local assemblers had been reduced to 28, 
roughly half that of 2000.86 Accordingly, the market grew more compact, and it was 
those assemblers that concentrated on price-based competiveness (the first group 
discussed above) that captured the bulk of the sales share. As Table II-9 shows, the 
largest assembler (A1) accounted for 23% of the total turnover of local assemblers in 
2006, and the four largest firms (inclusive of assemblers A1 and A3) together enjoyed a 
50% share.87 In contrast, assemblers that focussed on non-price-based competitiveness 
(the second group discussed above) accounted for a much smaller market share.  
However, there was little indication that either group of assemblers had amassed new 
capabilities. Those in the second category developed their own products by mobilising 
                                                        
86 Based on a list of motorcycle assemblers operational in 2006 provided by the General Statistics 
Office.  
87 Based on a list of motorcycle assemblers operational in 2006 provided by the General Statistics 
Office.  
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external capabilities rather than building their own internal capabilities: A5 collaborated 
with Chinese partners (questionnaire survey in 2007), while A6 outsourced product 
design to overseas companies (interview #1). 
Consolidation progressed on the suppliers’ side as well. As local content rules were 
relaxed in 2003, local assemblers as a whole began to depend increasingly on imported 
components (Table II-12), relying on local sourcing only when parts were available at 
competitive prices. Table II-11 classifies suppliers in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain 
according to their positions in Stage III. Of those interviewed by the author, several 
quickly expanded sales to local assemblers, the largest firms in particular such as A1 
and A3 (V16, C1, C2, C3, and C4). At the same time, the remaining suppliers faced 
diminishing sales to local assemblers, and they either shifted to the Japanese chain or 
other industries.  
Table II-12. Value of Imported Components per Vehicle Sold (Unit: US$) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
HVN 692 641 275 231 203 218 
Local Assemblers 506 338 181 179 420 396 
Source: The author, based on data provided in Institute for Industry Policy and Strategy (2007).  
What is striking is the size of turnover and the number of customers the first group of 
suppliers served at this stage. Supplier C1 had two factories registered as independent 
companies, which in 2006 ranked as 6th and 38th respectively in terms of turnover of all 
operational motorcycle component manufacturers in Vietnam, including the largest 
Japanese suppliers that served 100% of HVN’s growing orders. In 2007, this supplier 
sold over 860,000 units of plastic covers and frames (interview with C1 #1), which 
more or less accounts for the total number of motorcycles produced by local assemblers 
in that year (Figure II-1). Moreover, these suppliers simultaneously served 20 to 50 
local assemblers in Stage III (Table II-11), which was in fact more than the 
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aforementioned number of officially registered local assemblers in 2006.88  
Suppliers expanding their sales to local assemblers are particularly notable for the extent 
to which they built design and manufacturing capabilities. Moreover, unlike suppliers 
under the Japanese model, the accretion of new capabilities in the Vietnamese–Chinese 
chain was achieved primarily through suppliers’ independent volition rather than as the 
result of explicit demand from or assistance of lead firms. As the most prominent 
example, C1 had invested in generic manufacturing competencies in order to achieve 
reasonable quality, prompt delivery, and low prices, whilst mobilising the capability of 
the company’s R&D centre in China to reverse-engineer existing component designs 
and conduct minor cosmetic modifications (interview #1). The ability to conduct 
large-scale manufacturing to reasonable quality standards was developed by importing 
equipment and machinery from China and mobilising Chinese engineers (ibid.). The 
huge production volume also enabled the company to exploit economies of scale.  
Likewise, V16, a Vietnamese supplier of silencers, was one of the few local suppliers 
continuing to operate in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain in Stage III. This firm was the 
only local supplier subjected to in-depth analysis by this study that had acquired an 
adaptive or basic innovative level of new product introduction capability (Table II-10). 
Whereas it had replicated existing products in the 1990s, it subsequently gradually 
started to make cosmetic and functional modifications to standardised designs 
(interviews #1, #2). This was achieved through its own R&D efforts and attempts to 
engage with assemblers. The supplier independently established an R&D department, 
investing in design equipment, software, and testing and measuring equipment, as well 
as training its own design engineers (interview #1).  
                                                        
88 This is likely to be because some assemblers had shifted their focus to other lines of business 
where they were officially registered, yet continued to produce motorcycles on a small scale.  
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In short, the local motorcycle assembly sector was consolidated into those assemblers 
that focussed on price-based competitiveness in standardised models with minor 
external modifications. Consolidation also progressed on the suppliers’ side, which 
resulted in the rise of those with manufacturing and design competencies.  
6.2.3 The Rise of Supplier-Driven Coordination 
The result of the rapid consolidation of lead firms and suppliers amounted to de facto 
mutual dependence between large assemblers and large, competent suppliers. The 
results of questionnaire surveys conducted in 2007 show that assemblers A1, A3, A4, 
A5 and A6 developed relatively long-term relations with a limited number of key 
suppliers that extended for between three and six years, suggesting that the relations 
between lead firms and suppliers had stabilised.  
However, this does not imply Japanese-type organisation in which lead firms and 
suppliers are locked into particular relations. Assemblers expressed strong preference to 
avoid dependence on specific suppliers. Table II-13 shows that all of five assemblers 
under study cited the optimum number of suppliers for each type of component as two 
to three in order that they should not be dependent on specific firms. Remarkably, no 
major differences were observed between the two groups of assemblers. Neither were 
suppliers locked into relations with specific customers, a finding that is clearly 
illustrated by the large number served by suppliers surviving to Stage III (Table II-11).  
Thus far, it has become clear that the local motorcycle assembly sector came to be 
dominated by a small number of large assemblers producing low-priced, standardised 
models with minor external modifications. While their success is plausible given that 
they catered to the extreme low-end section of the Vietnamese market that even HVN’s 
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budget model had not penetrated, the question remains as to how they managed to 
resolve coordination issues around product and process parameters. First, the limits of 
de facto standardisation – as discussed at length in Section 6.1 – remained in place. 
These assemblers should have been able to achieve at least reasonable quality levels 
since their target consumers were no longer willing to accept low quality just because 
the products were cheap. Second, the assemblers were able to make minor modifications 
to original Japanese component designs, a factor that compounded coordination 
requirements. The question is therefore one of how firms met the necessary level of 
coordination. 
Table II-13. Assemblers’ Preferred Number of Suppliers of Each Component 
 
Number of suppliers* Reason 
A1 2–3 Competition based on quality and price is beneficial 
A3 2–3 Allows the assembler to take the initiative. 
A4 2–3 Allows suppliers to compete based on quality and price. 
A5 2–3 Allows the selection of suppliers based on price, quality and delivery. 
A6 2–3 Avoids passivity and defensiveness. 
Note: * Assemblers were asked to choose between one, two to three, or more than three. 
Source: The author’s questionnaire survey conducted in 2007 in collaboration with the Vietnam 
Institute of Economics, Vietnam Academy of Social Science.  
This question was explored via in-depth analyses of the embedded cases assemblers A1 
and A3, and their largest suppliers. The findings suggest that it was the suppliers rather 
than the assemblers that took the lead in dealing with coordination issues. By dealing 
systematically with non-compatibility problems arising from de facto standardisation 
and making modifications to component designs on behalf of their customers, these 
suppliers became the key force driving the transformation of the Vietnamese–Chinese 
chain.  
Such supplier-driven changes are demonstrated by the in-depth analysis of suppliers C1 
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and V16 discussed above. C1 rapidly expanded sales to local assemblers by utilising 
design competencies and generic large-scale manufacturing capacity to provide the 
complete, fine-tuned component modules that were most critical to the assemblers; 
incorporating minor cosmetic modifications, and processing them to reasonable quality, 
prompt delivery, and low cost standards. Although the supplier produced a large variety 
of motorcycle components, it focussed most sharply on plastic covers, frames and lights 
(interview #2). This is because local assemblers attached the highest importance to these 
component modules in terms of product differentiation, meaning that their manufacture 
called for exacting design work given that they essentially determined the external 
appearance of the whole vehicle.89 Each year, C1 launched an average of four designs 
incorporating minor modifications to these most necessary modules (interview #1). The 
three types of component that comprised the modules were fine-tuned with each other in 
order to maximise the performance of the module as a whole. Moreover, unlike the ad 
hoc, ex post adjustments typically observed in Stage II, supplier C1 systematically 
adjusted the interfaces of these modules with adjacent components at the initial stages 
of contact with assemblers (interview #2).  
V16 provides another case in point. Its main products, silencers, were critical to local 
assemblers because they affected both the product’s performance and its external 
appearance. This supplier continued to operate in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain in 
Stage III as it made effective use of its design and manufacturing capabilities to conduct 
minor cosmetic and/or functional modifications to the existing designs of this important 
component on behalf of its customers, because “local assemblers did not have design 
drawings and did not know anything about technical parameters” (interview #1). Based 
on surveys of local assemblers, motorcycle dealers, and final consumers, V16 regularly 
                                                        
89 Interviews with supplier C1 #3 and assembler A4 #4. Ge and Fujimoto (2005: 98–9) note that this 
was also the case in China.   
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launched new designs which reflected the latest market trends and policy requirements 
and carried the company’s own brand name (interviews #1, #2).  
In contrast, there was little indication that the sourcing practices of assemblers A1 and 
A3 were substantially different from those that had prevailed in Stage II, which 
suggested that the impetus for organisational innovation did not come from lead firms. 
Apart from the fact that their relations with key component suppliers had stabilised and 
been sustained over the long term, there was no evidence that the procedure for placing 
orders had changed in comparison to the previous stage as described in Section 6.1. 
Suppliers that continued to trade with either assembler A1 or A3 in Stage III, namely, 
C1, V16 and V21, noted that the manner in which these assemblers specified and 
monitored component quality and precision levels remained unchanged (interviews with 
C1 #2; V16 #2; V21 #1). None of these suppliers were provided active monitoring by 
assemblers A1 or A3, as noted by supplier C1: 
As for assemblers like A1 and A3, because the size of their orders is very large, 
they do not check the quality of the components carefully. Their complaints mostly 
concern wrong colours.       (C1 #2) 
The result of these supplier-driven changes was ‘coordination from below’, which 
addressed those coordination issues arising from the limitations of de facto 
standardisation without assemblers or suppliers being locked into particular relations or 
having to engage in intense communication. With the ability to conduct reverse 
engineering, design modification, and large-scale manufacturing, the two suppliers 
discussed in detail above together with several others formed a “shared supply base” 
(Sturgeon and Lee 2005) for local assemblers as a whole, including major assemblers 
such as A1 and A3 as well as other firms operating on a smaller scale.  
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Although the above features of this emerging industrial organisation apparently 
resembled a modular chain (Sturgeon 2002; Gereffi et al. 2005), the coordination 
pattern emerging in Stage III of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry should be 
distinguished from such a chain because: (1) de facto standardisation was partial in that 
it did not do away with coordination requirements; and (2) standardisation did not 
extend to the whole vehicle. Because of this partiality, suppliers C1 and V16 still had to 
adjust component interfaces for each of their customers, although they managed to 
reduce the time and cost of modifications by implementing them systematically.  
Nevertheless, albeit partial, supplier-driven coordination was the form of organisational 
adaptation best suited to the market conditions and capability alignment prevailing in 
Vietnam at the time. For suppliers, exploiting de facto standardisation to serve 
numerous customers made economic sense because in Vietnam’s fragmented market, 
pooling orders from multiple assemblers was the only way to achieve sufficient 
economies of scale (Fujita 2011). For assemblers who lacked both design and 
manufacturing competencies, relying on competent suppliers was the easiest and fastest 
route to solving the immediate problems of non-compatibility; increasing product 
variety by achieving cosmetic modifications to several key components; and exploiting 
the cost advantage of large-scale production.  
6.3 Summary and Discussion 
This section analysed the emergence and transformation of the Chinese model in 
Vietnam. In respect of the first sub-question concerning the trajectory of organisational 
transformation, the findings presented in this section did not render support to the 
argument of the empirical research to date, which has focussed on a small number of 
assemblers operational up to Stage II to argue that they started to develop long-term, 
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trust-based relations with their suppliers.  
Conversely, the foregoing analysis showed that in Stage III several powerful suppliers 
took the lead in addressing coordination needs on behalf of their customers without lead 
firms or suppliers having to engage in intense communication or being locked into 
particular relations. This suggests that even assuming a lead firm-driven shift towards 
trust-based relations had obtained among a certain group of assemblers in Stage II, it 
was still likely to be a transitory. The limited knowledge of products and production 
processes possessed by local assemblers also suggests that such networks even if they 
had existed were unlikely to have been sustainable. The research design adopted in this 
paper was critical in showing the overriding trend of organisational transformation in 
this sector of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry; that is, empirical research based on 
the integration of industry-level and firm-level data facilitated the analysis of changes in 
the operations of both lead firms and suppliers over an extended period of time.  
With regard to the second sub-question concerning the determinants of organisational 
transformation, it was argued that the product characteristics emphasised in the existing 
literature are in themselves insufficient to explain the phenomenon. De facto 
standardisation of Japanese models and low quality requirements reveal why 
arm’s-length linkages prevailed in the early 2000s but do not account for the emergence 
of supplier-driven coordination in Stage III.  
The empirical findings showed that the driver for change came primarily from the rise 
of supplier competencies. This was in sharp contrast to the Japanese chain, in which the 
lead firm actively sought to realign the capability structure to create conditions 
conducive to the effective functioning of its organisational adjustment. By 
independently accumulating complementary competencies in conducting minor design 
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modifications to existing models and manufacturing them in large quantities to 
reasonable standards, a small number of suppliers – including those analysed in depth as 
embedded case studies – formed a shared supply base for large and small assemblers 
seeking to increase the product variety of low-priced, standardised models aimed at the 
low-income market still unexploited by HVN.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper began by highlighting the challenges that the newly emerging Chinese model 
of industrial organisation posed to the conventional Japanese model. What can we learn 
from the rivalry between these two models in a third country context? How does its 
analysis contribute to the literature on models and trajectories of industrial organisation? 
By integrating extensive primary and secondary data collected at different points in time, 
this paper sought to describe and explain the decade-long organisational transformation 
in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry resulting from the direct clash of two contrasting 
models of industrial organisation. This concluding section summarises the empirical 
findings corresponding to the two sub-questions, and discusses the contribution of this 
paper to the wider body of literature on industrial organisation.  
First, this paper asked a ‘how’ question on the dynamic evolution of industrial 
organisation in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry: How did the Japanese and Chinese 
organisational models evolve in Vietnam? The literature suggests that these two models 
converged; however, the present study found that such convergence was short-lived. 
What seemed like important changes in both Japanese and Chinese models in the early 
2000s were eventually abandoned, while more dynamic, long-lasting changes got 
underway at a later stage of industrial development. In the end, the Japanese model 
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shifted from one variant to another variant of the same captive model of industrial 
organisation. The Chinese model essentially remained one of loosely coordinated 
organisation throughout the period of analysis; although it came to be characterised by 
several competent suppliers playing partial yet critical coordinating roles in later years. 
Fundamental differences between the two models continued to persist in the medium 
term.  
Second, this study examined the reasons for these organisational changes; that is, what 
factors drove the organisational transformation of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry? 
The literature emphasises the nature of the product that respective lead firms 
manufactured. Yet, the longitudinal analysis in the present paper found that explaining 
short- and medium-term trajectories of organisational transformation required another 
variable – that of the changing capability alignment in the respective value chains.  
The transformation of the Japanese model into an institutionalised competition variant 
can be explained in terms of changing capability alignment in both the lead firm and its 
suppliers, that is, lead firm acquisition of purchasing power and increasing supplier 
capabilities but not complementary competencies. It was HVN that took the lead in 
nurturing the necessary capabilities – not only its own but also those of its suppliers – 
although it took time and the dismantling of policy constraints before such initiatives 
started to produce the desired results. Conversely, the transformation of the Chinese 
model can be explained primarily in terms of the formation of supplier capabilities, that 
is, the rise of specialist suppliers with design modification and large-scale 
manufacturing competencies.  
In addition to empirical findings specific to the Vietnamese motorcycle industry, this 
paper also makes an important contribution to the broader body of literature. First, by 
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systematically tracing the long-term transformation of two industrial organisational 
models, this paper shed new light on the processes through which organisations evolve 
over time. The empirical findings showed that organisational transformation was far 
from a smooth and automatic process. In practice, such processes involved challenges, 
struggles and tensions. The results were diverse hybrids or intermediate forms of 
industrial organisation that did not necessarily correspond to the five most typical 
governance forms. The empirical findings indicate that the captive model – the 
conventional form of Japanese industrial organisation – can in practice be implemented 
as two distinct variants, each with strikingly different implications for competitiveness 
and supplier development. ‘Coordination from below’ in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain 
is another example of a hybrid form of organisation. Albeit partial, this provided 
effective means for local assemblers and suppliers to meet Japanese challenges under 
the conditions prevailing in Vietnam.  
Second, this study systematically explained the trajectories of organisational change in 
terms of two elaborate and operational variables: the nature of product/process 
parameters and the alignment of relevant capabilities. While much of the previous 
theoretical and empirical research has focussed on chain governance in its most 
orthodox forms, these patterns emerge only where specific combinations of these two 
variables are present. Where models are transferred to different contexts or where they 
meet new competitive challenges, there may be many instances in which ideal sets of 
conditions for intended organisational adaptation are unavailable. It is indeed such 
misalignments of variables that created the aforementioned challenges, struggles and 
tensions.  
Indeed, contrary to Gibbon et al.’s (2008) contention, the two variables did not transpire 
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to be structural constraints to transactions. These variables were heavily influenced by 
the strategic actions of firms in the value chain, and it was in fact such actions of lead 
firms and/or suppliers aimed at realigning these variables – albeit with limitations – that 
drove industrial organisation to full or partial transformation. HVN made active 
attempts to realign the capability structure in order to create the necessary conditions for 
the effective functioning of the market forces it sought to introduce. In 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains, coordination needs arising from the partial nature of de 
facto standardisation were simply left unattended in the early years because none of the 
actors had the capacity to deal with them. These needs were eventually met by the rise 
of competent suppliers that had both the will and the capacity to play a partial yet 
critical role in implementing the requisite coordination.  
Finally, the empirical findings of this study also provide important insights into the 
emerging rivalry between the Japanese and Chinese models of industrial organisation. 
In terms of its capacity to exploit the potential (unrealised) market demand and to 
capitalise on the existing alignment of relevant capabilities, the Vietnamese case 
demonstrates that the Chinese model initially proved more adaptable to developing 
country conditions. However, in the medium term, the Japanese model gained 
supremacy over the Chinese model as Japanese lead firms made certain – but not 
fundamental – adjustments to the nature of their products, while actively realigning the 
capability structure. Conversely, while the Chinese model lost supremacy in the medium 
term, it nevertheless continued to function in an adapted form as suppliers gained the 
complementary competencies required by local assemblers. The result of repeated 
rounds of organisational adaptation was enhanced organisational diversity. After a 
decade, the two models continued to exist side by side, both retaining the essential 
features of the original models yet incorporating important adjustment.  
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 PAPER III. THE DYNAMICS OF LOCAL SUPPLIERS’ CAPABILITY 
FORMATION IN THE VIETNAMESE MOTORCYCLE INDUSTRY 
1. Introduction 
A major challenge for developing countries seeking to build a competitive 
manufacturing sector lies in amassing a sizeable pool of competent suppliers of parts, 
components and accessories. Having a substantial domestic agglomeration of suppliers 
helps a developing country not only to increase the value added that accrues within the 
country but also attracts growing FDI, as agglomeration economies significantly 
influence location decisions of TNCs (UNCTAD 2001). However, satisfying demanding 
customers is not an easy task for firms in developing countries, and involves a process 
of continuous learning (Schmitz and Knorringa 2000; Schmitz 2006). Although GVC 
and TC research has provided critical insights into this process and its determinants, the 
following two interrelated research agendas remain underexplored in the existing 
literature.  
First, the literature has failed to show how supplier learning evolves over time. To date, 
much of the empirical research on firm-level capability building has been based on 
short-term observation (Bell 2006), and this has particularly been the case with 
small-scale suppliers at the lower end of the technological trajectory. Indeed, this 
research has focussed primarily on showing the capability levels such firms reached at a 
particular point in time, or the learning progress they had made in the period 
immediately preceding a study. This has left largely unexplored the question of how 
developing country suppliers build capabilities over an extended period. Given that they 
typically undertake continuous learning in order to meet the demands of their customers, 
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this is a serious omission. 
Second, due to their failure to give balanced attention to the roles of key actors involved 
in supplier learning, the GVC and TC approaches have only reached partial 
understanding of the sources of such capability building. On the one hand, the GVC 
approach emphasises the roles of ‘lead firms’ that set and enforce the parameters for 
other actors operating in the value chain (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001). Much of the 
discussion has been directed at how this ‘chain governance’ provides upgrading 
opportunities for local firms (Humphrey and Schmitz 2004; Schmitz 2006); while the 
endogenous accumulation of suppliers’ internal resources has not been examined in 
depth (Morrison et al. 2008). On the other hand, the TC approach focuses on the 
‘firm-internal’ accumulation of resources (Bell and Pavitt 1995), but has directed little 
attention to how this process is influenced by the nature of relations that suppliers 
develop with lead firms. It is in this light that Morrison et al. (2008) argue for the need 
to integrate the GVC and TC approaches in the study of mechanisms that link value 
chains with the learning and innovation of local firms. However, the fundamental 
questions of how this integration can actually be achieved and be applied in empirical 
research remain unexplored. 
Vietnam’s motorcycle industry provides an excellent case for addressing these research 
gaps. First, the rapid development that this industry has undergone in a relatively short 
space of time makes it an ideal candidate for analysing processes of change. Launching 
the domestic production of motorcycles from scratch only in the late 1990s, Vietnam 
emerged as one of the world’s major motorcycle producers after China, India and 
Indonesia in only a decade (Paper II). The rapid growth of the industry prompted 
numerous local firms to enter into motorcycle component production and acquire basic 
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production capabilities (Fujita 2007, 2011).  
Second, the development of this industry was driven primarily by competition between 
two kinds of lead firm cultivating contrasting types of value chain (Paper II). The 
coexistence of two contrasting value chains makes this industry a particularly 
illuminating case for examining the roles of lead firms and suppliers in the capability 
building of the latter.  
This paper uses the case of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry to address the two 
aforementioned underexplored research problems. Specifically, it addresses two 
empirical questions related to the dynamic evolution of supplier learning in the 
Vietnamese motorcycle industry. The first asks how supplier learning trajectories 
evolved over time. The focus is on the critical junctures in the process of capability 
building, which this paper refers to as ‘learning events’. 
Question 1: How did local suppliers’ capability building evolve from the late 
1990s? What functions and what levels of capability had they acquired by 2008? 
When did key learning events occur? 
The second question asks why learning trajectories evolved in the way they did. The 
focus is on analysing the constellations of relevant actors and knowledge flows that 
were conducive to key learning events.  
Question 2: What actor constellations and what knowledge flows led to critical 
learning events? 
Whilst these are empirical questions specific to the Vietnamese motorcycle industry, it is 
hoped that exploring them will go a long way to filling the two knowledge gaps in the 
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literature on the trajectories and sources of capability building. Accordingly, this paper 
argues that a decade-long longitudinal analysis that provides a balanced focus on the 
roles played by both lead firms and suppliers reveals a picture of local supplier learning 
that is substantially more dynamic, and gives a more insightful account than snapshot 
analyses or those that focus on either lead firms or suppliers alone.      
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 develops the conceptual framework and operationalises the key concepts. 
Section 4 discusses the methodology. Sections 5 to 7 present the empirical analysis. 
Section 5 addresses the first research question by tracking supplier learning trajectories 
using the event-based approach. Sections 6 and 7 turn the focus to the second research 
question. Section 6 outlines two contrasting models of supplier learning as they 
emerged in the early 2000s. Section 7 explains supplier learning trajectories in terms of 
adjustments that took place in the two learning models after 2005. The concluding 
section summarises the empirical findings and their contribution to the literature on 
supplier capability building.   
2. Literature Review 
This section reviews the existing literature related to the two main research questions and 
identifies research gaps. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 review the literature on the evolution of supplier 
learning trajectories and the sources of supplier learning respectively. Section 2.3 specifically 
reviews the empirical literature on the Vietnamese motorcycle industry in relation to these two 
issues. 
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2.1 Evolution of Supplier Learning Trajectories 
Based on the evolutionary theory of technical change (Nelson and Winter 1982), the TC 
approach considers that technological changes are not generated simply by importing 
equipment embodying new technology but require specialised resources accumulated 
through deliberate investment and effort (Lall 1992; Bell and Pavitt 1995; Bell and Albu 
1999). These firm-specific, intangible resources are often referred to as technological 
capabilities. The processes through which firms acquire skills and knowledge are often 
referred to as learning (Bell 1984). This study therefore uses the terms ‘capability 
building’ and ‘learning’ interchangeably.   
Numerous studies have elaborated different stages in the capability accumulation 
process and modelled them as sequential paths that firms are expected to follow.90 
Despite the different terminologies used by different authors, the basic underlying 
concepts are remarkably similar. These sequences include steps along a common path, 
running from imitation (learning to use knowledge sourced from elsewhere) to 
innovation (learning to make changes to the existing knowledge) (Bell 2006). In reality, 
however, capability formation does not necessarily evolve incrementally along a linear, 
pre-determined path. Firm-level learning trajectories often entail discontinuities and 
qualitative transformations – jumps, truncations or even reversals of previous learning 
trajectories (Bell 1984, 2006; Meyers 1990; Kim 1998).  
However, when it comes to showing empirically how supplier learning evolves over 
time, very little of the existing research adequately addresses the time agenda (Bell 
2006). While there have been a few in-depth case studies of the capability building 
                                                        
90 These include Lall (1992), Bell and Pavitt (1995), Ariffin (2000), and Figueiredo (2000, 2002). 
For comprehensive review of the literature, see Bell (2007). 
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trajectories of major corporations covering an extended period (Kim 1997; Dutrénit 
2000; Figueiredo 2000, 2002), the paucity of knowledge on the evolution of learning 
trajectories is particularly serious in terms of small-scale developing country suppliers 
towards the bottom of the technological ladder. Previous empirical studies in this field 
have largely focussed on ‘snapshots’ of supplier capability building. In these studies, 
learning has been assessed primarily in terms of the levels reached by firms at certain 
points in time (Ariffin and Figueiredo 2004, 2006, Figueiredo 2008a; Gammeltoft 2004) 
or the progress firms had made during the short period immediately preceding 
observation (Mitsuhashi 2005; Navas-Alemán 2006; Jonker et al. 2006). 
Nevertheless, such snapshot analyses suggest discontinuity in the learning trajectories of 
developing country suppliers. Some researchers explicitly focussing on the effects of 
major external shocks or policy shifts argue that instances of such major incidents 
constitute key turning points in the accumulation of technological capability (Tewari 
1999; Figueiredo 2008a, 2008b). A limited number of longitudinal studies that have 
analysed the learning trajectories of developing country suppliers over an extended 
period also point to the importance of the specific timing of intensive learning in the 
acquisition of advanced capability. Chitravas’ (2006) detailed analyses of learning 
mechanisms in nine Thai auto parts suppliers show that learning trajectories often 
consist of slower and faster phases, and that faster learning phases are typically driven 
by major events such as the initiation of new business relations with foreign car makers, 
the launch of new products, or engaging in export activities.  
The notion that capability building paths may consist of major leaps forward, slower or 
truncated knowledge acquisition, or even retrogression at different times is critical 
because this suggests that one could arrive at very different interpretations depending on 
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the timing of a study. This is corroborated by Bell (2006: 34), who discusses how two 
sets of empirical studies of the automotive industry in Latin America conducted by 
different researchers with varying time frames reached contrasting assessments of the 
industry’s development. Bell (ibid.) concludes that short-term observations without 
understanding of longer-term processes of change easily lead to false judgements about 
the development of firms or industries. 
In summary, the literature on capability building pays insufficient attention to the 
evolutionary dynamics of firm-level learning trajectories. This shortcoming is 
particularly relevant in terms of small developing countries towards the bottom of the 
technological ladder. Therefore, longitudinal research is necessary to address this gap.  
2.2 Sources of Supplier Learning  
Analysing the sources of supplier learning requires an exploration of the roles of critical 
actors. Different types of actors are emphasised in various strands of the literature: (1) 
lead firms are emphasised in the GVC approach (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001, 2004; 
Schmitz 2006); (2) suppliers themselves are the focus of the TC approach (Bell 1984; 
Bell and Pavitt 1995, 1997); and (3) other public and private support organisations such 
as universities, research institutes, and business associations are highlighted by the 
national or sectoral innovation systems approach (Lundvall 1993; Malerba 2002, 2004). 
As previous research has found that public and private support organisations are still 
underdeveloped and have played limited roles in supporting innovation in Vietnam’s 
motorcycle industry (Institute for Industry Policy and Strategy 2007), the key actors 
examined in the present study are lead firms and suppliers. 
The vital role that lead firms play in shaping supplier learning is at the centre of the 
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GVC approach (Schmitz 2004, 2006). Central to this approach is the governance of the 
value chain, a concept that is employed to explore various patterns by which 
relationships between lead firms and suppliers are coordinated (Humphrey and Schmitz 
2001; Schmitz 2004; Gereffi et al. 2005). Gereffi et al. (2005) classify the dominant 
patterns of governance into the following five types (in ascending order of explicit 
coordination): (1) market, (2) modular, (3) relational, (4) captive, and (5) hierarchical.  
Much of the empirical research in this field has focussed on whether certain types of 
governance are associated with certain types of supplier ‘upgrading’, a concept closely 
related to innovation and capability building (Morrison et al. 2008). The emerging 
empirical literature has generated a consensus that the ways lead firms define and/or 
enforce parameters influence supplier learning in important ways.91 In the words of 
Schmitz (2006: 566), “Chain governance structures the upgrading opportunities of 
developing country producers”.  
However, lead firms are not the only actors involved in supplier upgrading. The 
proponents of the GVC approach themselves admit that upgrading requires investment 
by suppliers in equipment, organisational arrangement, and people (Schmitz 2006, 
2007). Yet, a major gap in this line of research is that it has not addressed the question 
of how the lead firm’s support and the supplier’s investment in learning interact to shape 
the supplier’s capability building process.  
Conversely, the TC approach focuses on the endogenous process through which local 
firms diffuse, adapt and create knowledge. This approach holds that technological 
change or innovation is not generated by investment in machinery and equipment but 
requires purposeful investment in human resources and change-generating activities 
                                                        
91 For a review of the existing empirical literature, see Morrison et al. (2008). 
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(Bell 1984; Dahlman et al. 1987). The focus of this strand of the literature has largely 
been on supplier-internal factors such as learning strategies, activities and processes 
(Romijn 1999; Figueiredo 2003; Chitravas 2006; Scott-Kemmis and Chitravas 2007). 
With growing interest in how external sources of knowledge contribute to firms’ 
capability building, an increasing amount of attention has been directed at external 
sources of knowledge (Bell and Albu 1999; Nadvi 1999; Caniëls and Romijn 2003, 
2005; Kim 2004). However, the focus of this strand of the literature has been on R&D 
institutions, training organisations, machinery and input suppliers, or consultancy and 
information services, while explicit emphasis has not been put on the critical roles 
played by lead firms in shaping suppliers’ learning opportunities.  
It is in this light that Morrison et al. (2008) argue for the need to integrate the GVC and 
TC approaches. They contend that this would help bring together two essential elements 
in developing country firms’ learning and innovation: power relations around local 
firms; and the endogenous process of capability development. However, Morrison et al. 
(ibid.) do not elaborate how such integration could actually be achieved in practice, or 
how an integrated framework might be utilised in an empirical study. Therefore, this 
also remains an important yet underexplored research agenda.   
2.3 Local Suppliers’ Capability Building in the Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry 
The three-stage development of Vietnam’s motorcycle industry since the late 1990s 
(Paper II, Table II-1) has been driven by repeated rounds of competition between 
Japanese and Vietnamese lead firms (Paper II). On the one hand, Japanese lead firms 
were global industry leaders producing high-quality models that carried lead firm 
proprietary designs. They developed ‘Japanese chains’ in which suppliers were subject 
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to centralised control and extensive intervention from their lead firms. On the other 
hand, in the early 2000s, Vietnamese lead firms started the assembly of component kits 
imported from China, which were largely low-priced, low-quality products imitating 
popular Japanese models. However, the subsequent strengthening of import controls and 
local content rules by the Vietnamese government led these assemblers to expand local 
sourcing and in-house manufacturing of components, often in cooperation with Chinese 
companies. The value chains developed by these assemblers – referred to as 
‘Vietnamese–Chinese chains’ – are characterised by arm’s-length transactions with little 
explicit coordination. 
The central concerns of this paper are two-fold: (1) how local suppliers’ capability 
building trajectories evolved amidst repeated rounds of competition between two groups 
of lead firms; and (2) what knowledge sources were mobilised by local suppliers in 
building their capabilities. The emerging empirical research on this industry offers 
limited insight into these issues (Pham Truong Hoang and Shusa 2006; Pham Truong 
Hoang 2007; Nguyen Duc Tiep 2006, 2007; Tran Ngoc Ca 2009).  
To start with, the majority of these studies suffer from the following limitations. First, 
with the exception of Pham Truong Hoang and Shusa (2006) and Pham Truong Hoang 
(2007), the existing empirical analyses only provide ‘snapshots’ of local suppliers’ 
capabilities at given times. Second, most of these studies also suffer from a lack of 
analytical rigour. With the exception of Pham Truong Hoang (2007), none of the above 
authors adopt a systematic framework for classifying and assessing supplier capabilities. 
Moreover, virtually all of the aforementioned research including Pham Truong Hoang 
(2007) comprises case studies of a very limited number of suppliers without any clear 
explanation as to criteria for the selection of cases. 
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With regard to the first issue, Pham Truong Hoang (2007) is the only empirical research 
that explicitly examines local suppliers’ capability building processes using systematic 
methods. However, the conclusions reached are largely static: long-term, trust-based 
networks of Japanese motorcycle manufacturers promoted the acquisition of process 
capabilities, while arm’s-length networks of local assemblers promoted the acquisition 
of product capabilities – an argument that is broadly in line with the main contentions of 
the GVC approach. Moreover, the author’s formulation of empirical data suggests a 
trajectory that progressed steadily once suppliers had entered into the production 
networks of Japanese and/or local assemblers.92  
A possible reason why the existing empirical literature pays limited attention to the 
evolution of supplier learning trajectories is that it focuses almost exclusively on Stage 
II of industrial development. Although the initial round of competition triggered by the 
China shock in Stage II opened up new opportunities for local firms to enter into 
Japanese or Vietnamese–Chinese chains, frequent and arbitrary government policy 
intervention up to this stage hardly offered a stable environment for lead firms or 
suppliers (Paper II). It was only in Stage III that the fast-growing market and a less 
restrictive business environment conjoined to provide conditions conducive to supplier 
learning (ibid.). In studying supplier development trajectories, it is therefore essential 
that the decade following the mid-1990s is analysed in terms of a continuum. To date, 
no study has attempted this.  
In respect of the second issue, that is, the sources of supplier learning, most of the 
existing research has only focussed on the role played by one of the two key actors: lead 
firms or suppliers. Pham Truong Hoang and Shusa (2006) and Pham Truong Hoang 
                                                        
92 This is clearly shown in Figure 6.2 of Pham Truong Hoang (2007: 195). 
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(2007) describe learning in Japanese chains mainly as an outcome of knowledge transfer 
initiated by the lead firm. While Nguyen Duc Tiep (2006) and Tran Ngoc Ca (2009) 
discuss the determinants of learning from the supplier’s perspective in a Japanese chain 
using the concepts of ‘responsiveness’ and ‘readiness’ respectively, notions that are 
neither clearly operationalised nor supported by hard empirical data. Meanwhile, Pham 
Truong Hoang (2007) and Tran Ngoc Ca (2009) describe supplier learning in 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains largely as a unilateral exercise. In any case, none of the 
existing studies explicitly discuss how sources of supplier learning change over time. 
2.4 Summary 
The foregoing review of the literature on suppliers’ capability building in general and in 
the context of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry in particular identified two major 
research gaps. One concerns how supplier capability building trajectories evolve over 
time. In particular, there has been limited empirical research on how the learning 
trajectories of small-scale developing country suppliers towards the bottom of the 
technological ladder evolve over an extended period. The other research gap concerns 
the sources of supplier learning. Much of the existing literature has examined learning 
from either the supplier or the lead firm perspective. There have been few attempts to 
integrate the two perspectives and analyse the process of supplier learning along the 
lines suggested by Morrison et al. (2008). These are the knowledge gaps that the present 
study seeks to bridge.  
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3. Conceptual Framework and Operationalisation 
This section presents the conceptual framework of the paper and operationalises the key 
concepts. Since analysing capability building trajectories requires a frame of reference 
to assess the nature and levels of capabilities at different points in time, this section 
begins by discussing the classification of capability. It then introduces the conceptual 
apparatus to analyse learning trajectories, ‘learning events’, and a framework within 
which to analyse the sources of capability building.  
3.1 Classification of Capability 
For the purpose of analysing the evolution of learning trajectories, it is essential to 
develop the classification of capabilities with observable indicators. Following the 
approach pioneered by Lall (1992), and Bell and Pavitt (1995), the technological 
capabilities that suppliers of motorcycle components require are classified in two 
dimensions:93 the ‘functions’ they perform, and ‘levels’ reflecting “the depth or degrees 
of creative engagement with technology” (Bell 2007: 98).  
In terms of the first dimension of functions, categories were developed on the basis of 
the literature on product development and production systems in the automotive 
industry (Clark and Fujimoto 1991; Fujimoto 1999); the literature on the industrial 
development of late-comer countries (Suehiro 2008; Hayashi 1990); and the author’s 
field research on motorcycle and component manufacturers in Japan, China, Thailand 
and Vietnam.  
                                                        
93 Another possible dimension for the classification of capability is by ‘investment cycles’ (Lall 
1992; Bell 2007). However, this dimension has been omitted because – unlike large plant-based 
industries such as chemicals and steel – major investment in sophisticated machinery is less relevant 
for motorcycle component suppliers at the lower end of technological development.  
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The broad categories of technological functions performed by motorcycle component 
suppliers are product development and production. The former functional category of 
product development is referred to in this paper as new product introduction. This is 
because the types of activities undertaken by developing country suppliers are different 
from those engaged in by major developed country corporations.94 As opposed to 
activities typically undertaken by major developed country corporations such as market 
research, formulation of product concept, prototyping, and development of product 
design drawings (Fujimoto 1999), developing country suppliers normally start by 
replicating products already available on the market via reverse engineering, and 
subsequently shift to conducting minor modifications and adaptations to the original 
product designs to meet the requirements of the local market – the sorts of activities best 
categorised as new product introduction.  
The latter functional category of production is divided into two subgroups: 
equipment-related capabilities and production management capabilities.95 
Equipment-related capability is concerned with operating, designing and improving 
production hardware, that is, machinery and equipment, dies and moulds, tools, and jigs. 
The following three dimensions of equipment-related capability are particularly relevant 
to automotive component suppliers: (1) level of precision in manufacturing; (2) ability 
to design and improve production processes; and (3) design and manufacture of dies and 
moulds.96 Production management capability refers to the ability to improve ways in 
which the different elements of production are organised in order to increase overall 
productivity performance (Suehiro 2008).   
                                                        
94 The author is grateful to Martin Bell for highlighting this point. 
95 This distinction follows Sato and Fujita (2009), which draws on Suehiro (2008). 
96 Based on Fujimoto (1999), Asanuma (1999) and the presentation made by HVN’s director in 
charge of procurement at the Seminar on Vietnam-Japan Supporting Industry Business Promotion 
hosted by JETRO, SME Technical Assistance Center and JICA and held at Melia Hotel, Hanoi on 22 
January 2007. 
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In respect of the classification of levels, this paper adopts a simple four-tier 
classification system designed to accommodate the variety of activities and learning 
trajectories observed among motorcycle component suppliers in different types of value 
chain. The idea of using such fine-tuned classifications as those adopted in some of the 
recent sector-specific empirical analyses97 had to be abandoned because the multitude 
of activities undertaken by motorcycle component suppliers and the variety of their 
capability building trajectories made it difficult to assume a priori fine-tuned steps for 
suppliers to follow. Accordingly, rather than formulating a set of detailed indicators for 
each level of capability (Figueiredo 2002, Ariffin and Figueiredo 2006), the framework 
developed by the present study simply sets out the fundamental principles guiding the 
assessment of the degree of suppliers’ innovative engagement.  
This adaptation essentially follows the evolutionary view of technical change, which 
regards firm-level innovation as being generated by a continuous learning process of 
activities designed to absorb, adapt and create technology (Nelson and Winter 1982; 
Romijn 1999). Most fundamentally, the distinction is made between technology-using 
capability and technology-changing capability (Bell and Pavitt 1995; Ariffin 2000; 
Figueiredo 2008a, 2008b).98 The former is the ability to produce goods at a given level 
of efficiency according to given input specifications, and the latter is the ability to create, 
change or improve products, processes, production organisation, or equipment (Schmitz 
2007).  
Since latecomer firms normally first import mature, standardised technology and 
                                                        
97 For example, Figueiredo’s (2002) framework adopts seven levels for steel firms, while Pham 
Truong Hoang (2007) establishes eight distinct levels of capability for motorcycle component 
suppliers.  
98 Different authors use different terminology to refer to technology-using capability and 
technology-changing capability. Bell and Pavitt (1995) employ “production capacity” and 
“technological capability”, while Ariffin (2000) and Figueiredo (2008b) coin the terms “routine 
production capability” and “innovative technological capability”.  
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subsequently move on to acquire more advanced technology (Kim 1997, 2004), 
knowledge-using capabilities are classified into two levels by degree of mastery: routine 
operation (operational level) and stable maintenance of continuous operation 
(assimilative level). Likewise, knowledge-changing capabilities range from making 
relatively minor adaptations to the existing technology, to developing completely new 
technology (Hobday 1996). These are classified into two levels by degree of 
innovativeness: making relatively minor short-term adaptations to the existing 
technology (adaptive level), and creating new technology for medium- to long-term 
utilisation (innovative level).  
The above classification of capabilities results in the two-dimensional matrix presented 
in Table III-1. In the context of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry, the main focus is 
on how suppliers starting at the operational or pre-operational level mastered stable 
operation of the existing technology (equivalent of the assimilative level) and eventually 
acquired the ability to conduct basic innovation of the existing technology (i.e. adaptive 
level).  
3.2 Capability Building Trajectories and Learning Events  
Capability building is a long-term, cumulative process through which firms acquire new 
and progressively more advanced capabilities (Ariffin 2000; Figueiredo 2003). 
Although capability itself is intangible, acquisition of new capability can be confirmed 
by a firm’s demonstrated capacity to perform new activities that it had not been able to 
do previously or to perform the existing activities in an improved manner.  
Firms are generally expected to progress from a lower to a higher level in one or more 
of its functional categories. However, not all firms progress steadily along a linear path.
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Table III-1. Classification of Capabilities 
Type of Capability 
Level of 
Capability 
New Product Introduction 
Equipment-related 
(level of processing precision, process design, 
dies and moulds) 
Production Management 
Production Capability 
(Knowledge-using 
capability) 
Operational 
Replication of an existing/given product 
in the domestic market by recreating the 
design drawings. 
Basic operation of machinery and equipment, 
dies, moulds, jigs and tools to process 
components to the minimum level required in 
the domestic market. 
Routine production management 
required in the domestic market. 
Assimilative 
Replication of existing 
international-standard products by 
recreating design drawings. 
Processing components and manufacturing 
dies, moulds, jigs and tools to a level required 
by foreign customers; maintenance and repair 
of machinery and equipment, dies, moulds, 
jigs, and tools. 
Maintaining stable production 
management fulfilling levels required 
by foreign customers. 
Innovation Capability 
(Knowledge-changing 
capability) 
Adaptive 
Original improvements to existing 
products. 
Making original improvements to production 
systems, process specifications, and/or 
machinery/equipment.  
Making original improvements in 
production management so as to 
constantly boost its levels. 
Innovative 
The planning and designing of new 
products with significant elements of 
originality and novelty compared to 
existing products. 
Proprietary processing technology with 
significant elements of originality and novelty; 
design/manufacture of high-precision dies and 
moulds.  
Establishing production management 
system so as to achieve the world's 
topmost level in production 
management. 
Source: Adapted by the author from Lall (1992); Bell and Pavitt (1995); Figueiredo (2008b); Kim (2004); Sato and Fujita (2009).
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As suggested by the literature reviewed in Section 2.1, whilst learning is an 
evolutionary process comprised of major leaps, incremental learning, halted learning, 
and/or even retrogression to previous levels, the overall learning process is driven 
primarily by varieties of major and minor incidents through which a firm acquires the 
ability to perform new activities that it had not been able to do previously, or to perform 
existing activities in an improved manner. Moreover, innovations are often stimulated 
by inputs, needs, or pressure from users or the market (Abernathy and Utterback 1978). 
For component suppliers, it is often lead firm requirements – which may or may not be 
communicated explicitly – that play this stimulating role.   
In analysing supplier capability building trajectories, this paper focuses on incidents of 
major leaps in capability level. Such an incident – referred to as a ‘learning event’ – is 
defined as an incident that signifies critical improvement in the way activities are 
conducted, and thus a major capability level leap in one or more of the functional 
categories shown in Table III-1. The event-based approach has been used for analysing 
the management of innovation in the public and private sectors (Van de Ven and Poole 
1995), and project-based learning in the service sector (Lema 2010). 
Although a learning event might signify progress from a certain level to a higher level 
of capability, given the broad categorisation of capability levels, this is not a necessary 
condition; even progress within an existing level of capability would qualify as a 
learning event. The start date of an event is signified by the supplier launching a new 
initiative. Events may last for just a few months, or they might extend over several years. 
Goals or plans initially set before or on the start date may eventually be changed. Events 
are perceived to have terminated when the supplier has achieved an observable learning 
outcome (the end date). It is assumed that an event takes place in the supplier’s 
154 
 
 
 
activities in one or more value chains.99 
Figure III-1 exemplifies the capability building trajectory of a supplier in a given 
functional category of capability. The supplier experienced two major milestones 
(events A and B) that enabled it to progress from the operational to the adaptive level. 
The two events took place as the supplier responded to customer demands in different 
value chains (value chains A and B).  
3.3 Sources of Supplier Learning 
In order to develop a framework for analysing the sources of supplier learning, this 
paper examines modes of actor involvement and knowledge flows between actors (Bell 
and Albu 1999; Ernst and Kim 2002). The modes of actor engagement in supplier 
learning are diverse in their inclusion of direct modes of involvement in the supplier’s 
sourcing or generation of knowledge, and indirect modes in inducing and facilitating the 
supplier’s sourcing or generation of knowledge (Mitsuhashi 2005). Figure III-2 presents 
a model of supplier learning incorporating the roles played by lead firms, suppliers and 
other external actors. 
Based on the GVC and technology transfer literature, a lead firm’s involvement in 
supplier learning is classified into three broad categories that correspond to the main 
stages in the lead firm–supplier transaction cycle: inducement, direct and indirect 
knowledge transfer, and monitoring.  
  
                                                        
99 It is also possible for learning to take place in the course of exploring a completely new market, in 
which case an event might not be associated with a specific value chain. However, such an 
occurrence was rarely observed among local motorcycle component suppliers in Vietnam. Unstable 
market and government policy conditions made it highly risky for suppliers to engage in medium- to 
long-term R&D without any market assurance. 
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Figure III-1. Concept of Learning Events and Learning Trajectories 
 
Source: The author. 
Figure III-2. Model of Supplier Learning: Roles of Key Actors 
 
 
Source: Fujita (2012: 116). Adapted from Schmitz (2006); Wong (1991, 1992); Mitsuhashi (2005); 
Ivarsson and Alvstam (2004, 2005); Ernst and Kim (2002); UNCTAD (2001). 
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Inducement refers to the lead firm’s role in conveying to its suppliers the requirements 
and specifications to be met, thereby motivating them to learn and enabling them to set 
specific learning targets. The lead firm provides its suppliers with product design 
specifications and performance requirements, as well as advance indications of future 
production plans, and quality, performance, or feature requirements and targets 
(Ivarsson and Alvstam 2004, 2005, 2010; Wong 1991; Mitsuhashi 2005).  
Knowledge transfer may take direct and indirect forms. Direct knowledge transfer 
includes advice on or assistance in technical or non-technical aspects of production, 
on-site auditing of plant operations, troubleshooting of specific problems, and training 
of supplier staff through formal programmes or informal consultation (Wong 1991; Lall 
1980; UNCTAD 2001; Ernst and Kim 2002; Ivarsson and Alvstam 2004, 2005; 
Mitsuhashi 2005; Schmitz 2006). Indirect knowledge transfer100 includes the informal 
sharing of technical information and ideas, exposure to the lead firm’s system of 
managing and organising production activities, and observation of the lead firm’s 
corporate culture (Wong 1991, 1992).  
Monitoring refers to testing and diagnostic feedback on quality and other dimensions of 
the performance of suppliers or their products against initially prescribed targets or 
requirements (Schmitz 2006; Wong 1991; Ivarsson and Alvstam 2010).   
The TC approach emphasises the role of suppliers as the agents of learning. In the case 
of component suppliers in motorcycle value chains, the main channels through which 
suppliers generate new knowledge include investment in physical resources such as 
machinery and equipment, investment in human resources via recruitment and training, 
and in-house R&D and attempts at improving their activities (Bell and Pavitt 1995, 
                                                        
100 Wong (1991) refers to this as ‘spillover transfer’. 
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1997; Caloghirou et al. 2004). To reflect the actual activities undertaken by motorcycle 
component suppliers, the latter were broken down into in-house R&D aimed at 
improvement of product design and development, improvements in production 
procedures and organisational changes.   
Apart from lead firms and suppliers, other actors may also contribute to supplier 
learning as sources of explicit or tacit knowledge. Public and private 
innovation-supporting organisations such as business associations, government agencies, 
consultants, international organisations, bilateral donors, research institutes, and 
universities may all act as providers of advice, training, knowledge, or consultancy 
services (Malerba 2004; Malerba and Mani 2009). Intra-cluster sources may also 
constitute an important source of knowledge for small suppliers, such as the transfer of 
skilled labour among firms and the diffusion of know-how (Bell and Albu 1999).  
4. Methodology 
This section first introduces the overall methodological approach: retrospective case 
study. This is followed by discussion of the methods of selecting cases, and data 
collection and analysis.  
4.1 Research Design: A Retrospective Case Study 
This paper seeks to analyse motorcycle component supplier learning processes that 
extended over a period of a decade. To this end, it adopts the retrospective case study 
(de Vaus 2001; Glick et al. 1995; Tuma and Hannan 1984) as the main overarching 
method. In the present context, this involves illuminating supplier capability building 
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processes by observing the sequence of key events after a given supplier’s entry into a 
value chain.  
The basic unit of analysis is the supplier. However, individual learning events will also 
be analysed as embedded subunits. This study adopts a multiple rather than single case 
design in line with the conceptual framework presented in Section 3 that assumes 
learning trajectories to be heterogeneous.  
4.2 Selection of Cases 
While there is no ideal number of cases, it should be sufficiently large to enable the 
researcher to encompass a range of variation more or less representative of the sector 
(Eisenhardt 1989). Given the variety of factors assumed to influence supplier learning 
trajectories, in-depth examination of a very small number of suppliers (two to five), an 
approach adopted by most previous studies on the Vietnamese motorcycle industry 
(Pham Truong Hoang and Shusa 2006; Pham Truong Hoang 2007; Tran Ngoc Ca 2009), 
was considered to be inadequate. Rather, the author sought to cover a sufficiently large 
number of cases to shed light on the heterogeneity of learning trajectories among 
suppliers participating in different types of value chain as well as those participating in 
the same value chain.  
The cases were selected purposefully, rather than randomly, based on a combination of 
two types of replication logic in case study research: literal replication and theoretical 
replication (Patton 2002; Yin 2003; Eisenhardt 1989). The following describes how the 
cases were selected.  
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First, cases were limited to firms that mainly produced key motorcycle components that 
were vital to manufacturers. These included suppliers of metal and plastic parts, firms 
specialising in particular production processes such as plating, and suppliers of dies and 
moulds. As a guideline, cases were limited to those firms that depended on motorcycle 
components for at least 40% of their sales.  
Second, reflecting the focus of this paper on the lead firm as one of the key actors in the 
sector, cases were classified into three categories according to type of value chain and 
position in the chain: first-tier suppliers in Japanese chains, second-tier suppliers in 
Japanese chains, and suppliers in Vietnamese–Chinese chains.  
Third, within each category of suppliers participating in a particular type of value chain, 
attempts were made to include a subset of firms that were broadly similar in terms of 
attributes that might influence learning performance, as well as a subset of those that 
differed in this regard. Examples of such attributes include ownership (i.e. state or 
private), timing of entry into a value chain, and types of components manufactured.101  
Other than by the replication logic described above, the selection of cases was 
inevitably subject to pragmatic constraints such as time, financial resources, and access 
to firms (Eisenhardt 1989). To better ensure the quality of retrospective data covering 
the period of a decade, priority was given to those suppliers that had been interviewed 
by the author in 2002, 2003, 2004, and/or 2005. However, new cases were also added 
because (1) the number of previously interviewed suppliers – particularly those in 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains – was not sufficient; (2) information on crucial suppliers 
(including those that had only recently entered Japanese or Vietnamese–Chinese chains) 
                                                        
101 Ownership is significant because it often influences access to financial resources (Leung 2009). 
As discussed in detail in Section 7, a supplier’s membership of VEAM was also a key attribute in 
this respect.  
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became available; and (3) some suppliers previously interviewed either could not be 
contacted or refused to be interviewed.  
Table III-2 provides the list of 21 case suppliers, illustrating the basic profiles and 
attributes underlying the replication logic that guided the selection of cases. Suppliers 
are classified into three groups according to the type of motorcycle value chain in which 
they participated: Group A consists of 11 suppliers that participated in Japanese chains 
but not in Vietnamese–Chinese chains; Group B comprises 5 suppliers that had initially 
participated in Vietnamese–Chinese chains but eventually entered a Japanese chain; and 
Group C consists of 5 suppliers that had participated in Vietnamese–Chinese chains but 
not in Japanese chains. None of the suppliers in Group A transferred from a Japanese 
chain to a Vietnamese–Chinese chain. The majority of them also participated in value 
chains other than Japanese or Vietnamese–Chinese ones.  
Of the data given in Table III-2, that under the heading ‘year of business start-up’ may 
need elaboration. This ranged from 1959 to 2004, which means that the length of a 
given supplier’s operating experience could be anywhere between a few years and more 
than 40 years. Following the common approach to the investigation of firm-level 
capability building by stages of firm development (Ariffin 2000; Chitravas 2006), one 
might expect suppliers established in the 1960s to be much more advanced than those 
established in the 2000s. However, this was not necessarily the case. Length of 
operating experience prior to the start of Vietnamese market-oriented reform in the late 
1980s made little difference to a supplier’s learning attainment because the activities of 
such firms in those days were limited to the production of simple products for a stagnant 
domestic market subject to a centrally planned economic system that offered few 
opportunities for the acquisition of new capabilities. Therefore, taking account of the
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Table III-2. Suppliers Selected for Case Study 
Group Firm Ownership VEAM  Member 
Type of 
Component 
Processing 
Number of 
Employees 
Business 
start-up 
Products/experience prior to entry into a 
motorcycle value chain 
Value Chain Participation (1=1st tier; 2=2nd tier) 
Stage I Stage II Stage III 
J Other J V–C Other J V–C Other 
A 
V1 State   Plastic 550 1972 Household products 1 1 1   1 1   1 
V2 State   Metal 1,350 1974 Bicycle components 1 1 1     1     
V3 State   Metal  1,000 1974 Household products 1 1 1   1 1     
V5 Private   Plastic 1,000 1988 Plastic packaging for export   1 1   1 1   1 
V6 Private   Assembly  500 1994 Wire harnesses for export to Japan   1 1   1 1   1 
V7 State X Metal  1,000 1968 Agricultural machinery and components   1 1   1 1   1 
V8 Private   Specialised   81 2004 Senior management and key engineers gained experience at a Japanese company – – 1     
V9 State X Metal 1,100 1980 Diesel engines for domestic market   1 2   1 1   1 
V10 Private   Specialised  150 1988 Replacement components   1 2     2   1 
V11 Private   Plastic 182 1994 Household products and packaging   1 2     2   1 
V12 Private   Specialised  170 1999 Components of dies and moulds   1     1 2   1 
B 
V13 State X Metal 600 1974 Bearings for domestic market.   1   1 1  1    1 
V14 State X Metal 157 1970 Components for agricultural machinery    1 
 
1  1 (1)*    1 
V15 Private   Metal 200 1986 Replacement components   1 2 1 1  2   1 
V16 Private   Metal  400 1981 Bicycle components   1 2 1 1  2 1  1 
V17 Private   Metal  150 2001 Trading motorcycles –   1   2    1 
C 
V18 Private   Metal  150 1959 Bicycle components   1   1       1 
V19 Private   Metal  450 1987 Bicycle components   1   1       1 
V20 Private   Metal  170 1996 Replacement components   1   1     1 1 
V21 Private   Assembly  115 1988 Trading bicycles/motorcycles and components   1   1     1   
V22 Private   Assembly  100 1999 Trading motorcycle components   –   1       1 
Notes: 
(1) Types of component processing are classified as follows: metal = steel/aluminium parts requiring die-casting, machining, stamping, and/or forging processes; 
plastic=plastic injection moulding, specialised=suppliers engaged in specialised processes e.g. plating; assembly=suppliers producing components mainly as assembly 
processes without large investment in processing equipment. 
(2) ‘–’ denotes that the supplier was not established at the respective stage of industrial development.  
(3) * Indicates the firm was preparing to become a supplier. Although a formal supply contract was yet to be signed, it had experienced a learning event in this chain.    
Source: Fujita (2012: 119-120). Based on the author’s interviews, complemented by company brochures, and websites.
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specific Vietnamese context, this paper analyses capability building trajectories by the 
stages of industrial development since the mid-1990s outlined in Section 2 rather than 
by stages of suppliers’ development. 
4.3 Data Sources and Analysis 
The most important source of data was the author’s interviews with the 21 suppliers 
conducted between September 2008 and March 2009. All suppliers other than V6, V11, 
V12, V14, V18, V21 and V22 were interviewed more than once. The first interview was 
usually with a firm’s senior management with the aim of identifying up to three major 
learning events experienced by the supplier since the mid-1990s. The second interview 
was usually with the manager(s) directly responsible for new product introduction 
and/or production activities, and focussed on the collection of detailed data on each 
learning event.  
In terms of the suppliers interviewed only once, a second meeting was generally 
considered unnecessary because in these relatively small-scale companies, the senior 
management was typically responsible for new product introduction and production 
activities. The small size of such firms, limited product lines, the narrow scope of 
activities, and/or the comparatively few learning events evinced made it possible for the 
author to collect the required data in an extended interview with the senior management.  
Interviews were conducted in Vietnamese and were recorded with the permission of 
interviewees.102 Afterwards, the recordings were used to prepare transcriptions in 
Vietnamese.  
                                                        
102 This decision was made on the basis of the fact that as a non-native speaker of Vietnamese, the 
author had difficulty in simultaneously asking questions and taking notes.  
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The first round interview began by asking about the supplier’s overall business 
performance, product and market structure, and relations with its main customers since 
the late 1990s. The author then proceeded to elicit information on up to three major 
learning events that had taken place in the supplier’s activities in a Japanese or 
Vietnamese–Chinese chain.103 Senior managers were asked to identify the times at 
which the supplier’s methods of introducing new products, engaging in 
equipment-related activities, or conducting production management changed the most. 
By asking what the supplier learned to do as a result of a particular event, the author 
judged whether the incident constituted the acquisition of a new capability or not.104 If 
managers came up with more than three incidents, the author selected the three that best 
demonstrated the extent to which improvement in capability level was achieved. Many 
events involved changes in the level of capabilities in respect of more than one function. 
In cases of events associated with more than one lead firm, suppliers were asked to 
identify the one that played the most vital role.  
Having identified the domains of activities in which learning events took place, the 
author requested a second visit to the supplier for a meeting with the manager(s) in 
direct charge of the activities. Second round interviews normally proceeded as follows. 
(1) Interviews began by identifying the supplier’s capability status at the ‘point of 
departure’, that is, immediately preceding its entry into a motorcycle production 
value chain. Questions were asked about how each of the motorcycle value chain 
functions was conducted by the firm at this stage.  
                                                        
103 In reality, the author ended in securing details of between one and three events depending on the 
length of operation and growth path of each firm. 
104 Following the approach taken by Lema (2010), initial attempts were made to ask senior 
managers to shortlist the events they considered to be most important, but this invariably ended in 
details of incidents that were completely irrelevant to the analytical framework of the present study. 
Therefore, it was eventually decided that the author should select the events and assess capability 
levels on the basis of the analytical framework. 
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(2) Interviews proceeded to questions concerning how the means of conducting new 
product introduction or production changed after the learning events identified 
during the first interview. Follow-up questions were asked about the details of each 
event, such as how it actually took place, who participated in it, what contribution 
they made to the process, and what the firm was able to do as a result of the event. 
Additionally, firms were asked to rank the actors involved in the events in order of 
significance to the outcome.  
(3) Attempts were made to identify how one event eventually led to another. There were 
also instances when learning events identified in the first interview had to be 
modified as additional information pointed to the occurrence of more important 
events. 
It needs to be acknowledged that data collection via qualitative interviewing is subject 
to limitations. Since knowledge is contextual and can only be constructed or 
reconstructed during interviews, the qualitative interview method is heavily dependent 
on the interviewee’s capacities to interact with the interviewer as well as to remember, 
conceptualise and verbalise his or her experience (Mason 2002: 64). Particularly in 
retrospective interviews, typical errors are attributable to faulty memory, hindsight bias, 
or intentional misrepresentation of the past to maintain self-esteem (Golden 1992). 
Whilst such errors cannot possibly be eliminated completely, the author sought to 
increase the validity and reliability of the findings primarily by multiple sourcing of 
data (Patton 2002).  
First, as already elaborated, two or more individuals were interviewed for majority of 
the suppliers. Whilst senior managers were generally more concerned with the prestige 
of their companies, managers directly taking charge of new product introduction or 
165 
 
 
 
production were often much more knowledgeable about and willing to provide 
first-hand information on actual activities. Obtaining information on a particular event 
from different individuals was likely to have helped to correct any biases that the 
individuals might have had.      
Second, in most cases, an interview with the management was followed by a visit to the 
supplier’s factory, where the author had a chance to observe the components being 
manufactured, the types of machines and equipment being used, production 
management techniques being applied and the degree of worker discipline. The on-site 
visit provided precious pieces of evidence on the present status of the suppliers’ 
activities and enabled the author to confirm the reliability of the data obtained during 
the interview. 
Third, data gathered through the author’s previous interviews or surveys with some 
cases between 2002 and 2005 were utilised extensively. Since they were driven by 
different yet related sets of questions, some of this data transpired to be usable in the 
present study. Notes taken during factory visits were also precious sources of 
information that could be used to help identify degrees of change. Moreover, a general 
understanding of a given company’s development process and previous situation 
derived from past interviews also provided excellent foundations for preparing specific 
questions for the present study’s interviews. The author’s thorough knowledge of 
suppliers’ previous situations also enabled consistency checks and the extraction of data 
of much higher quality and precision than would have otherwise been possible. 
Fourth, suppliers’ direct customers (lead firms in the case of first-tier suppliers, and 
first-tier suppliers in the case of second-tier suppliers) provided vital objective 
assessments of learning performance and trajectories. In particular, data provided by 
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HVN, as well as lead firms and first-tier suppliers engaged in regular transactions with 
more than one of the 21 case suppliers, were critical as many assessments and remarks 
were presented comparatively. In the event that supplier and lead firm interviews 
produced different results, the author attempted to reconcile inconsistencies by looking 
for hints as to possible reasons for the differences through careful interpretation of 
interview data derived from both sides. Wherever possible, a third party such as an 
industry expert was also interviewed.  
Fifth, additional data were obtained from websites, annual reports, company directories, 
brochures of international exhibitions in which suppliers had participated, and reports 
prepared by experts who had visited suppliers at different times. Reports prepared by 
technical experts who had been dispatched by aid organisations to evaluate supplier 
capabilities provided particularly useful information.105  
The full list of interviews and interview schedule are provided in Appendices 1 and 2 
respectively. Interviews cited in this paper are referred to by firm and interview codes as 
explained in Appendix 1. 
Through the data collection process, the author amassed a set of questionnaires 
completed during interviews, hand-written notes taken during interviews and factory 
visits, photographs of production sites, and several hundred pages of interview 
transcriptions. The analysis began with the coding of these materials to create a database 
of learning events, which covered start and end dates; types and levels of capability 
attained as a result of events; types of value chain in which events took place; actors 
involved in events; and sources of knowledge mobilised in the process of events.  
                                                        
105 JETRO (1996, 2001) are examples of such reports. 
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In the initial stages of analysis, the database was utilised extensively to search for 
similarities and differences in learning attainment and its sources across suppliers. Since 
the fact that suppliers had not been sampled randomly meant that percentages (of events 
or suppliers) could not be used to support hypotheses, the author followed the 
replication logic to search for similarities across suppliers classified by value chain 
participation and identify the reasons for any exceptions. As the author proceeded to the 
supplier-level analysis, an initial attempt was made to utilise the database to analyse 
learning trajectories as a sequence of events that took place within a particular supplier. 
In the last stage of the analysis, an effort was made to conduct an in-depth comparative 
examination of a small number of particularly illuminating cases. 
5. Local Suppliers’ Capability Building: Attainment and Trajectory 
This section presents the findings of the empirical study in relation to the first research 
question:  
How did local suppliers’ capability building evolve from the late 1990s?   
After a brief overview of learning events, the section analyses the functions and levels 
of capability acquired by suppliers. The section then looks at learning events in 
sequence and identifies the most critical junctures in decade-long learning trajectories. 
5.1 Attainment: Functions and Levels of Capability Acquired 
The author’s interviews with 21 case suppliers identified a total of 56 learning events. 
While the aim was to identify three events per supplier, only one or two could be 
identified for suppliers V7, V8, V12, V17, V21 and V22. The reasons include a short 
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history of operations after entry into a motorcycle value chain (V8 and V21); limited 
scope of activities (V8, V12, V17 and V22); and/or the fact that suppliers focussed on 
comparatively few major projects (V7). Some identified events were on-going as of 
2008–09.106 Of the 56 events, 44 occurred mainly in suppliers’ activities in either 
Japanese or Vietnamese–Chinese chains, while the remaining 12 events were concerned 
with suppliers’ activities in other value chains either in the motorcycle or other 
industries. The main focus of the empirical sections is on the 44 events in Japanese or 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains; the remaining 12 events in other chains are partially 
covered in the analysis of supplier learning trajectories in Section 5.2. 
Table III-3 provides a list of the 56 events, including the stage of industrial development 
during which each took place, the type of value chain in which each took place, and the 
functional type of capability acquired in each instance. In respect of those events 
concerned with suppliers’ activities in more than one value chain, the two most 
important chains are shown. Although it was possible for a learning event to take place 
in a supplier’s activities in both Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese chains, this did not 
occur in any of the events analysed in this paper. 
                                                        
106 V9’s third learning event – analysed in depth in Section 7.1.3 – is a typical example. 
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Table III-3. List of Learning Events 
Supplier 
code/ 
Event # 
Event Title 
Stage of 
Industrial 
Development 
Type of Value Chain Type of 
Capability 
Acquired Main Secondary 
V1-1 
Improved processing and production management to obtain contract to supply simple plastic components to HVN and 
VMEP  
I HVN-1 Other  
Eq/PM 
V1-2 
Developed and instituted company-wide management system for improved QCD performance and to obtain ISO 9001 
certification  
III HVN-1 Other 
PM 
V1-3 
Upgraded capacity to design and manufacture plastic moulds of higher precision; obtained HVN recognition as supplier of 
plastic moulds 
III HVN-1 Other 
Eq 
V2-1 Improved processing and production management for obtaining contract to supply chain cases to HVN I HVN-1 – Eq/PM 
V2-2 Improved processing and process design for increased product variety with higher precision levels for HVN II HVN-1 – Eq/PM 
V2-3 
Instituted improved organisational arrangements for making constant improvements in process design to meet tighter HVN 
QCD requirements  
III HVN-1 – Eq/PM 
V3-1 Improved processing and production management to obtain contract to supply toolboxes to HVN I HVN-1 – Eq/PM 
V3-2 Improved processing and process design for increased product variety with higher precision levels for HVN II HVN-1 – Eq/PM 
V3-3 
Improved production management and established high-precision processing lines at new factory to meet tighter QCD 
requirements 
III HVN-1 – Eq/PM 
V5-1 Improved processing and production management to obtain contract to supply simple plastic components to HVN II HVN-1 – Eq/PM 
V5-2 Set up operation to design and manufacture moulds for plastic components to be supplied to HVN III HVN-1 – Eq/PM 
V5-3 Conducted market research and developed new products (plastic toys) to export to Europe III Other – Prd 
V6-1 Replicated sample of wire harness to supply to local car manufacturers II Other – Prd 
V6-2 Set up operation to source subcomponents and assemble wire harnesses to be supplied to HVN II HVN-1 – PM 
V6-3 Improved management of second-tier suppliers to meet tighter HVN cost reduction targets and environmental standards  III HVN-1 – Eq/PM 
V7-1 Improved processing and production management to obtain contract to supply sprockets to HVN II HVN-1 – Eq/PM 
V7-2 Established new high-precision forging process to supply core engine components to Japanese first-tier supplier to HVN III HVN-2 – Eq/PM 
V8-1 Set up operation to design and manufacture dies and moulds to be supplied to HVN and its first-tier suppliers III HVN-2 HVN-1 Eq/PM 
V8-2 Improved production management to meet large orders to tighter HVN lead time and delivery requirements III HVN-1 HVN-2 PM 
V9-1 Improved production management practices in supplying subcomponents to local first-tier supplier to HVN  II HVN-2 – PM 
V9-2 Improved processing to expand production of machinery components for export and domestic market III Other – Eq 
V9-3 Established high-precision forging lines to supply core engine components to HVN III HVN-1 – Eq/PM 
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Table III-3. Continued 
Supplier 
code/ 
Event # 
Event Title 
Stage of 
Industrial 
Development 
Type of Value Chain Type of 
Capability 
Acquired Main Secondary 
V10-1 
Developed new plating line with improved production management practices for subcontracting plating process to 
Japanese and Taiwanese suppliers to HVN and YVN 
II HVN-2 YVN-2 
Eq/PM 
V10-2 Acquired trivalent chromium plating technology to meet HVN tighter environmental standards  III HVN-2 Other Eq/PM 
V10-3 Improved production management for new customers in electronics industry III Other HVN-2 PM 
V11-1 
Upgraded capacity to design and manufacture plastic moulds for Taiwanese and Japanese first-tier suppliers to HVN and 
YVN 
II HVN-2 YVN-2 
Eq 
V11-2 Conducted reverse engineering to supply plastic containers to local customers II Other – Prd 
V11-3 Improved production management to meet tighter QCD requirements and to obtain ISO 9001 certification III HVN-2 YVN-2 PM 
V12-1 
Improved processing and production management practices to supply subcomponents to first-tier Japanese suppliers to 
HVN and YVN 
III HVN-2 Other 
Eq/PM 
V12-2 
Improved processing and production management to realise higher precision levels and shorter lead time required by 
customers 
III HVN-2 Other 
Eq/PM 
V13-1 Conducted reverse engineering and manufacture of stamped metal components to order for local assemblers II V-C – Prd 
V13-2 Improved processing and production management practices to obtain contract to supply components to HVN II HVN-1 – Eq/PM 
V13-3 
Improved production management to meet tighter HVN QCD requirements; recognised by HVN as one of top ten 
best-performing suppliers of 2007 
III HVN-1 – Eq/PM 
V14-1 Improved processing to produce engine components for local assemblers II V-C – Eq 
V14-2 Improved production management in preparation to obtain approval of and supply components to HVN  III HVN-1 – PM 
V14-3 Designed and manufactured moulds for components for agricultural machinery and other products III Other – Eq 
V15-1 Conducted reverse engineering and manufacture of die-cast aluminium components to order for local assemblers II V-C Other Prd/Eq/PM 
V15-2 
Improved processing and production management practices; won contract to supply components to first-tier Japanese 
supplier to HVN 
II HVN-2 – Eq/PM 
V15-3 
Improved production management and mould maintenance to meet tighter requirements of Japanese first-tier supplier to 
HVN 
III HVN-2 – Eq/PM 
V16-1 
Conducted market research and component design for regular launch of new silencer models incorporating cosmetic and 
functional improvements potentially demanded by local assemblers 
III V-C – Prd 
V16-2 
Improved production management to meet tighter QCD requirements for Japanese first-tier supplier and to explore new 
customers for motorcycle components 
III HVN-2 Other 
PM 
V16-3 Set up mould design and manufacturing operations to explore new customers for motorcycle components III HVN-2 Other Eq 
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Table III-3. Continued 
Supplier 
code/ 
Event # 
Event Title 
Stage of 
Industrial 
Development 
Type of Value Chain Type of 
Capability 
Acquired Main Secondary 
V17-1 Launched production of clutches to be supplied to local assemblers II V-C – Eq/PM 
V17-2 Improved processing and production management to meet requirements of Japanese first-tier suppliers to HVN III HVN-2 – Eq/PM 
V18-1 Conducted reverse engineering and manufacture of stamped metal components to order for local assemblers I V-C – Prd/Eq/PM 
V18-2 Improved processing and production management to produce motorcycle components to be supplied to VMEP  II Other  – Eq/PM 
V18-3 Replicated samples and improved production management to export forklifts to new customer in Germany III Other – Prd 
V19-1 
Conducted reverse engineering and manufacture of an increasing variety of engine components to order for local 
assemblers 
II V-C – Prd/Eq/PM 
V19-2 
Improved product design capacity to develop a new motorcycle valve model and improved processing of them as 
replacement components for domestic market  
II Other – Prd/Eq 
V19-3 Improved process design to achieve better quality and productivity of replacement components for the domestic market III Other – Eq 
V20-1 Conducted reverse engineering and manufacture of silencers to order for local assemblers II V-C – Prd/Eq 
V20-2 Improved reverse engineering and processing to meet requirements of local assemblers III V-C – Prd/Eq 
V20-3 Improved production management to produce motorcycle components for VMEP III Other  – Eq/PM 
V21-1 Launched the assembly of shock absorbers for local assemblers III V-C – Prd/PM 
V22-1 Launched the manufacture of motorcycle chains for local assemblers II V-C – Prd/PM 
V22-2 Conducted market research and developed an increasing variety of replacement components for the domestic market III Other – Prd 
Notes:  
(1) Value chain types are abbreviated as follows: HVN-1 = first-tier supplier in HVN value chain; HVN-2 = second-tier supplier in HVN value chain; YVN-2 = 
second-tier supplier in Yamaha Vietnam value chain; V–C = Vietnamese–Chinese chain.  
(2) Types of capability are abbreviated as follows: Prd = new product introduction; Eq = equipment-related; PM = production management.  
Source: The author’s interviews. 
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A closer look at the learning events reveals that the type of chain seems to be associated 
with the functional type of capability acquired. It turned out that a single event often 
resulted in the supplier’s acquisition of capabilities in more than one function. Of the 33 
events that took place in Japanese chains, 26 were associated with the acquisition of 
equipment-related capabilities and 30 with the acquisition of production management 
capabilities. Significantly, none of them were associated with the acquisition of new 
product introduction capabilities. Conversely, events in Vietnamese–Chinese chains 
were associated with acquisition of capabilities in a wider range of functions: new 
product introduction (9 out of 11 events), equipment-related activities (7 events), and 
production management (6 events).  
In terms of level, suppliers’ learning attainment can be analysed by comparing the initial 
level (level of capability immediately before the supplier’s entry into the value chain in 
question) and the highest level reached as a result of learning events experienced in the 
respective value chain. An important point to note is that this latter level refers to the 
stage at which suppliers’ most advanced activities in the respective value chain took 
place and therefore needs to be distinguished from full mastery of the level of capability 
in question.  
Table III-4 shows the results for learning in Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese chains 
respectively. With regard to those suppliers that participated in both Japanese and 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains, results for learning in each are shown separately. Let us 
begin with a note on the starting point, that is, the period immediately preceding a 
supplier’s entry into a Japanese or Vietnamese–Chinese chain. At this stage, the sampled 
suppliers conducted routine operations in the domestic market (equivalent to the 
operational level) or had not yet commenced production.  
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By 2008–09, suppliers in groups A and B had achieved remarkable improvement in 
capability levels via learning events in Japanese chains. This was particularly the case in 
respect of first-tier suppliers, some of which (V1, V2, and V6) even reached the 
adaptive level for either or both equipment-related and production management 
capabilities. While most first-tier suppliers reached the assimilative level for both types 
of capability, three (V5, V6, and V9) did not reach this stage with regard to either 
capability type.  
The levels of learning attained by second-tier suppliers (V10–12 and V15–7) generally 
fell short of those of first-tier suppliers. None reached the adaptive level, and only one 
of the six second-tier suppliers (V12) reached the assimilative level for both 
equipment-related and production management capabilities.  
Table III-4. Learning Attainment by Case Suppliers 
(a) Learning in Japanese Chains 
Supplier 
Starting Level Level of Most Advanced Activities Number of 
Years in 
Chain 
Equipment- 
related 
Production  
Management 
Equipment- 
related 
Production 
Management 
V1 Operational Operational Adaptive Adaptive 14 
V2 Operational Operational Adaptive Assimilative 14 
V3 Operational Operational Assimilative Assimilative 14 
V5 Operational Operational Assimilative Operational 9 
V6 Below operational Operational Operational Adaptive 9 
V7 Operational Operational Assimilative Assimilative 9 
V8 (n/a) (n/a) Assimilative Assimilative 6 
V9 Operational Operational Operational Operational 8 
V10 Operational Operational Assimilative Operational 11 
V11 Operational Operational Operational Operational 9 
V12 Operational Operational Assimilative Assimilative 6 
V13 Operational Operational Assimilative Assimilative 7 
V14 Operational Operational (No event) Assimilative 5 
V15 Operational Operational Operational Operational 6 
V16 Operational Operational Assimilative Operational 12 
V17 Operational Operational Operational Operational 5 
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(b) Learning in Vietnamese–Chinese Chains 
Supplier 
Starting Level Level of Most Advanced Activities 
Number 
of Years 
in Chain 
New 
Product 
Introduction 
Equipment- 
related 
Production 
Manage- 
ment 
New 
Product 
Introduction  
Equipment- 
related 
Production 
Manage- 
ment 
V13 Operational Operational Operational Operational (No event) (No event) 4 
V14 Operational Operational Operational (No event) Operational (No event) 1 
V15 Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational 4 
V16 Operational Operational Operational Adaptive (No event) (No event) 9 
V17 (n/a) (n/a) (n/a) (No event) Operational Operational 7 
V18 Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational 10 
V19 Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational 9 
V20 Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational (No event) 10 
V21 (n/a) (n/a) (n/a) Operational (No event) Operational 5 
V22 (n/a) (n/a) (n/a) Operational (No event) Operational 4 
Note: 
(1) ‘No event’ denotes that the supplier did not experience any major learning event in the 
respective chain signifying the acquisition of the respective type of capability in the respective 
stage of industrial development.  
(2) For V8, V17, V21 and V22, starting level could not be identified because their business start-up 
coincided with the entry into the respective value chain.  
Source: The author’s interviews. 
Conversely, suppliers in groups B and C failed to achieve notable improvement in 
capability levels whilst in Vietnamese–Chinese chains and their capability levels even 
by 2008–09 remained largely at the operational level. However, there was one notable 
exception: V16 reached the adaptive level of new product introduction capability whilst 
operating in a Vietnamese–Chinese chain.  
The findings can be summarised as follows. First, with regard to functional categories 
of capability, learning in Japanese chains concentrated on equipment-related and/or 
production management capabilities, while learning in Vietnamese–Chinese chains 
covered a wider range of functions that included new product introduction. Second, in 
terms of levels, most suppliers in Japanese chains – those of the first-tier in particular – 
had reached the assimilative level of production capability by 2008–09. On the other 
hand, learning attainment in Vietnamese–Chinese chains was generally modest, 
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although there was an exceptional case of a supplier that reached the adaptive level of 
new product introduction capability. 
5.2 Learning Trajectories: Identifying Discontinuity 
This subsection examines the trajectories that led to the learning attainment discussed 
above. It does so by examining learning events in sequence and identifying the timing 
of major leaps in capability level. Figure III-3 maps the sequence of learning events 
experienced by the 21 case suppliers. Each event is numbered and shows the level and 
functional category of capability acquired by each supplier. The subsection begins by 
examining the learning trajectories of suppliers that started motorcycle component 
production in Japanese chains (Group A suppliers). It then proceeds to analysis of the 
learning trajectories of suppliers that started motorcycle component production in 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains, including those that ultimately transferred to Japanese 
chains (Group B suppliers) and those that remained in Vietnamese–Chinese chains 
(Group C suppliers). 
5.2.1 Suppliers Initiating Motorcycle Component Production in Japanese 
Value Chains (Group A Suppliers) 
 
Of the 30 learning events identified by Group A suppliers, 25 took place principally in 
activities in Japanese chains and the remaining 5 occurred in activities in other chains. 
This means that each Group A supplier experienced a series of learning events in a 
Japanese chain. Once a supplier had entered a Japanese chain it tended to remain there 
for the long term, gradually improving equipment-related and/or production 
management capabilities.  
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Figure III-3. Supplier Learning Trajectories 
(a) Suppliers in Group A 
 
Firm Type of 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Capability
V1 Eq (DM) Event #3
Eq (Pr) Event #1
PM Operational Event #2
V2 Eq (Pr) Event #2 Operational Event #3 Assimilative
Eq (PD) Operational Assimilative Adaptive
PM Operational
V3 Eq (Pr) Event #1 Event #2 Operational Event #3 Assimilative
PM Operational
V5 Prd Event #3 Assimilative
Eq (DM) Event #2 Assimilative
Eq (Pr) Event #1 Operational Operational
PM Operational Operational
V6 Prd
Eq (DM) Event #3 Operational
PM Event #2 Assimilative Adaptive
V7 Eq (Pr) Event #1 Event #2 Assimilative
PM Operational Assimilative
V8 Eq (Pr) Event #1
PM
Event #2
Assimilative
V9 Event #2
Event #3
PM Event #1 Operational
V10 Eq (Pr) Event #1 Operational Event #2 Assimilative
PM Operational Event #3 Assimilative
Eq (Pr)
Operational Assimilative
Operational
Assimilative
Assimilative
 Operational
Stage III
Operational Assimilative
Operational
Event #1 Operational
Event #1 Operational
Operational
Stage I Stage II
Adaptive
Adaptive
Operational
Operational
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Figure III-3. (a) Suppliers in Group A (Continued) 
 
(b) Suppliers in Group B 
 
 
 
Firm Type of 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Capability
V11 Prd Event #2 Operational
Eq (Pr) Event #1 Operational
PM Event #3 Operational
V12 Eq (Pr) Event #1 Operational Event #2 Assimilative
PM Operational Assimilative
Stage I Stage II Stage III
SupplierType of 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Capability
V13 Prd Event #1 Operational
Eq (PD) Event #3 Assimilative
Eq (Pr) Event #2 Operational Assimilative
PM Operational Assimilative
V14 Eq (PD) Event #1 Operational
Eq (DM) Event #3 Assimilative
PM Event #2 Assimilative
V15 Prd Event #1 Operational
Eq (Pr) Operational Event #2 Event #3 Operational
PM Operational Operational Operational
V16 Prd Event #1 Adaptive
Eq (DM) Event #2 Assimilative
PM Event #2 Operational
V17 Eq (Pr) Event #1 Operational Event #2 Operational
PM Operational Operational
Stage I Stage II Stage III
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Figure III-3. Continued 
(c) Suppliers in Group C 
 
Notes: 
(1) Types of capability are abbreviated as follows: Prd = new product introduction capability; Eq (Pr) = processing precision dimension of equipment-related 
capability; Eq (PD) = process design dimension of equipment-related capability; Eq (DM) = dies and moulds dimension of equipment-related capability; PM = 
production management capability. 
(2) Cells denoting events are shaded as follows: light shaded = events in Japanese chains; dark shaded = events in Vietnamese–Chinese chains; unshaded = events in 
other value chains. 
Source: The author’s interviews.
SupplierType of 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Capability
V18 Prd Event #1 Operational Event #3 Operational
Eq (PD) Operational
Eq (Pr) Operational Event #2 Operational
PM Operational Operational Event #3 Operational
V19 Prd Event #1 Operational Event #2 Adaptive
Eq (Pr) Operational Operational
Eq (PD) Event #3 Adaptive
PM Event #1 Operational
V20 Prd Event #1 Operational Event #2 Operational
Operational Operational
Event #3 Operational
PM Operational
V21 Prd Event #1 Operational
PM Operational
V22 Prd Event #1 Operational Event #2 Operational
PM Operational
Eq (Pr)
Stage I Stage II Stage III
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In respect of the timing of learning events in Japanese chains, they were scattered 
throughout the three stages of industrial development, but Stage III transpired to be 
particularly significant in terms of both the number of events and levels of capability 
attained. Indeed, the levels of capability reached during the first two stages tended to be 
rudimentary. Figure III-3(a) shows that instances of progress towards the assimilative 
level up to Stage II were limited to the process design dimension of V2’s 
equipment-related capability and V6’s production management capability. While the 
absence of learning events in some suppliers in earlier stages (e.g. supplier V1 in Stage 
II) does not deny the absence of learning during the respective stage, any learning that 
did take place in Stage I or Stage II is to be expected to have been less significant than 
that which took place in Stage III.  
It is only in Stage III that we start to observe suppliers acquiring an adaptive level of 
production capability. It is also in Stage III that most sampled suppliers of the first-tier 
reached the assimilative level. While this finding cannot be generalised to local first-tier 
suppliers in HVN’s value chains at large, it is consistent with HVN’s assessment that, 
apart from a number of cases, its local suppliers were generally able to reach the 
company’s requirements – which by definition is equivalent of the assimilative level – 
by 2006–8 (interview #5).   
Stage III transpired to be a period of major leaps in capability level for several 
high-performing suppliers. V1, a first-tier supplier of plastic components, is a typical 
example. In Stage III, both equipment-related and production management capabilities 
of this supplier reached the adaptive level. It learned to design and manufacture plastic 
moulds for a variety of complex components to a degree of proficiency equivalent to the 
adaptive level of capability (Event #3). In 2006, V1 was recognised by HVN as a 
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supplier of plastic moulds, which allowed the former to design and manufacture moulds 
not only for its own use but also for HVN’s other suppliers of plastic components. V1 
also implemented organisational improvement that enhanced its levels of production 
management in order to satisfy the increasingly challenging QCD performance targets 
set by HVN (Event #2). 
Likewise, suppliers V2 and V6 also experienced critical learning events in Stage III; 
however, the functional types of capability in which ‘leaps’ took place differed across 
suppliers. V2 made its most influential changes in the domain of the process design 
dimension of equipment-related capability. The supplier managed to systematically and 
consistently make its own adaptations to production processes and equipment in order 
to enhance its QCD performance (Event #3). On the other hand, V6 focussed its 
learning on production management. In response to stringent cost reduction target and 
new environmental standards imposed by HVN, this supplier developed and instituted 
its own quality management standards within its own factory as well as those of 
second-tier suppliers supplying metal and plastic sub-components.  
Yet, for some suppliers, Stage III transpired to be a period of slower or even stalled 
learning. For example, V5 became a first-tier supplier of plastic components to HVN 
four years after V1. To begin with, V5 learned to process relatively simple plastic 
components – using moulds provided by HVN – to the required precision and QCD 
levels (Event #1). However, similar starting points notwithstanding, the learning 
performance of V5 lagged behind that of V1. As of Stage III, V5 was only capable of 
designing and manufacturing moulds for its own use (Event #2), while its production 
management capability remained at the operational level. This apparent lack of progress 
seems to have been due at least in part to V5’s diversification from about 2005 to 
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accommodate other unrelated fields in terms of both manufacturing (i.e. producing 
plastic toys for export to Europe) (Event #3) and non-manufacturing (i.e. real estate and 
logistics).  
For intermediate suppliers, Stage III was a period of accelerated learning compared to 
previous stages but not to the extent of the major leaps observed in high-performing 
suppliers. For example, V3 improved its levels of precision and production management 
sufficiently to meet HVN’s increasingly demanding requirements (Event #3). V8 also 
improved levels of precision in dies and moulds, and stepped up its production and 
delivery management to meet the increasing quantities of orders placed by HVN and its 
first-tier suppliers (Event #2). Through such events, these suppliers progressed from the 
operational level to the assimilative level for either or both equipment-related and 
production management capabilities, but failed to go beyond that.  
5.2.2 Suppliers Initiating Motorcycle Component Production in 
Vietnamese–Chinese Value Chains (Groups B and C) 
Figure III-3(b) shows the sequence of learning events that took place in the ten suppliers 
in Groups B and C. Only 11 of the 26 learning events experienced by these firms took 
place principally in Vietnamese–Chinese value chains. This means that much of the 
learning undertaken after entry into Vietnamese–Chinese chains took place in other 
value chains. In terms of the timing, events were concentrated in Stage II – the early 
years of suppliers’ participation in Vietnamese–Chinese chains. Unlike suppliers in 
Japanese chains, initial acquisition of new capabilities by these groups of suppliers was 
not followed by impetus towards progressively higher levels of capability. Moreover, 
levels of capability acquired in Vietnamese–Chinese chains remained largely 
rudimentary.  
182 
 
 
 
With the exception of V16, no Group B or Group C supplier progressed beyond the 
operational level in any of the functional categories of capability as a result of learning 
events in Vietnamese–Chinese chains. In terms of new product introduction activities, 
these suppliers mostly replicated existing products – either from samples provided by 
customers or standardised products available on the domestic market – failing to make 
their own adaptations to existing product designs that incorporated significant 
functional, qualitative or cosmetic improvements. Likewise, their equipment-related and 
production management activities tended to remain at the rudimentary level.  
What happened to Group B and C suppliers in Stage III? Most switched their focus 
away from Vietnamese–Chinese chains. All Group B suppliers entered Japanese chains 
as first- or second-tier suppliers whilst concluding their involvement in 
Vietnamese-Chinese chains. However, there was an exception. V16 did not leave its 
Vietnamese–Chinese chain entirely and continued to operate simultaneously in Japanese 
and Vietnamese–Chinese chains. Group C suppliers generally shifted the relative weight 
of their operations to other value chains. Again, V20 and V21 did not leave their 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains completely, and continued to operate simultaneously in 
these and other value chains.  
After transferring to Japanese chains in Stage III, Group B suppliers experienced similar 
learning patterns to the Group A firms discussed above. The former improved 
equipment-related and/or production management capabilities in their new Japanese 
chains, although the degrees of improvement varied across suppliers. V13, V14, and 
V16 reached the assimilative level for equipment-related and/or production 
management capabilities, while V15 and V17 failed to progress beyond the operational 
level for these types of capability.  
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Only three suppliers originally in groups B and C – namely, V16, V20 and V21 – 
continued to operate in Vietnamese–Chinese chains into Stage III. Of these, V16 alone 
managed to attain an adaptive level of new product introduction capability. The most 
important learning event for V16 started in Stage II in a Vietnamese–Chinese chain and 
was consolidated in Stage III. Whereas this supplier merely replicated samples provided 
by local assemblers or produced components according to standardised designs in the 
early years, it gradually started to make its own cosmetic and functional modifications 
to such designs on behalf of local assemblers (Event #1). Cosmetic modifications aimed 
at meeting rapidly changing consumer preferences were frequent. Although much less 
frequent, V16’s functional modifications culminated in 2008 in the launch of an 
innovative silencer design that complied with new government policy which required 
the meeting of Euro 2 emission standards.107  
The frequent launching of new models reflecting the latest market trends and policy 
requirements enabled V16 to maintain sales to local assemblers even into Stage III. 
Conversely, neither V20 nor V21 succeeded in improving their capabilities beyond the 
operational level. V20 failed to achieve substantial improvements in the routine 
operational capabilities it had acquired upon entry into a Vietnamese–Chinese chain in 
Stage II (Event #1). And V21, a late entrant into a Vietnamese–Chinese chain, 
experienced a learning event in Stage III but only succeeded in reaching the operational 
level of new product introduction and production management capabilities.  
5.3 Summary  
This section explored the ‘how’ question about supplier learning trajectories. It began 
                                                        
107 Interview with V16 #1. The Vietnamese government implemented Euro 2 emission standards for 
motorcycles from July 2007 (Prime Minister’s Decision 249/2005/QD-TTg dated 10 October 2005). 
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by broadly confirming the findings of previous research that the type of capability 
acquired is associated with a certain type of value chain; but it went further in 
examining the sequence of learning events experienced by the sampled firms, showing 
that supplier learning in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry was indeed an extended 
process consisting of major leaps, slow progress, and/or halted learning. One of the 
most important findings was the importance of Stage III as the most dynamic period of 
learning regardless of the type of motorcycle value chain in which individual suppliers 
operated. When looked at from the medium-term perspective, the Stage II learning 
attainment emphasised in the existing literature transpired to be relatively modest.   
In terms of suppliers that initiated motorcycle component production in Japanese chains, 
it was found that the acquisition of equipment-related and/or production management 
capabilities tended to progress slowly up to and including Stage II. This was followed 
by a divergence in learning performance in Stage III, whereby some suppliers 
experienced major leaps towards the basic innovative level while others saw their 
learning stall.  
In respect of suppliers that initiated motorcycle component production in 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains, learning focussed on the acquisition of routine capabilities 
covering wider functional categories in the early years of chain participation. Again, it 
was in Stage III that a growing divergence in learning performance across suppliers 
became apparent. While learning in Vietnamese–Chinese chains slowed down or even 
halted in most suppliers, one, V16, attained an adaptive level of new product 
introduction capability that helped the supplier to maintain and even expand its sales to 
local assemblers throughout Stage III.  
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6. Learning Models in Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese Chains up 
to the Early 2000s: An Aggregated Analysis of Learning Events 
Having analysed how supplier learning trajectories evolved over time, we now turn to 
the question of why learning trajectories evolved in the ways they did. The research 
question is:  
What actor constellations and what knowledge flows led to critical learning events?  
In exploring this question, sections 6 and 7 attempt to explain supplier learning 
trajectories in terms of the roles of key actors: lead firms and suppliers. In endeavouring 
to explain the fundamental differences in learning patterns between Japanese and 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains, Section 6 outlines two contrasting learning models in their 
original forms, as they emerged in stages I and II. This is done by engaging in 
aggregated analyses of 44 learning events in Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese chains 
respectively.  
6.1 Contrasting Actor Constellations in Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese 
Chains 
The first step in enumerating the key features of the two learning models lies in 
identifying those actors that operated as important sources of supplier learning. Table 
III-5 shows the most important and second most important actors in the 44 learning 
events that took place in Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese chains as identified by the 
suppliers. All firms ranked their own activities as the most important source for all the 
events they experienced regardless of the type of value chain in which they took place. 
Whilst suppliers’ self-evaluation of their own roles should be interpreted with caution as 
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managers tend to insist on the value of their own achievements, this finding is consistent 
with the conclusion in the TC literature that firm-level capability building is ultimately 
determined by deliberate investment in specialised, innovative activities undertaken by 
firms themselves as the agents of learning (Bell and Pavitt 1995).  
However, important differences emerged in the role of lead firms. These companies 
were found to be extremely important in learning events in Japanese chains, especially 
in the earlier stages of industrial development. The lead firm was identified as the 
second most important actor in terms of all learning events that took place principally in 
Japanese chains during stages I and II. Conversely, lead firms played a minimal role in 
learning events in Vietnamese–Chinese chains, particularly during the early years of 
industrial development. In none of the learning events that took place in 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains in stages I and II was a lead firm chosen as the second most 
important actor. Indeed, in more than half of these events, suppliers stated that they 
were the only actors involved.  
These very different actor constellations in Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese chains 
respectively point to two contrasting models of learning: the Japanese model, which 
involves active roles played by both the lead firm and the supplier; and the 
Vietnamese–Chinese model, in which learning is achieved principally through the 
supplier’s own volition. In order to explore the two models in depth, it is necessary for 
the analysis to reach beyond actor constellations to examine the specific modes of actor 
involvement and knowledge flows between actors. Since the above discussion suggests 
that contrasts between the two models can be observed more clearly in stages I and II 
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Table III-5. Key Actors in Learning Events 
(a) Learning events at the first tier of Japanese chain 
Stage Firm Event # 
Key Actors  
Most Important Second Most Important 
I 
V1 1 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (HVN) 
V2 1 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (HVN) 
V3 1 Supplier itself  Customers or customer-designated unit (HVN) 
II 
V2 2 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (HVN) 
V3 2 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (HVN) 
V5 1 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (HVN) 
V6 2 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (HVN) 
V7 1 Supplier itself  Customers or customer-designated unit (HVN) 
V13 2 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (HVN) 
III 
V1 2 Supplier itself None 
V1 3 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (HVN) 
V2 3 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (HVN) 
V3 3 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (HVN) 
V5 2 Supplier itself Other external actor (Vietnamese provider of software) 
V6 3 Supplier itself Other external actor (related company) 
V8 2 Supplier itself Other external actor (related company) 
V9 3 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (Japanese partner designated by HVN) 
V13 3 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (HVN) 
V14 2 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (HVN) 
(b) Learning events at the second tier of Japanese chain 
Stage Firm Event # 
Key Actors  
Most Important Second Most Important 
II 
V9 1 Supplier itself Other external actor (Japanese aid organisation) 
V10 1 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (Japanese first-tier suppliers) 
V11 1 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (Japanese motorcycle manufacturers and their first-tier suppliers) 
V15 2 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (Japanese first-tier supplier) 
III 
V7 2 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (Japanese first-tier supplier and a partner designated by HVN) 
V8 1 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (HVN) 
V10 2 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (Japanese first-tier suppliers) 
V11 3 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (Japanese motorcycle manufacturers and their first-tier suppliers) 
V12 1 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (Japanese first-tier suppliers) 
V12 2 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (Japanese first-tier suppliers) 
V15 3 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated unit (Japanese first-tier supplier) 
V16 2 Supplier itself Other external actors (visited and observed factories in Japan) 
V16 3 Supplier itself Other external actors (machinery providers) 
V17 2 Supplier itself Other external actor (Japanese aid organisation) 
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(c) Learning Events in Vietnamese–Chinese Chain 
Stage Firm Event # 
Key Actors  
Most Important Second Most Important 
I V18 1 Supplier itself None 
II 
V13 1 Supplier itself None 
V14 1 Supplier itself None 
V15 1 Supplier itself None 
V17 1 Supplier itself Other external actor (Chinese partner) 
V19 1 Supplier itself Other external actors (visited and observed factories in Taiwan) 
V20 1 Supplier itself None 
V22 1 Supplier itself Other external actor (Russian partner) 
III 
V16 1 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated units (local assemblers) 
V20 2 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated units (local assemblers) 
V21 1 Supplier itself Customers or customer-designated units (local assemblers) 
Source: The author’s interviews. 
than in Stage III, the remainder of this section searches for similarities across learning 
events in the same types of value chain, with the aim of illuminating the key features of 
the original Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese learning models respectively as they 
emerged in stages I and II.  
6.2 Lead Firm-Driven Learning Model in Japanese Chains 
Table III-6 shows the fieldwork results for the roles played by key actors in learning 
events. The columns indicate the type of value chain and the period in which each 
learning event took place, and the rows depict the types of actor involvement in supplier 
learning based on the framework presented in Section 3. Consistent with the discussion 
in Section 6.1, lead firms played an extensive role in supplier learning in Japanese 
chains during stages I and II. The following analysis focuses on first-tier suppliers, to 
which the Japanese learning model applies particularly well.  
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Table III-6. Sources of Learning in Learning Events 
  Japanese Chain (first tier) Japanese Chain  (second tier) 
Vietnamese–Chinese 
Chain 
Timing (stages at which learning events took place) Total I II III Total II III Total I II III 
Lead Firm 
(or 
companies 
designated 
by lead 
firm) 
Inducement 
Product specifications and QCD requirements 19 3 6 10 13 3 10 3  0 0 3 
Providing dies and moulds 5 3 1 1 4 1 3  0  0  0  0 
Direct Knowledge 
Transfer 
Technical advice and training 10 3 5 3 6 2 4  0  0  0  0 
Troubleshooting 14 3 5 6 4 1 3  0  0  0  0 
Indirect Knowledge 
Transfer Learning by observing 4  0 2 2 2 1 1  0  0  0  0 
Monitoring 
Testing and feedback from lead firm: 
 a) Providing results only  0  0  0  0 2 1 1 2  0  0 2 
 b) Giving reasons  0  0  0  0 6 1 5  0  0  0  0 
 c) Follow-up on measures taken to overcome problems 18 3 6 9 5 2 3  0  0  0  0 
Factory audit 19 3 6 10 9 4 5  0  0  0  0 
Supplier 
Physical investment 13 2 4 7 10 3 7 6 1 3 2 
In-house improvement/R&D in new product introduction  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 2  0  0 2 
In-house improvements/R&D in production 9 3 2 6 4 2 2 5  0 3 2 
Organisational change 14 1 5 8 5 2 3 1  0  0 1 
Other external actors  
Foreign Organisations: technical advice and training  5  0 1 4 5 2 3 2  0 2  0 
Domestic Organisations: technical advice and training  2  0  0 2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Recruiting individuals/mobility of human resources 5 1 2 2 1  0 1  0  0  0  0 
Foreign-invested companies in Vietnam or companies 
located abroad: learning by observing 2  0 1 1 4 1 3 3  0 3  0 
Total number of Learning Events  19 3 6 10 14 4 10 11 1 7 3 
Source: Fujita (2012: 122). Based on the author’s interviews with suppliers. 
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6.2.1 The Lead Firm 
Table III-6 shows that the role of the lead firm extended over three domains of 
involvement in supplier learning: inducement, direct and indirect knowledge transfer, 
and monitoring. Inducement was found to be critical in promoting supplier capability 
building. In all learning events that took place in first-tier suppliers in Japanese chains, 
product specifications and so-called QCD requirements were identified by suppliers as 
the key drivers of capability building. Lead firms provided suppliers with detailed 
drawings including technical parameters. Annual and monthly production plans were 
also provided to allow suppliers to set investment and production targets.  
Clearly defined specifications enabled the supplier to identify the gap between its 
current level of manufacturing capability and lead firm requirements, thus enabling it to 
set appropriate learning goals. Lead firm provision of dies and moulds was also 
important in the early years of transactions with local suppliers as a means used by 
HVN to ensure the requisite levels of precision; all learning events that took place in 
first-tier suppliers in Stage I being facilitated by such provision. Accordingly, the first 
important step for suppliers in accumulating equipment-related capability was in 
studying dies and moulds provided by lead firms, and learning to conduct appropriate 
maintenance of them.  
However, viewed from a different angle, the provision of detailed specifications was 
also a constraint to supplier learning. The fact that detailed drawings for Honda’s 
models to be launched in Southeast Asia were developed at the company’s R&D centres 
in Japan and/or Thailand meant that there was virtually no scope for suppliers in 
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Vietnam – regardless of nationality – to participate in product development.108 
Consequently, HVN’s requirements of its suppliers centred on the processing of 
components precisely in accordance with the drawings and specifications provided, 
which basically boiled down to meeting QCD targets (interview with HVN #4).  
As an illustration of Honda’s evaluation criteria for prospective suppliers, Table III-7 
shows the types of capability the company expected of its suppliers. Apart from a few 
management-related expectations, the majority of requirements are related to production 
management and equipment-related activities, which were the major channels via which 
suppliers sought to improve QCD levels. Although there is a criterion termed 
‘development’, specific requirements suggest that suppliers were expected to produce 
and maintain dies and moulds, and manufacture components in accordance with design 
drawings provided by HVN rather than develop their own component designs. Such 
lead firm demands explain why supplier learning in Japanese chains concentrated so 
much on these two functions and did not extended to new product introduction.   
Monitoring by lead firms was also found to be vital to all learning events in first-tier 
suppliers in Japanese chains, including those in Stage III. A critical point to note is that 
monitoring took the form of what Schmitz (2006: 566) refers to as “constructive 
monitoring”. If components delivered to HVN did not reach the required standard, the 
company not only returned them to the supplier but also informed it of the reasons for 
rejection, and requested the taking of both immediate and permanent measures to 
overcome the problem (interview with HVN #4). The progress of implementation was 
also monitored. As the general director of V3 pointed out in relation to its Event #1: 
                                                        
108 Up to the early 2000s the bulk of R&D activities in respect of models to be launched in 
Southeast Asia were conducted in Japan, but they were gradually relocated to the R&D base in 
Thailand from the turn of the century (interview with Honda R&D Southeast Asia #1).  
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“[HVN] provide us with ‘training’ in the context of production…for instance, [in the 
form of] inspection and advice” (interview with V3 #1). 
Table III-7. HVN Criteria for Supplier Evaluation 
Quality 
Quality targets, standardised quality control, testing standards, working 
standards 
Costs 
Consciousness of cost, unambiguity of quotations, proactivity in 
reducing production costs, 3S*  
Delivery 
Smooth flow of production lines, management of production plans and 
performance, management of orders and delivery, inventory 
management 
Development  
Maintenance and manufacture of dies and moulds, own/proprietary 
production technology, value engineering proposals 
Management  
Business mind, proactive attitude towards improving productivity, 
resolution of labour disputes (e.g. strikes), promotion of good working 
attitude amongst employees 
Notes: * 3S is a Japanese management system comprising: Seiri=orderliness; Seiton=neatness; 
and Seiso=cleanliness. 
Source: Presentation made by HVN’s director in charge of procurement at the Seminar on 
Vietnam-Japan Supporting Industry Business Promotion hosted by JETRO, SME Technical 
Assistance Center, and JICA and held at Melia Hotel, Hanoi on 22 January 2007. 
Direct and indirect knowledge transfer also played a role in helping suppliers to reach 
the requisite QCD and precision levels, which were often substantially higher than 
standards prevailing in the local market. Direct knowledge transfer was identified as an 
important source of learning in all events other than one in stages I and II. Its 
importance was particularly emphasised by the three firms that HVN engaged as 
first-tier suppliers in Stage I. Prior to signing formal supply contracts, these suppliers 
were repeatedly visited by lead firm experts over a period of up to a few years 
(interviews with V2 #1; V3 #1). These experts provided hands-on advice and training 
directly to managers in suppliers’ factories (V3 #1). In instances of unexpected trouble 
in particular, lead firm experts were usually dispatched to assist. The general managers 
of V1 and V2 pointed out that troubleshooting was a joint initiative in which the 
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supplier and the lead firm worked together to determine the cause of a problem and find 
a solution (interviews with V1 #4 and V2 #1).  
Similar remarks were made by a number of companies that were engaged as first-tier 
suppliers to HVN in Stage II in respect of first learning events in Japanese chains 
(Events #1 of V5, V7 and V13). In relation to its first learning event, V7’s general 
director noted: “They offered a lot of assistance…especially in implementing quality 
control systems... From 2001 to 2003, they [Honda experts] visited us so often that I’ve 
lost count” (interview with V7 #2).  
As noted above, there was an exception. In relation to its first learning event, V6 
remarked that the lead firm came to inspect the factory and tested samples but did not 
provide any direct assistance. There are two possible explanations for this. The first has 
to do with the type of component. This supplier produced wire harnesses that required 
relatively simple assembly operations for which there were a number of alternative 
suppliers. Second, V6 had attained the necessary skill level in production management 
for suppliers of this type of component through its previous experience of exporting 
wire harnesses to Japan (interview #1). 
6.2.2 The Supplier  
Although the lead firm undoubtedly played a vital role in the Japanese learning model, 
it is clear that the kinds of interventions discussed above do not directly result in 
suppliers attaining a capability level that enables them, for example, to process products 
with higher levels of precision, or implement sophisticated production management 
techniques. It was the supplier’s own mobilisation of internal knowledge sources that 
directly led to the accumulation of firm-level capabilities. In the words of the chairman 
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of supplier V1 (as of the date of interview) who served as the general director of the 
company from 1995 to 2008, “Our internal capacity is the main [driver of capability 
building]” (interview with V1 #3).  
Even when the lead firm provided generous assistance, Japanese experts did not 
supervise suppliers’ day-to-day operations. It was left to suppliers to work out how 
advice and instructions could be applied to routine operations: 
[The Japanese expert] did not stay continuously. He set requirements [concerning 
production, quality management, or equipment] as the situation demanded… He 
only gave us ‘homework’ to do. If we were able to do it [by his next visit], he gave 
us more work to do. In this way, he assisted us to gradually upgrade each time he 
visited us. The Japanese worked with us in this way. 
(interview with V13 #1 on Event #2)  
As shown in Table III-6, suppliers’ internal knowledge mobilisation included investment 
in machinery and equipment, in-house improvements in production, and organisational 
changes. In all learning events experienced by first-tier suppliers in stages I and II, they 
identified the most important learning source as various combinations of these internal 
sources. However, at this stage, the mobilisation of internal sources entailed limited 
innovative activities on the part of the supplier.  
First, supplier-side activities concentrated principally on trial-and-error efforts to 
improve manufacturing processes and production management practices following the 
advice of Japanese experts. The general director of V2 explained how the company 
qualified as an official supplier to Honda (Event #1):  
The process was very long; we finally succeeded after three trials…. At that time, 
[HVN] did not assist us. We had to work on our own initiative, that is, [we 
needed to] respond to HVN’s specifications and requirements by coming up with 
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the products. 
(interview with V2 #1) 
Second, where physical investments were made, they tended to be small in scale. For 
example, V2 was only able to invest in a few second-hand Japanese lathes and Chinese 
stamping machines due to financial constraints (interview #1).  
6.2.3 External Actors Other Than the Lead Firm 
The mobilisation of internal learning sources was sometimes facilitated through external 
sources other than lead firms, such as production management experts dispatched from 
a Japanese training organisation (Event #1, V7); production management training 
programmes organised by a Vietnamese organisation (Event #2, V3); and supplier 
employee visits to Taiwan, Thailand or China to observe factories in similar industries 
(Event #1, V5). Nevertheless, as far as learning events during stages I and II were 
concerned, such external sources were not as important as internal sources or the 
supplier’s lead firm (Table III-5). This suggests that these external sources played a 
complementary role rather than a critical role in supplier capability building.  
6.3 Suppliers’ Independent Learning in Vietnamese–Chinese Chain 
In Vietnamese–Chinese chains, the pattern of actor involvement in supplier learning was 
found to be markedly different from that in Japanese chains. Consistent with the 
discussion in Section 6.1, Table III-6 shows the critical role played by suppliers in 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains themselves. The following subsections discuss the roles of 
key actors in this learning model.  
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6.3.1 The Lead firm 
No evidence was found of learning events during stages I or II in which a lead firm had 
played a key role; and none of the suppliers remarked that they had ever received direct 
technical assistance from lead firms in relation to any learning events. Specifications 
and requirements stipulated by lead firms were only vaguely defined and thus failed to 
provide incentives or targets for supplier learning. In the case of engine components, for 
which de facto standard designs were widely shared within the industry (Paper II), lead 
firms placed orders by merely stating required components without providing any 
samples, design drawings, or other specifications (interview with V19 #3). In terms of 
other components, specifications were commonly provided in the form of samples for 
suppliers to replicate; yet even in such cases, neither detailed written specifications nor 
parameters were provided (interviews with V13 #1, V15 #2, V18 #1, V22 #1).  
Vaguely defined specifications also meant that lead firm monitoring was largely 
non-existent. Although there were instances in which local assemblers returned faulty 
components asking the supplier to make adjustments, they did not constitute acts of lead 
firm assistance, as was the case in Japanese chains, but rather a reflection of lead firm 
inability to coordinate product parameters around de facto standard models (Paper II). 
Indeed, it should be borne in mind that ultimately, de facto standardisation based on 
uncoordinated duplicative imitation of popular models – frequently employing different 
measurement methods and degrees of precision in recreating design drawings– was at 
best a partial method of ensuring component compatibility (ibid.).  
Local suppliers pointed out that assemblers returned their components when they found 
them to be incompatible with adjacent ones, a problem that occurred primarily because 
assemblers arbitrarily switched suppliers according to price (interviews with V13 #1; 
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V15 #2; V16 #1; V17 #1; V20 #2). Local assemblers in effect compensated for their 
lack of coordination capacity in an ad hoc fashion by demanding that suppliers make ex 
post adjustments (Paper II).   
In short, the way lead firms engaged with their suppliers failed to provide them with 
targets or incentives for learning. However, this also implies that lead firms did not limit 
the scope of supplier activities. Unlike Japanese chains, suppliers in 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains were not constrained in terms of engaging in new product 
introduction activities, for example, making modifications to existing component 
designs, although few suppliers exploited such opportunities in stages I or II.  
6.3.2 The Supplier  
Table III-6 shows that supplier learning in Vietnamese–Chinese chains was largely a 
result of the mobilisation of internal knowledge sources on the supplier’s own initiative. 
In-house improvements in new product introduction, equipment-related activities, or 
organisation were found to constitute the main sources of learning in most events. New 
product introduction activities concentrated mainly on the reverse engineering of either 
samples provided by lead firms or products available on the domestic market by 
measuring samples, analysing the materials used, and recreating design drawings. 
Production activities focussed mainly on setting up production lines and maintaining the 
manufacture of components. In some events, investment in additional machinery and 
equipment was undertaken, particularly by suppliers that had only recently commenced 
production activities (interviews with V21 #1; V22 #1), or those that had previously 
only produced relatively simple items such as bicycle parts (interviews with V18 #1; 
V20 #1).  
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6.3.3 External Actors other than the Lead Firm 
In some events, external sources of knowledge other than the lead firm complemented 
internal learning sources, particularly where suppliers only had limited internal 
resources. Two suppliers received direct technology transfer from abroad. In initiating 
component production, V17 entered into a technology transfer agreement with a 
Chinese partner, who provided engineers, design drawings, dies, machinery and 
equipment, subcomponents, and materials. The Chinese engineers remained on site at 
V17’s factory throughout the period of the contract, which extended over seven years, to 
assist with machinery operation (interviews #1, #2). Similarly, V22 entered into a 
technology transfer contract with a Russian partner in order to produce motorcycle 
chains (interview #1).  
Some suppliers exploited knowledge gained from observing manufacturers abroad. For 
example, in the early 2000s, V15’s general director and chief engineer visited factories 
in China that produced similar components in order to observe factory layout, types of 
machinery being used, and how the machines are operated (interview #2). Likewise, 
V19’s general director repeatedly visited Taiwan to observe the type of machinery being 
used, process design techniques, and methods of production management (interview 
#2).  
6.4 Summary  
As a first step in analysing why supplier learning trajectories evolved in the ways 
identified in Section 5, this section conducted an aggregated analysis of learning events 
in terms of learning sources, which focussed on the roles of key actors – lead firms and 
suppliers. Following the replication logic underlying the case study, this section 
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searched for similarities in sources across learning events that took place in the same 
types of value chain. Two contrasting patterns of actor constellations and modes of actor 
involvement emerged out of this analysis. These patterns fit particularly well with stages 
I and II of Vietnamese industrial development, when only a few inconsistent learning 
events could be identified, all showing clear reasons for their exceptionality.  
The basic features of the two contrasting learning models are depicted in Figure III-4. 
The Japanese model combines active lead firm interventions and supplier mobilisation 
of internal learning sources in accordance with lead firm requirements. A thick one-way 
flow of knowledge from the lead firm to its suppliers is the most prominent 
characteristic of this model. The fact that lead firm interventions were aimed at assisting 
suppliers to reach QCD requirements explains why supplier learning was concentrated 
on equipment-related and production management capabilities. Lead firm involvement 
in the form of inducement, knowledge transfer, and monitoring functioned as a key 
driver of supplier learning. Although capability building ultimately depended on the 
supplier’s efforts to mobilise internal learning resources, very few of them sought to 
manoeuvre into independent or innovative learning activities in stage I to II.  
Conversely, the Vietnamese–Chinese learning model is based primarily on the supplier’s 
own initiative in the mobilisation of internal sources of knowledge. Under this model, 
knowledge flows between the lead firm and its suppliers were extremely limited and 
invariably not managed in a fashion conducive to the promotion of supplier learning. 
Limited lead firm involvement in specifying the scope of supplier activities and 
providing incentives for supplier learning explains why capability building in 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains extended over a wider scope of functions but remained 
modest in terms of levels reached.    
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Figure III-4. Original Supplier Learning Models in the Vietnamese Motorcycle 
Industry (Stage I–Stage II)  
(a) Japanese Learning Model 
 
 
(b) Vietnamese–Chinese Learning Model 
 
Source: The author. 
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7. Evolution of the Two Learning Models (2005–2008): In-depth 
Analyses of Selected Suppliers 
This section continues to explore why supplier learning trajectories evolved in the ways 
they did. Having outlined the key features of the two contrasting learning models in 
their original forms, the focus turns to how they changed over time. Given the 
limitations of the aggregated analysis of learning events in revealing the diverse and 
even possibly opposing directions of change emerging in Stage III, this section relies on 
an in-depth examination of a smaller number of particularly illuminating cases. Section 
7.1 examines two distinct directions of change emerging in Japanese chains coordinated 
by HVN. Suppliers analysed in depth are V1, V2, V3 and V5 (Variant 1 of the Japanese 
model), and V7 and V9 (Variant 2 of the Japanese model). Section 7.2 switches the 
focus to changes in Vietnamese–Chinese chains. In so doing, it examines V16 and V18, 
two suppliers of stamped steel components that continued to operate in 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains up to Stage III yet with contrasting learning trajectories. 
7.1 Lead Firm-Driven Adjustments to the Japanese Model  
In the case of HVN’s value chain, the impetus for transformation of the learning model 
came from the lead firm. Therefore, this subsection begins by discussing HVN’s 
sourcing practices up to the early 2000s, which sustained the Japanese learning model in 
its original form (as discussed in Section 6.2), as well as adjustments that HVN sought 
to implement from 2005 onwards. It then examines two distinct variants of the Japanese 
learning model emerging out of suppliers’ reactions to adjustments in HVN’s sourcing 
practices.  
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7.1.1 Drivers for Change: Adjustments in Lead Firm Sourcing Practices 
As discussed in Section 6, HVN played an extensive role in assisting the long-term 
development of its suppliers’ production capabilities in stages I and II.109 Honda’s 
attempt to nurture local suppliers in Vietnam was initiated upon the commencement of 
local production in the mid-1990s, a strategy the company had developed in its other 
overseas production bases. Such moves gained momentum in the early 2000s for two 
reasons. One was the need to economise radically on component procurement costs as 
HVN launched a new model in response to the China shock, which was priced at 
roughly one-third of its previous models. The other came in the form of the local 
content rules, which were announced in the late 1990s but fully implemented only after 
2001.  
These developments combined to prompt HVN to explore new, low-cost sources of 
components in Vietnam. Given the limited number of Japanese suppliers operating in 
the country, HVN inevitably had to mobilise non-Japanese suppliers and especially local 
firms. Where suppliers’ capability levels fell short of the company’s requirements, HVN 
offered technical assistance to help them raise their capability levels up to the required 
standards. 
Local suppliers entering HVN’s chains were exposed to challenging quality 
requirements, and stringent cost-reduction targets introduced upon the launch of the new 
model in the early 2000s added further to the pressure. At this stage, however, HVN’s 
power to enforce its requirements on suppliers was subject to the following limitations. 
First, HVN’s purchasing power was limited due to the small scale of orders. Even 
though the new model had gained popularity among Vietnamese consumers, the 
                                                        
109 Unless otherwise specified, the analysis in this subsection is based is based on Paper II. 
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company was constrained in the expansion of production due to a series of restrictive 
policies introduced by the Vietnamese government from 2002. Consequently, annual 
production only increased to some 400,000 units (Paper II, Figure II-2), which was 
barely sufficient for suppliers to achieve minimum economies of scale in the 
manufacture of those components that did not require capital-intensive production 
processes.  
Second, suppliers faced little substantive competition. The limited availability of firms 
with the ability to meet HVN’s demanding requirements hampered its attempts to 
mobilise new suppliers with the aim of exposing them to intense competition. Moreover, 
HVN’s annual production fell below the one million unit threshold that the company 
regarded as the minimum volume necessary for the dual sourcing of components. 
Therefore, having once entered an HVN value chain, suppliers could expect to receive 
orders in the long term.  
As the industry entered a new stage of development in about 2005, power relationships 
within the value chain were transformed markedly. On the one hand, HVN began to 
wield huge purchasing power over its suppliers. This occurred as policy changes 
brought about a significant boost to the market as a whole as well as HVN market 
shares in particular. The company’s annual production exceeded one million units in 
2007 (Paper II, Figure II-2), thus creating conditions conducive to the launch of dual 
sourcing. On the other hand, the growing market attracted an increasing number of 
foreign-invested and local suppliers, including Japanese suppliers that had previously 
hesitated to invest in Vietnam. This meant that HVN could no longer spare its resources 
in nurturing new suppliers from scratch.  
Having obtained a larger pool of competent suppliers that were increasingly dependent 
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on HVN for sales, the company was ready to implement key adjustments to its sourcing 
practices. First, it used its weight to enforce increasingly stringent QCD targets on 
suppliers. These performance targets were systematically enforced and progressively 
adjusted each year. Underperforming suppliers were pressurised to improve their 
performance and, if they failed to do so, might be gradually replaced by those with 
better track records (interview with HVN #5).  
Second, technical assistance was now offered selectively. Having obtained huge 
purchasing power and the capacity to switch suppliers, HVN began to prioritise the new 
policy of developing closer ties with those suppliers with which Honda had direct 
capital relations (Paper II). In addition to Japanese suppliers that were members of the 
Honda Group, such favoured suppliers included Honda’s joint venture partner in 
Vietnam, VEAM. As a result, HVN shifted to “a focussed approach in offering direct 
technical assistance to suppliers” (interview with HVN #4). Instead of assisting a wide 
range of local firms with the aim of increasing the local content ratio, as HVN had done 
in the early 2000s, assistance was now offered only to strategically selected suppliers, 
particularly VEAM members. V7 was one of the first VEAM members to be selected as 
an HVN first-tier supplier in the early 2000s. With the new priority, V9 and V13 were 
added as first-tier suppliers in 2004–05. Finally, after four years of preparation, by early 
2009, HVN had agreed in principle to source metal stamped components from V14 
(interview with V14 #1).  
7.1.2 Emergent Model 1: Learning Driven by Supplier Initiative 
The aforementioned adjustments to HVN’s sourcing practices brought about a 
modification to the original Japanese learning model discussed in Section 6.2. The 
present subsection focuses on an emerging variant of the Japanese learning model, 
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which was characterised by the growing importance of suppliers’ independent, 
innovative initiatives in the face of diminished direct knowledge transfer on the part of 
the lead firm. The analysis is based on an in-depth comparative examination of two sets 
of suppliers: two suppliers of plastic components (V1 and V5), and two suppliers of 
various metal components (V2 and V3). These firms were selected because suppliers 
belonging to each set started to exhibit contrasting learning trajectories by this stage in 
spite of similar developments up to Stage II.  
The analysis of learning events experienced by these suppliers up to the early 2000s 
(Events #1 and #2 in V2; Events #1 and #2 in V3; Events #1 and #2 in V1; Event #1 in 
V5) supports the original Japanese model. V1, V3, and V5 emphasised how frequent 
hands-on advice offered by Honda’s experts helped them to overcome initial difficulties. 
V2 was less enthusiastic about discussing the role of lead firm assistance but its general 
director acknowledged that HVN’s support helped them to overcome problems that they 
had experienced difficulty in solving by themselves (interview #1). While it was mainly 
left to the suppliers to ensure that they reached the required standards, activities in 
mobilising knowledge sources were largely similar across firms and there were few 
original attempts that went much further than following HVN instructions.  
Learning events that took place in these four suppliers during Stage III suggest the 
continual modification of the Japanese model. First, a combination of inducement and 
monitoring began to exert greater pressure on them. Product specifications grew 
increasingly demanding as HVN launched new models consisting of more complex and 
high-precision components; annual QCD targets were set more clearly and raised each 
year; and performance was monitored systematically via monthly, quarterly and annual 
compilation of defect ratios, frequency of delayed deliveries, and cost reduction records.  
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V1 noted that it faced its biggest challenge in terms of production management in about 
2004–05. Deliveries increased from once a day in the early years to between five and 
seven times a day, quality targets were specified as defect ratios in parts per million, and 
incremental cost reduction was requested every year. Faced with these challenges, the 
supplier realised that there was a need to fundamentally change its quality management 
system (Event #3). Likewise, V2 pointed out that it was between 2005 and 2008 that the 
company transformed its equipment-related activities most extensively. Increasing 
orders for complex components110 and challenging annual cost reduction targets 
imposed by HVN became the impetus for V2 to acquire the ability to continuously 
improve process designs, thereby generating the capacity to manufacture increasingly 
complex components (Event #3). 
Second, direct knowledge transfer initiated by the lead firm began to play a more minor 
role, suggesting that its relative importance had diminished. In all of the events 
experienced by the four suppliers under study in Stage III, lead firm roles in addition to 
specifications and monitoring were largely limited to checking and approving process 
design and factory layout, and the troubleshooting of problems that could not be solved 
by the suppliers themselves.  
Last and most important, suppliers’ internal learning activities became much more 
diverse and sophisticated, emerging as a key factor in determining supplier learning 
trajectories. In high-performing suppliers, capability building activities combined both 
long-term, persistent attempts at internal resource accumulation and more independent, 
innovative initiatives, often going much further than requirements, advice, or 
                                                        
110 In the late 1990s, V2 produced 15 or 16 types of simple component requiring little processing; 
however, by 2008, it was producing more than 300 types of component, including some that had to 
undergo 25 distinct processes (interview #2).  
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instructions provided by HVN. This is illustrated by Event #3 in V1. This supplier’s 
attempts at developing and instituting a company-wide production management system 
were based on its independent initiative rather than requests made from the lead firms it 
worked with.111 The initiative was launched by the general director in 2005 with the 
aim of integrating the individual management techniques and schemes that had 
previously been introduced in the company into an integrated quality control system 
(interview with V1 #3).  
Through organising study groups and discussions within and across departments, V1 
substantially improved coordination and communication between different sections of 
the firm, nurtured problem-solving capacity and quality awareness, and implemented 
continuous improvement in activities at all levels and successfully obtained ISO9001 
certification in 2006 (interviews with V1 #3, #4). By 2008, this supplier was receiving 
increasing volumes of HVN’s orders for relatively complex plastic components as well 
as plastic moulds requiring relatively high levels of precision (interview with V1 #4). 
This is in sharp contrast to V5, which, as we shall see, lagged far behind the other in 
terms of capability building.   
A combination of internal resource accumulation and enhanced independent learning 
initiatives can also be observed in respect of Event #3 in V2.112 This supplier acquired 
the ability to design production processes for complex components and implement 
continuous improvement in such processes. To this end, V2 not only invested in human 
resources that is, the training of engineers, and physical equipment such as hot and cold 
                                                        
111 HVN was V1’s largest although not sole major customer. The firm served buyers in other sectors 
such as consumer electronics and telecommunications but, most notably, it only traded with foreign 
buyers that had similar requirements (interview with V1 #2, #4). Equipment-related and production 
management capabilities that the supplier acquired via its relation with HVN could therefore be 
applied to the service of other customers as well.   
112 Unless otherwise mentioned, the discussion on this event is based on the interview with V2 #2. 
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forging equipment, and computer numerically controlled (CNC) machining stations, as 
other local suppliers in Japanese chains had done, but also implemented a number of 
systematic organisational improvements that facilitated in-house engineering efforts.  
First, V2 developed and implemented a system of regular and close communication 
between its process design departments and production sites. This enabled it to 
continuously improve manufacturing processes that reflected the actual requirements of 
production sites. Second, reports on experiences in the design and improvement of 
production processes were systematically compiled and shared across different 
departments via internal workshops. The accumulated records of past experimentation 
and design changes became key resource to which process design engineers could refer 
when either initiating new products or improving existing ones.  
Through these changes, V2 not only won HVN orders for high-precision components 
requiring complex production processes but also improved its productivity performance.  
On the other hand, the learning performances of V3 and V5 fell short of those achieved 
by V2 and V1, primarily due to a lack of one or both of the key elements of supplier 
learning progress: long-term, persistent attempts at internal resource accumulation, and 
independent, innovative initiative. V5 lacked both. The sources of learning in its Event 
#2 demonstrate the limited emphasis the supplier placed on the persistent accumulation 
of internal resources – not to mention independent innovative initiatives.  
V5 acquired mould design and manufacturing capability via the quick route of 
investment in new machinery and equipment, and the recruitment of several new 
employees, including engineers and operators, who had worked for a Japanese joint 
venture company that produced plastic moulds (interview #2). However, V5 engaged in 
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limited internal training and organisational changes aimed at improving its 
equipment-related or production management activities (ibid.).  
As a result, its mould design and manufacturing capability fell behind that of V1. Unlike 
V1, V5 was only permitted to manufacture moulds for its own use in the production of 
relatively simple components. Moreover, production management techniques taught by 
the former employees of the Japanese joint venture company had not contributed to 
significantly improving the level of the supplier’s production management capability. In 
addition, persistent problems, such as damage to components in transit due to improper 
loading and careless driving (ibid.), reveal fundamental weaknesses in management and 
a lack of awareness of quality standards.  
The second case of shortcoming, V3, had made steady progress in internal resource 
accumulation in response to lead firm requirements but had failed to engage in more 
independent and innovative activities. This explains why the supplier reached the 
assimilative level but failed to progress further, unlike V2. In terms of physical 
investment in new machinery and product lines, V3 was on a par with V2. However the 
main differences between the two suppliers lay in their respective degrees of 
independent innovative effort. Although V3 endeavoured to adhere to HVN’s 
requirements and instructions, it engaged in limited in-house R&D in equipment-related 
or production management activities. In the end, the supplier ended up failing to make 
progress beyond the assimilative for its equipment-related and production management 
capabilities, and HVN’s orders to this supplier continued to focus on relatively simple 
components. 
7.1.3 Emergent Model 2: Learning Assisted by Extensive Lead Firm 
Intervention  
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Concurrent with the aforementioned modification, a totally different type of adjustment 
was underway that gave rise to another variant of the Japanese learning model. Under 
this variant, the lead firm continued to intervene extensively in suppliers’ activities with 
the aim of localising the production of high-precision engine components. Whereas the 
former type of adjustment discussed in Subsection 7.1.2 was observed for the majority 
of HVN’s first-tier suppliers, the current type of adjustment was limited to two VEAM 
member company initiatives: V7’s initiation of forging processes for connecting rods 
(Event #2), and V9’s commencement of forging processes for crankshafts (Event #3).113 
Although these events were quite exceptional, they deserve in-depth analysis because of 
their importance to Vietnamese industrial development.  
These two events were the first incidences in which local Vietnamese companies 
acquired the sophisticated capabilities necessary for manufacturing high-precision 
automotive engine components. When HVN sought to localise the production of these 
parts in about 2005,114 the company designated the two VEAM member companies to 
undertake initial processing, as they were the only local companies equipped with the 
requisite hot forging technology (interview with HVN #4), but as we shall see their 
membership of VEAM was also a critical factor behind HVN’s decision to engage them. 
The final processing of the connecting rods and crankshafts was to be undertaken by 
Japanese supplier J11 and HVN respectively.   
The most notable feature of these two learning events is that the necessary levels of 
precision far exceeded the existing capabilities of either supplier. However, it is worth 
emphasising the differences between the two suppliers in terms of the degree of such 
                                                        
113 It was confirmed with HVN that these were the only suppliers with which the lead firm trialled 
its new approach to component localisation (interview with HVN #5). 
114 Since production processes for these components required substantial investment, localisation of 
manufacture made economic sense only when the scale of HVN’s production reached approximately 
one million units per year (interview with Japanese supplier J11 #1).  
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divergence. Even though the two suppliers had the relevant technology, HVN was 
apparently more enthusiastic to outsource high-precision processing to V7 than V9. 
Indeed, HVN’s procurement manager admitted that V7 had a more advanced level of 
technology at this stage (interview with HVN #4). Having supplied sprockets to the lead 
firm since 2001, V7 had made progress in improving equipment-related and production 
management capabilities (Event #1).  
Conversely, V9 had not previously served HVN or any other international buyer as a 
direct customer; its experience in Japanese chains had been confined to limited 
subcontracting work provided by V7 (Event #1). HVN made the decision to outsource 
the high-precision processing of crankshafts to V9 “taking into consideration the 
interests of the joint venture partner, VEAM” (interview with HVN #4). Faced with 
large gaps in V9’s technological capability, HVN proposed that the supplier set up a 
joint venture with a Japanese firm to be designated by the former. However, this 
proposal was rejected by V9, which opted to acquire the requisite technology 
independently (ibid.).  
Due to the large gap in the capability levels of both V7 and V9, and the level required 
by HVN, the emergent learning model variant was characterised by active and 
far-reaching intervention by the lead firm. HVN insisted that the two suppliers sign 
technological assistance agreements with Japanese companies designated by Honda 
(ibid.). Apart from inducement and monitoring by the direct customer, direct knowledge 
transfer was to be provided by these Japanese companies as a condition of the 
agreement in return for payment by the suppliers. Nevertheless the way in which the 
emerging variant actually worked and the level of mastery varied between V7 and V9.  
In the case of V9, the designated partner was a Japanese company with expertise in 
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high-precision forging technology, designing and manufacturing dies, and the 
development of forging equipment and production systems. This company provided V9 
with a comprehensive package of assistance including (1) drawings, dies, process 
designs, working standards, and quality control schemes; (2) specifications for the 
equipment to be installed; (3) an intensive training programme for V9’s engineers and 
operators, including a 3-month course for 15 engineers at the company’s headquarters in 
Japan; and (4) a full-time Japanese supervisor posted at V9’s factory to monitor and 
supervise the daily operation of the new production lines (interview with V9 #1). The 
last element of the package deserves particular attention. V9’s daily operations had been 
constantly monitored by the full-time Japanese supervisor from the outset; as of March 
2009 – nearly five years after the initial launch of the project – the Japanese expert was 
still stationed full time on site (interview with HVN #5).  
The case of V7 involved more complex transactional relations and knowledge flows, as 
shown in Figure III-5. In addition to V7 itself, three other actors were involved: 
Japanese supplier J11 (a direct customer of V7 and a first-tier supplier based in Vietnam 
that undertook final processing of components to be delivered to HVN); a Japanese 
supplier Y in Thailand (a Japanese affiliate based in Thailand supplying connecting rods 
to Honda Thailand; entered into a technological assistance agreement with V7); and 
Vietnamese supplier Z (a manufacturer that supplied forging dies to V7).  
Under the technological assistance agreement between Y and V7, experts from the 
former visited V7 and Z every three months to conduct regular checks and offer advice. 
Given the limited frequency of Y’s visits, supplier J11 monitored V9’s routine 
operations, acting as a mediator as necessary. Accordingly, supplier J11 reported 
problems in V7’s operations via emails to Y with photographic and video attachments, 
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and supervised V7 on the basis of recommendations received in reply. In other words, 
J11 took direct responsibility for V7’s performance in relation to HVN, providing V7 
with hands-on support in the absence of any formalised agreement or payment.  
Under this arrangement, V7 was subject to far-reaching and active intervention from 
both J11 and Y. During the initial years of operation, J11 required V7 to provide 
situation reports on a daily basis (interview with J11 #1). J11 and Y organised numerous 
training sessions on forging technology, such as maintenance of dies and temperature 
control, in the form of both classroom sessions and the on-site training of engineers 
(ibid.). However, unlike the case of V9, lead firm intervention did not go as far as 
full-time supervision in overseeing the daily operation of production lines over an 
extended period. Moreover, the degree of assistance and supervision gradually 
diminished over time (ibid.).  
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Figure III-5. Transactional Relationships and Knowledge Flows comprising Supplier V7’s Learning Event #2 
 
Source: The author, based on interviews with supplier V7 #2, #3; Japanese supplier J11 #1; and HVN #4, #5.
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In both cases, intervention by companies designated by the lead firm meant limited 
space for the suppliers to manoeuvre and they were basically expected to process 
components in exact accordance with instructions. However, supplier learning activities 
still mattered. This was particularly the case with V7. Since the early 2000s, V7 had 
consistently engaged in internal training to upgrade levels of processing, maintenance of 
dies, and production management (interviews with V7 #1, #2). By 2008, the frequency 
and intensity of assistance from J11 and Y had diminished, and the company was able to 
operate the forging process for the production of high-precision components largely on 
its own (interview with J11 #1), a task that required thorough and sophisticated 
technical knowledge that very few if any Vietnamese firms had managed to achieve.  
With reduced assistance, V7 was able to reach HVN’s product quality requirements 
largely on its own by the end of 2009. As a result, the precision dimension of its 
equipment-related capability reached the assimilative level, which could be assessed as 
an important observable learning outcome. However, even though V7 managed to reach 
the quality requirements by 2010, this had still been achieved at the expense of low 
productivity resulting from high internal defect ratios and a lengthy manufacturing cycle 
(interview with JJ11 #1). This suggests that production management still had room for 
improvement.  
In the case of V9, the space for independent initiative was more limited. Apart from 
recruiting new engineers and operators, almost everything needed for production was 
either provided or specified by the Japanese partner. Moreover, five years after the 
production line had started operating, the vital role of the Japanese supervisor had not 
diminished (interview with HVN #4, #5). Acknowledging that V9 occasionally made 
arbitrary and ill-informed adjustments to equipment or production processes, HVN’s 
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procurement manager stressed that the supplier’s performance could not be sustained 
without external supervision:  
We buy the components from V9 because we regard [V9’s forging factory] as a 
Japanese factory. Without the [full-time Japanese] supervisor, the forging factory 
would soon be like V9’s other old-fashioned factories [which manufactured 
products for other customers]. 
 (interview with HVN #5)  
This suggests that V9’s track record in sustaining the stable operation of its first forging 
line and in reaching HVN’s QCD targets from 2006 to 2008 cannot be entirely 
attributed to capabilities specific to the supplier. As of 2008, the learning event was still 
on-going. Even though V9 continued to aim towards building assimilative levels of 
equipment-related and production management capabilities, its inability to maintain 
stable and continuous operation suggests that its capabilities remained at the operational 
level.  
7.2 Supplier-Initiated Transformation of the Vietnamese–Chinese Model 
Unlike the lead firm-driven adjustments to the Japanese learning model discussed above, 
the impetus for the transformation of the Vietnamese–Chinese model came primarily 
from the suppliers. The key feature of this variant was the emergence of a two-way 
knowledge flow between the lead firm and its suppliers. Although the intensity of such a 
knowledge flow cannot be compared to that observed in the Japanese chains, it still 
signified an important departure from the arm’s-length market transactions that 
prevailed during stages I and II. This subsection investigates the transformation of this 
learning model via an in-depth comparative analysis of suppliers V16 and V18, as 
suppliers of metal stamped components in Vietnamese–Chinese chains that had begun 
to exhibit contrasting learning trajectories by Stage III. 
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The lack of lead firm initiative in transforming relations with suppliers is confirmed by 
the findings of research on local assemblers (Paper II, Section 6.2). By this stage, the 
local assembly sector was dominated by a small number of large firms focussing on the 
production of low-priced imitations of Japanese models for the rural market that even 
HVN’s low-priced model had not penetrated. The in-depth analyses of some of the 
largest assemblers in Stage III found that they continued to define product specifications 
only vaguely and engaged in limited monitoring of supplier performance (ibid.).  
The absence of a lead firm-initiated impetus for changing arm’s-length relations was 
corroborated by suppliers V16 and V18. First, neither of them had main customers or 
local assemblers that placed regular orders over the long term. As of the time of the 
interview in 2008, supplier V16 had transactions with more than 20 local assemblers, its 
general director commenting: 
For us, all customers are equally important…all of them are our main customers. 
For instance, a company placed large orders with us in September this year but it is 
quite possible that next year, this company will not be able to sell [its products] and 
thus will no longer place orders with us. 
 (interview with V16 #1) 
Second, there were no instances of lead firm direct knowledge transfer playing a key 
role in supplier learning in Stage III (Table III-6). Third, in terms of inducement and 
monitoring, the ways in which lead firms communicated product specifications and 
monitored supplier performance had not changed substantially. Neither V16 nor V18 
was explicitly informed by their customers of the specifications required. They both 
pointed out there were increased instances of customers returning defective components 
and asking for replacements after 2005; however, in the absence of clearly specified 
product standards or requirements, V16 suspected that inspection was conducted 
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arbitrarily:  
They only inspect externally by sight. If they look at a component and happen to 
notice any visible defect, they ask for replacement. They don’t have testing 
equipment – they don’t invest in it – and they don’t have engineers specialised in 
testing components. 
 (interview with V16 #2 on Event #1) 
Given such limited lead firm engagement, any impetus for change came from the 
supplier. This is illustrated by V16’s first learning event, which extended from Stage II 
to Stage III. Through this event, V16 acquired the ability to make its own minor 
cosmetic and functional modifications to the design of silencers. A notable feature of 
this event was that the mobilisation of internal knowledge sources occurred in the 
context of the supplier’s attempts to actively engage with the lead firm and generate a 
two-way knowledge flow.  
By 2002, V16 had recognised the potential demand of its customers for component 
design modifications (interview #1). Since “local assemblers did not have design 
drawings or know anything about technical parameters” (ibid.), the supplier took the 
initiative to launch a new silencer design. The supplier established an R&D department; 
invested in software, and design, testing and measuring equipment; and trained design 
engineers. The R&D department initially only had 3 engineers but this number had 
increased to 24 or 25 by 2006 (ibid.).  
In the process of product design and prototyping, the R&D department worked closely 
with a marketing department that made systematic attempts to survey customer 
preferences by engaging in regular communication with local assemblers, motorcycle 
dealers, and final consumers (interview with V16 #1, #2). V16’s attempts at engaging 
with its customers resulted in the following two-way knowledge flow: (1) lead firms 
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transferred information on market demand to V16; (2) by pooling and analysing the 
market information gathered from various actors, V16 developed component 
prototypes; and (3) lead firms provided feedback on the prototypes (ibid.).  
Here it should be emphasised that unlike suppliers in Japanese chains, V16 deliberately 
engaged with many lead firms rather than one specific company, and developed product 
designs aimed to meet the requirements of such lead firms in general rather than the 
discrete requirements of any one of them (interview #1). Even when the lack of 
component compatibility arising from the limits of de facto standardisation called for 
adjustments in the interface with other components, V16 systematically arranged for the 
requisite modifications upon the start of the transactions with its customers (interview 
#2) – quite unlike ad hoc and ex post adjustments observed earlier in 
Vietnamese–Chinese chain. Thus, under volatile market conditions, V16 was able to 
save on product development costs and avoid the risk of becoming dependent on a 
particular lead firm.  
By 2005–06, V16 was able to launch 3 to 4 new component designs per year under the 
company’s own brand name, which were sold to more than 30 local assemblers 
(interview #1). In 2008, it even launched an innovative silencer design that complied 
with new government policy which required the meeting of Euro 2 emission standards 
(ibid.). It was a combination of investment in physical and human resources, and the 
strategic pooling and use of knowledge flows with many lead firms that enabled V16 to 
acquire the adaptive level of new product introduction capability. Due to such enhanced 
capability, the supplier was able to expand its sales to a large number of customers 
while most other suppliers in Vietnamese–Chinese chains were facing diminishing 
sales.  
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Conversely, V18 failed to achieve substantial improvement in the basic reverse 
engineering capability it had acquired during the early years of its entry into 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains (Event #1). The supplier was one of the first local 
companies to produce motorcycle components for local assemblers, serving around 50 
customers in the late 1990s (interview #1). However, the absence of capability building 
in subsequent years can be attributed to the limited investment it made in physical and 
human resources. Of the machinery and equipment the supplier used, only 30% 
constituted new investment, while 70% was accounted for by antiquated machines it 
had used for manufacturing bicycle parts – its traditional product (ibid.). Even the 
supplier’s new equipment consisted largely of second-hand apparatus that did not 
include design or high-precision processing machines (ibid.).  
V18 also made limited effort to accumulate human resources, as the general director 
himself took charge of most skill-intensive activities such as the replication of drawings, 
prototype production, design of production processes, and testing (ibid.). As the entry of 
new suppliers into the sector meant that competition between them grew more intense, 
V18 suffered from a serious decline in sales. In 2006, it decided to cease the 
manufacture of motorcycle components for local assemblers and transfer to other 
products – although as of 2008, its endeavours in exploring new markets had met with 
limited success.115  
7.3 Summary and Discussion 
In an attempt to answer the question of why supplier learning trajectories evolved over 
time, this section examined adjustments that took place in the two original learning 
                                                        
115 From 2003, V18 began to supply motorcycle components to VMEP but its sales volume failed to 
grow. As of 2008, the supplier was being approached by a German company seeking to outsource the 
manufacture of forklifts to a Vietnamese firm, but no contract had yet been signed (interview #1).   
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models during Stage III. In so doing, it sought to explain why some suppliers in 
Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese chains respectively reached the adaptive level of one 
or more functional types of capability while others lagged behind.  
While the actor constellations of the original models outlined in Section 6 were broadly 
maintained in Stage III, variations were observed in the nature and intensity of actor 
involvement in supplier learning as well as knowledge flows between actors. Figure 
III-6 depicts the emerging variants of the two learning models. Two distinct types of 
adjustment were observed in the Japanese model and one in the Vietnamese–Chinese 
model.  
In the first Japanese variant (Figure III-6a), direct knowledge transfer initiated by the 
lead firm is diminished. The lead firm continued to play an important role via 
inducement and monitoring to impose increasingly challenging performance targets on 
suppliers, but supplier learning outcomes grew to depend increasingly on their own 
independent and innovative initiatives. Under this model, the independent learning 
initiatives of high-performing suppliers often extended beyond lead firm requirements 
or instructions. Such activities enabled these suppliers to reach the basic innovative 
level of equipment-related and/or production management capability and even influence 
HVN’s allocation of orders for highly sophisticated components or processes.  
Conversely, the second Japanese variant (Figure III-6b) involved a thicker one-way 
knowledge flow from lead firm to suppliers than in the previous stages. Interventions 
from companies directly designated by the lead firm intensified in magnitude and 
content, eventually being consolidated as formalised agreements in return for payment 
by the suppliers. These interventions continued to cover all three domains of lead firm 
involvement: inducement, direct and indirect knowledge transfer, and monitoring. Due 
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to the large capability gaps that had to be filled, even routine operation of the production 
processes by suppliers required frequent and extensive assistance from the companies 
designated by the lead firm, leaving little room for the former to manoeuvre. However, 
the comparative case study of V7 and V9 showed that suppliers’ internal mobilisation of 
resources still influenced learning outcomes.  
Figure III-6c depicts the emerging variant of the Vietnamese–Chinese learning model. 
While capability building continued to be largely a result of suppliers’ independent 
learning initiatives, one case study supplier, V16, took the lead in initiating a two-way 
knowledge flow with its customers in the course of its second learning event. 
Assemblers provided V16 with key inputs for product design – i.e. market information – 
while the supplier responded to lead firm requirements by initiating several prototypes 
incorporating its own suggestions and specifications. While the intensity of knowledge 
flow in this variant cannot be compared to that in Japanese chains, together with several 
other suppliers, V16 formed a “shared supply base” (Sturgeon and Lee 2005) from 
which to service local assemblers in general (Paper II).116  
Not only did the formation of advanced capabilities enable V16 and other suppliers to 
expand their sales to a wide range of customers but the emergence of a shared supply 
base also led local assemblers to adjust their sourcing practices. Instead of engaging in 
frequent switching of suppliers in search for those offering low prices, as was the case 
in Stage II, local assemblers by Stage III came to capitalise on these competent 
suppliers to realise reasonable quality, high product variety incorporating diverse 
cosmetic modifications to several critical components, and low costs facilitated by huge 
                                                        
116 This organisational pattern would seem to resemble that observed in industries where standards 
of compatibility give rise to modular networks (Sturgeon and Lee 2005); although the partiality of 
component standardisation in the Vietnamese motorcycle assembly sector means that emerging 
organisational patterns should be distinguished from modular networks (Paper II). 
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manufacturing economies of scale (Paper II). 
 
Figure III-6. Adjustments to Learning Models (Stage III) 
(a) Japanese Learning Model Variant 1 
 
 
(b) Japanese Learning Model Variant 2 
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(c) Vietnamese–Chinese Learning Model Variant 
 
Source: The author. 
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Vietnamese–Chinese chains and at the second tier of Japanese chains, it had not 
succeeded in its attempts to be qualified by HVN as a first-tier supplier (interview with 
V16 #2). This is plausible, given HVN’s hesitation to outsource components – which 
entails provision of proprietary design drawings – to companies whose management is 
oriented towards manufacturing of components that imitate Japanese designs (interview 
#5).  
As a result of on-going adjustment, the two learning models came to be characterised by 
increasingly complex flows of knowledge between lead firms and suppliers. This is 
quite unlike the original learning models, in which capability building could be 
explained primarily (although not exclusively) in terms of the leading roles played by 
either of the two key actors: the Japanese model, in which learning was critically shaped 
by a one-way knowledge flow from lead firm to suppliers; and the Vietnamese–Chinese 
model, in which learning resulted from suppliers’ independent learning activities. In the 
first variant of the Japanese model and the adjusted Vietnamese–Chinese model in 
particular, supplier learning was driven by a combination of critical roles played by both 
lead firms and suppliers. The present analysis thus corroborates the argument that in 
analysing the sources of learning, it is essential to give a balanced focus to the roles 
played by both the lead firm and its suppliers rather than merely emphasising the 
unilateral actions of either party. 
8. Conclusion 
This concluding section summarises the empirical findings corresponding to the two 
research questions introduced at the outset, and discusses the contribution of the paper 
to the wider body of literature on learning and innovation in developing country 
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suppliers operating in a variety of value chains. 
To reiterate, this paper began by enquiring: How has local suppliers’ capability building 
evolved since the late 1990s? The existing empirical literature suggests that supplier 
learning is a steady and continuous process that progresses incrementally. However, my 
longitudinal analysis covering the period of a decade found that supplier learning was 
an evolutionary process involving major leaps, slow progress, and/or even halted 
learning at different points in time.  
Regardless of the type of motorcycle production value chain suppliers participated in, 
the biggest leaps in capability level experienced by case suppliers were overwhelmingly 
concentrated in Stage III of industrial development – a period that is largely neglected in 
existing empirical analyses of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry. Yet, it was only in 
Stage III that high performers in Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese chains started to 
acquire basic innovative levels of capability in production and new product introduction 
activities respectively. The findings also identified low-performing and/or intermediate 
groups in both Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese chains, thus suggesting a growing 
divergence in learning performance across suppliers.  
However, these results should be interpreted with caution. As cases were selected 
strategically, the results clearly show the heterogeneity of learning paths across 
suppliers but do not reveal anything about how prevalent each of the emerging patterns 
was. Considering that local suppliers have come to face high barriers to entry and 
intense competition in both Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese chains (Papers II, IV), 
the cases of high performers analysed in Section 7 of the present paper are likely to be 
generalisable only to a narrow group of suppliers operating in the Vietnamese 
motorcycle industry. Nevertheless, considering the advanced capabilities these suppliers 
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acquired, they are likely to be among the core companies driving the development of the 
local mechanical component industry in Vietnam. 
The paper then enquired into why supplier learning trajectories evolved in the ways they 
did. The research question was: What actor constellations and what knowledge flows 
led to critical learning events? The literature emphasises constellations that focus on 
either of the two main actors: the lead firm as the key agent structuring learning 
opportunities in Japanese chains, or suppliers building capability independently in 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains. This paper took the analysis of actor constellations as its 
starting point but then went further to examine the specific knowledge sources that 
contributed to key learning events.  
Formulated as two distinct models of supplier learning and their adjustments over time, 
the findings showed that the changing roles played by both lead firms and suppliers 
were indeed critical in explaining the trajectories of supplier learning over the three 
stages of industrial development. The Japanese learning model initially combined active 
lead firm intervention and suppliers’ mobilisation of internal resources in accordance 
with the guidance of the former. However, over time, this model was transformed into 
two distinct variants – one providing greater scope for suppliers’ innovative initiatives 
in internal resource mobilisation to influence learning outcomes; and the other 
characterised by even more powerful intervention and guidance on the part of the lead 
firm. On the other hand, the Vietnamese–Chinese model was initially based on suppliers’ 
independent learning but evolved into a two-way knowledge flow driven by attempts by 
suppliers to actively engage with a large number of their customers.  
In summary, these empirical findings point to a much more dynamic picture and provide 
greater insight into local supplier learning in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry than 
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that illustrated by previous empirical research that relied on static analyses of a very 
small number of cases. In the recent dynamic Stage III of Vietnamese industrial 
development, supplier learning not only progressed to significantly advanced levels but 
was also driven by mechanisms that were qualitatively different from those in the 
previous two stages. Such learning dynamics could only be gauged by means of the 
research design adopted in this paper, that is, longitudinal research covering a decade of 
rapid industrial development and consolidation; and which incorporated a sufficiently 
large number of cases to accommodate the increasing heterogeneity of learning 
trajectories across suppliers.  
Apart from the above empirical contributions specific to the Vietnamese motorcycle 
industry, this paper also adds to the wider body of literature on firm-level capability 
building in the following ways. First, this study demonstrated the power of longitudinal 
research by showing that the timing of analysis has a profound impact on the judgement 
of capability building in small developing country suppliers. The existing literature is 
characterised by static analysis that associates each functional capability acquired with a 
certain type of value chain because research has only addressed the less dynamic period 
of learning up to the early 2000s. By extending the coverage to include a more recent 
period of capability building, the present paper found a remarkable dynamism and 
heterogeneity of learning trajectories even among those suppliers that participated in the 
same types of value chain.  
In this respect, this paper is an important addition to the stock of longitudinal research 
on firm-level capability building (Bell 2006). While Bell (ibid.) argues for the power of 
longitudinal research drawing on studies of particular industries conducted by different 
researchers at different points in time (which are likely to be conducted according to 
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different conceptual frameworks and methodological approaches), the present paper 
pushes the research frontier a step further by utilising a single decade-long longitudinal 
study of a fixed set of strategically selected firms that adopts a fixed conceptual 
framework and methodology – and done by the same researcher – to demonstrate that 
judgements about capability building in fact change remarkably depending on the 
timing of observation.  
Second, this paper integrated the essence of the GVC and TC approaches – a challenge 
that was identified by Morrison et al. (2008) but had not been implemented in previous 
empirical analyses of supplier learning. Such a synthesis was achieved by combining 
two analytical apparatuses developed for the present study: (1) a conceptual framework 
that considered the roles of both lead firms and suppliers in shaping learning 
trajectories; and (2) an event-based methodology designed to analyse the trajectories of 
firm-level capability building. Together, these analytical apparatuses made it possible to 
systematically trace the complex and multiple knowledge flows that contributed to 
supplier learning, and to effectively observe changes over time.  
The key insight that emerges from this empirical longitudinal study is that suppliers are 
not just passive implementers of what lead firms demand; rather, through their own 
actions, suppliers may influence learning outcomes and/or even the sourcing strategies 
of lead firms. While lead firms may be more powerful, the dynamic is one of exerting 
mutual influence and mutual learning. Most importantly for developing countries, while 
lead firms have learned to continuously adjust their sourcing practices, some local 
suppliers have been on an even steeper learning curve, making huge advances in 
capability building. 
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 PAPER IV. DOES CHINA’S ECONOMIC RISE HELP OR HINDER THE 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF ITS NEIGHBOURS? 
1. Introduction 
There is growing interest in the effects of China’s extraordinary industrial dynamism on 
its neighbours (Eichengreen 2006; Humphrey and Schmitz 2007). With its huge size, 
vast low-cost labour force, and deep industrial foundation, China has become a major 
producer of a wide range of manufactured goods (Yusuf et al. 2007) that is now moving 
towards the acquisition of innovation capabilities (Altenburg et al. 2008; Dahlman 
2009). The impact of China’s rapid economic growth is felt globally via international 
trade (Dimaranan et al. 2007). Thus, particularly amongst China’s less developed 
neighbours trying to develop their own industries, one of the most pressing questions is: 
does China’s economic rise help or hinder the industrial development of its neighbours? 
The recent literature argues that the answer to the above question depends to a 
considerable extent on the status of the country (Eichengreen 2006; Humphrey and 
Schmitz 2007). According to these authors, Asia’s more advanced nations benefit from 
the complementary effects of Chinese industrialisation. China’s rise as a platform for 
labour-intensive international trade helps the industrial development of these countries 
because the exports of the former depend to a great extent on capital equipment and 
components sourced from such countries. Conversely, China’s less developed 
neighbours suffer from the competitive effects of the other’s growth. China’s rise often 
hinders the industrial development of these countries as they specialise in labour- 
intensive industries in which China has come to play a dominant global role; while 
opportunities for exporting to China are limited in the main to unprocessed products.   
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This study acknowledges the above distinction as an important starting point, but 
attempts take the debate one step further. A critical element missing from the existing 
literature is the dynamics of change over time. To date, limited empirical research has 
shed light on how the impact of China’s economic rise has shifted over time, and why it 
has done so. The present research paper seeks to fill these knowledge gaps, which it 
attempts by engaging in a longitudinal analysis of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry.  
In the early 2000s, the industry was hit by massive imports of low-priced Chinese 
motorcycle components that imitated Japanese products, this so-called ‘China shock’ 
initially bringing about serious damage to the nascent local motorcycle production 
sector (Paper II). However, in the longer term, the competitive effects of this incident 
completely transformed the industry. Indeed, in 2005, a leading economist described the 
Vietnamese motorcycle sector as having “already achieved high degrees of scale merit, 
product quality and competitiveness” (Ohno 2005: 47) and “the only leading industry in 
Vietnam that can grow robustly without heavy reliance on exports” (ibid.: 48). 
Accordingly, the present paper examines the processes and mechanisms by which such 
severe competitive effects were transmuted into positive results.  
Although the effects of the rise of Chinese manufacturing industries have been observed 
globally,117 this paper focuses specifically on China’s less developed neighbours. These 
countries depend heavily on imports from China118 owing to their geographical 
proximity, some of them even sharing common borders with the former (Eichengreen et 
al. 2007). This means that nowhere else is the impact of Chinese trade felt more 
                                                        
117 The literature analyses the impact of China’s industrial development on Latin America (Moreira 
2007; Alvarez and Claro 2009; Jenkins et al. 2009); Africa (Kaplinsky 2008; Kaplinsky and Morris 
2009; Tegegne 2009); and South Asia (Sonobe and Otsuka 2010). Reference to this literature is made 
where relevant.  
118 Whereas the average level of dependence on Chinese imports for emerging and developing 
countries globally in 2010 was 9%, such a rate was 36%, 16%, 39% and 27% for Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam respectively (IMF 2011a).  
232 
 
 
 
strongly than in these countries.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature and elaborates the research question. Section 3 discusses the research 
methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. Finally, the concluding section 
draws out the key insights derived from the study, and enumerates its limitations and 
areas for future research.   
2. Literature Review 
A growing literature has generated two contrasting views on how China’s industrial 
dynamism affects industrial development of its neighbours. One view is that the rise of 
China helps industrial development of neighbouring countries. The focus of this stream 
of the literature is on the growing integration of East Asian economies propagated by 
regional production networks of TNCs from developed countries (Ando and Kimura 
2003; Ng and Yeats 2003; Ando 2006). China has emerged as a major assembly centre 
for these regional production networks, but has so far depended largely on imported 
capital equipment, components, and technology (Gaulier et al. 2007). The proponents of 
this view contend that China’s emergence as a major export platform benefits its 
neighbours as it has created opportunities for them to supply the necessary inputs for 
China’s export production (Lall and Albaladejo 2004; Athukorala 2009).   
The other view sees China’s economic rise as a constraint to the industrial development 
of its neighbours because the impact of the former is largely competitive. Proponents of 
this view argue that China’s huge production capacity combined with remarkable levels 
of price competitiveness exerts enormous economic pressure on firms in neighbouring 
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countries in their home and/or third country export markets (Roland-Holst and Weiss 
2004; Coxhead 2007).  
Eichengreen (2006),119 and Humphrey and Schmitz’s (2007) attempts at synthesising 
these opposing views suggest a way of resolving the debate. By analysing trade data 
that differentiate trade in final and intermediate products,120 these authors argue that the 
impact varies by country type. On the one hand, complementary effects are limited to 
more advanced neighbours that form integral elements of regional production networks 
as providers of the capital equipment, core components, and materials that China 
depends on. On the other hand, China’s less developed neighbours are not positioned to 
gain from complementary effects because they are largely excluded from regional 
production networks. On the contrary, they suffer from cut-throat competition both at 
home and in export markets, as they specialise in labour-intensive industries in which 
China has attained such remarkable levels of competitiveness (Eichengreen 2006; 
Humphrey and Schmitz 2007).  
Albeit helpful, the above synthesis still neglects a critical aspect of the impact of 
China’s rise: the dynamics of change. Although to date, this element has not been a 
subject of empirical examination, the literature does suggest that China’s impact may 
change over time. In terms of complementary effects, Lall and Albaladejo (2004: 1457) 
argue that China’s impact may evolve as the country accumulates capabilities with 
regard to the production of the capital equipment, core components, and/or materials 
that it currently imports from its economically advanced neighbours.121  
                                                        
119 Eichengreen et al. (2007) provide the trade data analysis on which this paper is based. 
120 The classification adopted differs by author but the underlying concept is the same. Athukorala 
(2009) employs a similar approach. 
121 Lall and Albaladejo (2004) do not offer a concrete answer as to whether or not this is a probable 
scenario. Athukorala (2009) also raises a related question concerning how long China’s reliance on 
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There has been limited empirical research to date in respect of competitive effects. 
Nevertheless, several previous studies that have examined in general terms how 
competition with China has affected developing country producers provide useful 
insights. While there have been cases in which imports from China indeed displaced 
developing country producers (Alvarez and Claro 2009; Kaplinsky and Morris 2009), 
there have been other cases in which competition induced innovation responses amongst 
incumbent producers (Sonobe and Otsuka 2010). Tegegne (2009) found different 
responses even among producers in a single industry: small and medium shoe 
manufacturers in Ethiopia responded to Chinese imports by improving design, quality 
and response time, although micro enterprises reduced their production, labour force, 
and working hours. This means that the competitive effects of China may change 
depending on whether or not developing country producers strengthen their competitive 
edge vis-à-vis Chinese products. 
In summary, we know from the existing literature that there are two contrasting views 
on the impact of China on its neighbours, one optimistic and the other pessimistic, and 
that the actual impact depends primarily on type of country and sector. The literature 
also suggests that such an impact may change as China and/or developing countries 
accumulate new capabilities and one group strengthens its competitive edge over the 
other. However, there has been limited empirical research on how China’s impact on its 
neighbours has changed over time or why it does so. These are the knowledge gaps that 
this paper seeks to bridge.  
As the existing literature suggests, the impact of China’s economic rise vary 
considerably across sectors and countries. This paper focuses on the Vietnamese 
                                                                                                                                                                  
imported components can continue, concluding that such dependence will be sustained in the short 
to medium term, given the maintenance of China’s comparative advantage in unskilled labour.  
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motorcycle industry as a sector that was affected heavily and early by massive imports 
from China. The research questions to be addressed are as follows: 
Question 1: How has China’s impact on the Vietnamese motorcycle industry changed 
since the early 2000s?  
Question 2: Why has China’s impact changed in the ways it has?    
3. Methodology 
Analysing how China’s impact has changed over time poses a major methodological 
challenge. It cannot rely merely on the analysis of trade flows, as much of the research 
reviewed in the previous section has done. This is because it needs to understand what 
goes on inside firms and between firms in the countries affected.  
To this end, this study focuses on two sets of value chains organised by lead firms 
competing for the Vietnamese market. One set of value chains – referred to as 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains – was organised by local Vietnamese motorcycle 
assemblers that were the key actors perpetrating the China shock. As the Vietnamese 
government had prohibited the imports of assembled vehicles, more than fifty of these 
firms entered into the assembly of imported Chinese motorcycle components in the 
early 2000s. Although the China shock only lasted a few years, quite a few of these 
assemblers continued to operate and eventually commenced the import-substitution 
production of low-priced motorcycles in Vietnam. This group is analysed both 
collectively and individually via the in-depth examination of six case assemblers 
(A1-A6) that were found to play significant roles at different points in time (Paper II).  
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The other set of value chains was organised by the Japanese motorcycle manufacturers 
that had dominated the Vietnamese market before the China shock. The study focuses 
primarily on HVN for two reasons. First, the company remained the single most 
dominant actor in the industry throughout the period of investigation (Paper II), which 
means that it had a major influence on the development of the sector. Second, HVN was 
most severely affected by the China shock and reacted with the most fundamental 
adjustments to its business model (Paper II), which makes the company particularly 
relevant in terms of the impact of the rise of China.    
The analysis covers a period of a decade from the late 1990s. Whilst Papers II and III 
divided the historical development of the industry into three distinct stages, this paper 
further partitions the second stage into the period of the China shock and that of its 
immediate aftermath. This subdivision thus results in a four-stage classification as 
follows:  
 Stage I (mid-1990s–1999): aims to show the status of the industry before the China 
shock  
 Stage II(a) The China Shock (2000–2001): aims to show the actual events of the 
shock 
 Stage II(b) The aftermath of the China Shock (2002–2004): aims to show the 
short-term consequences of the shock on the industry 
 Stage III (2005–2009): aims to show how the impact of the shock changed the 
industry in the medium term 
The study integrates industry-level and firm-level data. Industry-level data include 
published and unpublished statistics obtained from various organs of the Vietnamese 
government, and reports and research papers. Firm-level data comprise that on key 
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actors in the two sets of value chains selected as in-depth case studies, which were 
obtained from repeated rounds of fieldwork conducted by the author in Vietnam and 
Thailand between 2001 and 2010. The comprehensive list of firms interviewed and 
surveyed is provided in Appendix 1. Interviews cited in this paper are referred to by 
firm and interview codes as explained in Appendix 1. 
Details of the fieldwork and the full results of analyses of the dynamics of industrial 
organisation, and local suppliers’ capability building using these data are compiled as 
Papers II and III respectively. The main task of the present paper is to synthesise the 
findings of these two studies, and complement them with additional data for the purpose 
of illuminating the processes and mechanisms linking China’s economic rise and 
industrial development outcomes. The specific methods used to answer the two 
questions are as follows. 
The first research question addresses the ways in which China’s impact changed over 
time. This is explored by examining industrial development outcomes over the stages of 
industrial development specified above. Two sets of indicators are used to assess the 
extent to which Vietnam succeeded in developing competitive motorcycle assembly and 
component production industries. The first set of indicators is concerned with the 
market performance of Japanese and Vietnamese lead firms: 
 Domestic market shares: This indicator shows the relative competitive performance 
of motorcycle manufacturers in the domestic market. However, its utilisation 
requires caution because, as we shall see, government regulations may occasionally 
distort market competition.  
 Price level, product quality, and variety: The analysis of market performance 
indicators should determine the sources of lead firm competitiveness; they include 
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price level as well as the non-price indicators such as product quality and variety. 
Wherever possible, the performance of lead firms in Vietnam is compared with that 
of their regional competitors.  
Since data collected at different times were not always based on the same set of 
quantitative measurements, the focus of this study was on the direction of change rather 
than the degree of change.  
The second set of indicators focuses on the development of a domestic component 
supply base, which is analysed in this paper in terms of number of active suppliers, and 
the types and levels of capability122 they acquired. Whilst large international 
‘follow-source’ suppliers – i.e. those that pursue their customers’ investment 
destinations – have emerged as key actors in developing countries (Humphrey 2000, 
2003; Belderbos et al. 2000), local suppliers also have a critical role to play as agents of 
the host country’s long-term industrial development, and should thus be distinguished 
from foreign-invested suppliers (Ivarsson and Alvstam 2004). Accordingly, nationality 
is an important consideration in analysing this study’s data on suppliers.  
The second research question is concerned with why the Chinese impact changed in the 
way it did. In tracing the chains of causation linking the market competition triggered 
by the China shock and industrial development outcomes, this study introduces a 
mediating variable: industrial organisation. Much of the analysis involved in answering 
the second question involves integrating the findings of the two previous papers, which 
examined relations between four variables: market competition, industrial organisation, 
lead firm performance and supplier capability building. Figure IV-1 shows relations 
between the variables (indicated as arrows) and the sources of data on which the 
                                                        
122 The classification of capabilities is discussed in Paper III. 
239 
 
 
 
analysis of the present paper is based.  
Paper II provided findings on how industrial organisation was determined by market 
competition (arrow #1) and supplier capabilities (arrow #3). Paper III provided findings 
on how the building of supplier capabilities was influenced by the way in which lead 
firms coordinated relations with their suppliers (arrow #4). The present analysis of the 
relation between industrial organisation and lead firm performance (arrow #2) is based 
on additional data compiled for this paper using the aforementioned indicators.  
Figure IV-1. Relations between Variables 
 
Source: The author.  
A critical point to note with regard to relations between variables is the cause and effect 
dynamic between industrial organisation and supplier capability building. That is, the 
building of supplier capabilities was not only an important development outcome in 
itself but also a key factor in influencing industrial organisation, or, more precisely, one 
of the prerequisites to the transformation of industrial organisation. As we shall see, the 
changing direction of causality between these two variables is central to explanation of 
the changing impact of the rise of China on the development of the Vietnamese 
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motorcycle industry.  
4. Findings on the Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry 
This section presents the findings of the empirical research. It starts by discussing the 
status of the industry before the China shock. It then analyses what actually occurred 
during the shock, how its impact changed in both the short and medium terms, and why 
this impact changed over time. The section concludes by discussing future prospects for 
the industry.  
4.1 Stage I: Before the China Shock  
In the mid-1990s, the Vietnamese government launched an import substitution policy in 
respect of foreign-made motorcycles. Attracted by the growing market, the world’s four 
major motorcycle manufacturers (Honda, Yamaha and Suzuki from Japan, and Sanyang 
from Taiwan) invested in Vietnam in the mid- to late 1990s. 
At this stage, HVN was far from regionally competitive. Although Honda-brand 
products dominated the market, they largely constituted imports from Thailand and 
Japan (Paper II, Figure II-1); the fact that the Vietnamese government prohibited the 
importation of assembled vehicles in 1998123 notwithstanding. HVN’s products failed 
to compete against imported Honda-brand motorcycles because the company’s 
made-in-Vietnam models were priced at roughly similar levels to Thai-made 
Honda-brand products (Table IV-1), which had high prestige with Vietnamese 
consumers (Nguyen Tran Que and Hoa Huu Lan 1998: 134). 
                                                        
123 Prime Minister’s Decision 11/1998/QD-TTg dated 23 January 1998.  
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Table IV-1. Regional Price Comparison of Honda Motorcycles  
 Stage I Stage II/China Shock Stage III 
HVN models $2,100 (official price of 
the Super Dream in 
1998) 
$719 (official price of 
the Wave Alpha in 
2002) 
$1,564 (official price of 
the Click in 2008) 
Honda-brand models 
made in Thailand 
$2,300 (the Dream II 
imported from 
Thailand)* 
$694 (official price of 
the Wave 100 in 2002) 
$1,108 (official price of 
the Click in 2006) 
Note: * Data on Honda-brand models made in Thailand in Stage I represent prices in Vietnam, not in 
Thailand.  
Sources: Oto-xe may (Automobiles and Motorcycles), August 2002: 39, January 2007: 100; Nguyen 
Duc Hien (2004: 234); Mizuno and Kitano (2000: 137); Mishima (2010: 216).  
Moreover, the Vietnamese motorcycle component supply base was seriously 
underdeveloped. Apart from a limited number of foreign-invested suppliers that had 
followed Japanese and Taiwanese manufacturers to Vietnam, there were virtually no 
local specialised component suppliers at this stage (JETRO 1996; Chen and Jou 2002).  
At this stage, HVN depended on a dozen Japanese and a handful of Vietnamese 
suppliers (Paper II, Table II-4). None of the latter had previous experience of 
manufacturing motorcycle components or serving global customers, but they gradually 
learned and acquired advanced production-related capabilities with generous technical 
assistance from HVN (Paper III).  
In short, HVN was far from regionally competitive and the Vietnamese component 
supply base remained underdeveloped. However, none of the actors were compelled to 
adjust their strategies at this stage. After all, there were only a few players, all of whom 
manufactured products with largely similar attributes, that is, high-quality and 
expensive models transferred from other higher-income markets.  
4.2 Stage II(a): The China Shock and its Immediate Consequences 
On the basis of the above account, one would expect massive imports of low-priced 
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Chinese products to have had severe competitive effects on the Vietnamese motorcycle 
industry. Indeed, this is exactly what happened.  
Figure IV-2 confirms the magnitude of the China shock, Chinese exports of motorcycles 
to Vietnam surging dramatically from 2000 to 2001. Similar to imported Honda-brand 
motorcycles in the late 1990s, these Chinese vehicles arrived in the form of knockdown 
component kits in order to circumvent the ban on the importation of assembled vehicles. 
Accordingly, more than fifty local Vietnamese firms were engaged in the assembly of 
Chinese component kits that were, in essence, copies or slightly modified imitations of a 
few popular Japanese base models (Paper II).   
Figure IV-2. China’s Exports of Motorcycles to Vietnam  
 
Source: Global Trade Information Services, Inc. (2012). 
Unsurprisingly, the China shock brought about a strong negative impact on the nascent 
Vietnamese motorcycle industry. With prices as low as half to one-third of domestically 
produced foreign-brand models,124 Chinese motorcycles penetrated the medium- and 
low-income consumer markets that had remained unexploited by foreign motorcycle 
                                                        
124 The average price of imported Chinese motorcycles was US$1,000–1,100 in 1999, but had fallen 
dramatically to US$500–600 by 2001 (Nguyen Duc Hien 2004: 236). 
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manufacturers. Having lost business to Chinese firms, all foreign manufacturers 
experienced a sharp drop in market share. Honda, in particular, faced its market share 
decline from 67% in 1998 (including 27% for HVN’s domestically produced 
motorcycles and 40% for imported Honda-brand motorcycles) to 12% in 2001 (9% for 
the former and 3% for the latter) (Paper II, Figure II-1). 
4.3 Stage II(b): The Short-Term Impact of the China Shock 
The China shock caused severe damage to Vietnam’s motorcycle production; however, 
this was not the end of the story. As discussed in Paper II, a number of important 
developments took place within a few years of the shock, the most prominent of which 
were HVN’s launch of its new low-priced model in response to Chinese competition; 
and the initiation of import-substitution production of low-priced motorcycles by local 
assemblers in response to strengthened government regulations. The following 
subsections discuss how industrial development outcomes changed within a few years 
of the China shock.  
4.3.1 Market Performance of Major Lead Firms 
The launch of the new Wave Alpha model helped Honda improve its market 
performance, shares rising from 12% in 2001 to 36% by 2004 (Paper II, Figure II-1). 
Unlike the 1990s, the 36% market share was now accounted for by HVN’s domestically 
produced motorcycles, whilst the market shares of imported Honda-brand motorcycles 
had gone down to 0% (ibid.). This was achieved by remarkable improvement in HVN’s 
price-based competiveness. The Wave Alpha was priced roughly one-third of its 
previous models and at a level broadly similar to an equivalent model launched in 
Thailand the same year (Table IV-1), whilst the vehicle’s performance quality standards 
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were only slightly modified – mostly downwards – to reflect the specific user conditions 
of Vietnam (Paper II; Amano and Shintaku 2010). However, further recovery was 
prevented as the company was unable to invest in additional production capacity. 
Consequently, HVN’s production increased substantially in 2002 but only modestly in 
the following two years (Paper II, Figure II-2).  
In the meantime, the performance of local assemblers faltered, their combined market 
shares declining from 80% in 2001 to 30% in 2004 (Paper II, Figure II-1); suggesting 
that local assemblers collectively had lost out to HVN and other foreign motorcycle 
manufacturers. It naturally follows that local assemblers’ individual market shares were 
in an even more parlous condition, the 30% combined share of 2004 being achieved by 
numerous firms operating on a very small scale. For example, 60% of the motorcycles 
produced by local assemblers in 2004 were accounted for by those turning out 40,000 
units or fewer (Figure IV-3).  
However, such a decline in market share was not because local assemblers had lost their 
price-based competitiveness. On the contrary, the prices of their products were 
favourable even compared with those of Chinese imports. Table IV-2 shows the average 
prices of products for four of the six case assemblers for which data were available for 
the year 2004. Domestically, their vehicles were priced 25% to 55% lower than HVN’s 
low-priced model and at levels similar to the average unit price of China’s motorcycle 
exports. Rather, local assemblers lost their market share due to the low quality of their 
products. Their models failed to appeal to Vietnamese consumers who, after 
experiencing serious quality issues with Chinese motorcycles, increasingly opted for 
better-quality Japanese models (The Motorbike Joint Working Group 2007: 11).  
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Figure IV-3. Motorcycle Production of Local Assemblers by Scale of Production 
 
Note: The number of assemblers producing less than 10,000 units per year in 2005 is not provided. 
Source: The Motorbike Joint Working Group (2007: 27). 
 
Table IV-2. Average Product Prices of Selected Local Assemblers (Unit: US$) 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 Wave Alpha 
(HVN’s low- 
priced model) 
Average Unit Price of 
Motorcycles Exported 
by China 
2004 365 451 n/a 439 622 n/a 819 374 
2007 310 n/a 279 373 745 497 801 398 
Source: Questionnaire surveys and interviews conducted by the author collaboration with the 
Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam Academy of Social Science in 2004 and 2007.  
The data on Chinese exports were calculated on the basis of data from Global Trade Information 
Services, Inc. (2012).  
4.3.2 Development of Component Suppliers 
The intense price-based competition triggered by the China shock combined with the 
strengthened enforcement of the local content rules compelled both HVN and local 
assemblers to explore low-cost component sources within Vietnam (Paper II). The result 
was a significant boost to the domestic component supply base as a whole. 
On the one hand, important transformation was underway in HVN’s value chains, as the 
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launch of a low-priced model called for significant reduction in procurement costs. 
Since only limited numbers of Japanese suppliers had set up production in Vietnam, 
HVN inevitably found it necessary to mobilise non-Japanese suppliers (Paper II). As a 
result of an extensive search, provision of technical assistance, and capability building, 
HVN’s portfolio of suppliers in Vietnam expanded from 16 in 1998 to 43 in 2004, local 
firms increasing from 5 to 13 over the same period (Paper II, Table II-4).  
Another important development that took place within HVN’s value chains was the 
emergence of second-tier component suppliers. Facing radical price reduction targets 
imposed by the lead firm upon the launching of the budget model, HVN’s first-tier 
suppliers sought to replace imported subcomponents and materials with locally-sourced 
ones (Fujita 2007, 2011). Although the precise number of the resultant second-tier 
suppliers is unknown, Fujita (2007: 18) found that 6 of HVN’s first-tier suppliers (3 
Taiwanese, 1 Korean, and 2 Japanese) used an average of 27 second-tier suppliers in 
2005, and that the single Korean firm traded with as many as 50 second-tier suppliers. 
Unlike first-tier suppliers, most of which were large SOEs, local second-tier suppliers 
included numerous private firms operating on a much smaller scale (Fujita 2011).  
HVN’s first- and second-tier suppliers not only increased in number but also improved 
their production-related capabilities. Progress was particularly remarkable amongst the 
former. First-tier suppliers started to progress from a rudimentary (operational) level of 
capability upon entry into an HVN chain, with some even reaching a more proficient 
(assimilative) level of capability in Stage II. Second-tier suppliers made more modest 
yet steady progress in improving their production-related capabilities (Paper III).  
In the meantime, local assemblers steadily increased local sourcing in response to 
government policy requirements. Indeed, 29 of 45 assemblers operational in 2002–03 
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reached local content ratios of more than 40%125 as they came to depend less on 
imported components. Local assemblers’ dependence on imported components 
decreased significantly between 2000 and 2003 (Paper II, Table II-12).  
This happened as a large number of suppliers entered Vietnamese–Chinese chains in 
response to high demand for standardised components without stringent quality 
requirements. Although precise figures are not available, a conservative estimate – made 
on the basis of official statistics – of the number of suppliers operating in such chains is 
50 (Paper II, Section 6.1.2). This included (1) limited numbers of Taiwanese and Korean 
firms, most of which were specialist component suppliers already incorporated into the 
value chains of Japanese and/or Taiwanese motorcycle manufacturers; and (2) numerous 
local firms that had previously operated in related fields, for example, the production of 
motorcycle or bicycle spare parts (Fujita 2007; Paper II).  
After entering a Vietnamese–Chinese chain, a local supplier acquired basic product 
introduction and production capabilities. In-depth analyses of sampled suppliers in such 
chains found that capabilities acquired were largely rudimentary (operational level), 
although they extended over a wide range of functions covering both product 
introduction and production (Paper III).  
In summary, the local motorcycle industry started to show positive signs of recovery 
within a few years of the China shock. Lead firm competitiveness improved albeit 
subject to limitations; and the local component supply base grew, allowing ample space 
for Vietnamese firms to enter value chains and accumulate new capabilities.  
 
                                                        
125 Based on a survey conducted by the National Economic University and Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) (Nguyen Duc Hien 2004: 259).  
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4.4 Stage III: Medium-Term Impact of the China Shock  
Several years after the China shock, a new stage of industrial development began. The 
dismantling of interventionist policies that had repressed overall market growth and 
distorted competition generated significant development (Paper II). This was manifested 
as a major boost to the market as a whole; the rapid expansion of foreign motorcycle 
manufacturers, HVN in particular; and the struggle of local assemblers to respond to the 
penetration of HVN into the middle-income market. The following subsections discuss 
how industrial development outcomes changed as a result of such medium-term impact.  
4.4.1 Market Performance of Major Lead Firms 
In Stage III, HVN emerged as a dominant actor, accounting for roughly half of the 
Vietnamese motorcycle market in 2008 (Paper II, Figure II-1). This achievement was 
driven by the company’s active attempts to seize the growing market by launching a 
variety of increasingly sophisticated models whilst achieving incremental quality 
improvement and cost reduction. From 2005 onwards, HVN launched a large number of 
new models (Paper II, Table II-8). The bulk of these were middle- to high-end vehicles 
featuring sophisticated designs, product performance, and/or quality, all of which 
combined to account for an ever more significant proportion of company sales.126  
In terms of regional comparison, HVN’s newly-launched models were priced 40% 
higher than similar models produced by Honda Thailand (Table IV-1). However, this 
anomaly was probably more due to the fact that the receding competitive threat of China 
in Vietnam meant that HVN was less compelled to implement an aggressive pricing 
                                                        
126 As of 2004, the basic version of the Wave Alpha accounted for 70% of HVN’s motorcycle sales. 
This proportion had dropped to 20% by 2007, when a greater proportion of HVN’s sales was 
accounted for by high-end versions of the Wave Alpha as well as other higher-end models (interview 
with HVN #3). 
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strategy, rather than because HVN’s price competitiveness relative to Honda Thailand 
had deteriorated. On the contrary, the growing scale of HVN’s production, which even 
exceeded that of Honda Thailand in 2007 (Honda Motor Co, Ltd. 2010); the intense 
competition between suppliers; and the increasingly challenging performance targets 
that HVN imposed on suppliers (Papers II, III) suggest substantial improvements to 
overall productive performance at this stage.  
The mounting dominance of foreign motorcycle manufacturers notwithstanding, local 
assemblers survived in the market because they improved their price- and 
non-price-based competitiveness, their collective market shares indeed rising from 30% 
in 2004 to 36% in 2005–06 (Paper II, Figure II-1). More importantly, local assemblers 
consolidated themselves into a small number of firms operating on a larger scale (Figure 
IV-3). For example, among those selected for in-depth case study, assemblers A1 and 
A3 sold a total of 300,000 and 95,000 units respectively in 2007 (Paper II, Table II-9), 
together accounting for approximately one-third of the total number of motorcycles sold 
by local assemblers that year. 
In order to serve low-income consumers in rural areas that even HVN’s low-priced 
model had failed to penetrate, these assemblers further boosted their price-based 
competitiveness. Domestically, the products of assemblers A1 and A3 were priced at 
39% and 35% respectively of HVN’s low-priced model; and regionally, the prices of 
their products in 2007 were even lower than the average unit price of Chinese exports 
(Table IV-2).  
Moreover, A1 and A3 also increased the non-price dimensions of competitiveness. One 
of the striking features of these assemblers – as opposed to other local firms operating 
on a smaller scale – was the large variety of product designs they introduced (Paper II, 
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Table II-8). Although their models carried imitated Japanese designs and/or brands, a 
wide range of minor cosmetic modifications proved effective in penetrating the low-end 
consumer market (Paper II). There is also informal evidence to suggest that the quality 
of motorcycles produced by local assemblers had improved in comparison to the 
previous stage.127  
4.4.2 Development of Component Suppliers 
With a booming market and growing production volumes, Vietnam’s component supply 
base experienced further development and consolidation. On the one hand, HVN further 
expanded local sourcing. Although the local content rules were abolished in 2003, and 
import tariffs on motorcycle components from ASEAN countries – including Thailand 
and Indonesia – on which HVN had been heavily dependent for supplies were reduced 
to 5% in 2006, HVN’s local content ratio continued to increase, reaching 90% by 2007 
(Paper II, Table II-4). Unlike the previous stage, this was achieved primarily by utilising 
foreign-invested suppliers and Japanese firms in particular (Paper II). Market growth 
combined with improvement in the overall investment environment128 triggered the 
entry of numerous foreign suppliers (Paper II). As a result, local suppliers faced higher 
barriers to entry and intense competition. 
Local assemblers adopted a somewhat different strategy. As the local content rules were 
abolished, local assemblers as a whole increased their dependence on imported 
components, reversing their previous move towards domestic sourcing. Following a 
                                                        
127 In 2007, the general director of a Japanese supplier J6 pointed out that the performance tests of 
vehicles produced by local assemblers in Vietnam had found no substantial difference from genuine 
Honda-brand products when operated at normal speeds; although they were found to be much less 
reliable when operated at high speeds of 150 to 180km per hour (interview #2).  
128 A series of policy reforms in 2005 implemented in preparation for WTO accession significantly 
improved Vietnam’s investment climate, resulting in a sudden surge of FDI from 2006 to 2008 (Tran 
Quang Tien 2009). 
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temporary decline from 2002 to 2003, their dependence on imported components 
increased after 2004 (Paper II, Table II-12). This suggests that local assemblers sought 
to exploit advanced component supply bases overseas.  
However, within Vietnam, assemblers grew to depend on an emerging pool of highly 
competent suppliers equipped with the capability to reverse-engineer and implement 
cosmetic and functional modifications to Japanese component designs and to 
manufacture them in large scale to reasonable quality levels (Paper II). Of 22 
Vietnamese, Taiwanese, Korean and Chinese suppliers in Vietnamese–Chinese chains 
interviewed by the author, four Chinese and one Vietnamese suppliers expanded their 
production by serving a considerable number of local assemblers (Paper II, Table II-11). 
Table IV-3 summarises their sales performance in 2007. In the meantime, faced with 
diminishing orders from local assemblers, many of the remaining suppliers transferred 
either to Japanese chains, where they operated mainly as second-tier suppliers, or to 
other industries (Paper II, Table II-11).  
Table IV-3. Major Suppliers Serving Local Assemblers in Stage III 
 Ownership Component Number of local 
assemblers 
served in 2007 
Sales to local assemblers in 2007 
(units sold and type of component) 
C1 Chinese Plastic covers, 
frames, lights, 
engines 
43 860,000 (plastic covers and frames) 
100,000 (engines) 
C2 Chinese Clutches, engine 
components 
(n/a) 700,000 (clutches) 
400,000 (engine components) 
C3 Chinese Frames 19 140,000 (frames) 
C4 Chinese Electric 
components 
50 148,000 (ignition coils) 
159,000 (starter relay) 
160,000 (rectifiers) 
V16 Vietnamese Silencers 20 500,000 (silencers) 
Note: Data on supplier V16 are for the year 2006.  
Source: The author’s questionnaire surveys and interviews conducted in collaboration with the 
Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences in 2007.  
 
252 
 
 
 
As local suppliers in both HVN and Vietnamese–Chinese chains faced intense 
competition in this stage, there were no longer a reserved space for them. Those in HVN 
chains had to compete with Japanese, Taiwanese and Korean suppliers; whilst those in 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains vied with Chinese suppliers. The result was a growing 
division between two groups of local suppliers: a handful of high performers that were 
rapidly accumulating capabilities and growing, and the rest, which lagged behind.  
The former group included most of HVN’s key first-tier suppliers and those firms that 
continued to receive large orders from local assemblers. These suppliers won orders for 
large proportions of the growing orders by HVN or local assemblers operating at large 
scales by acquiring increasingly sophisticated capabilities. The in-depth empirical 
analyses in Paper III found that seven of HVN’s local first-tier suppliers and one in a 
Vietnamese–Chinese chain had reached assimilative or adaptive levels in the key 
capabilities required for their operations.129 Whilst their numbers were limited, it is 
worth recalling the remarks of HVN’s procurement manager, who stated that apart from 
a number of cases, its local first-tier suppliers were generally able to meet the 
company’s requirements without the need for hands-on technical assistance by 2009 
(Paper III); which by definition means that they had reached the assimilative level of 
production capability. This suggests that the above findings can be generalised to most 
of HVN’s local first-tier suppliers, which numbered 18 as of 2007 (Table II-4).  
The latter group included (1) those that stayed on as first-tier suppliers in Japanese or 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains but experienced declining orders as they failed to meet lead 
firm requirements; and (2) second-tier suppliers in Japanese chains that struggled to 
address the ever intensifying competition. These firms made relatively limited progress 
                                                        
129 Suppliers V1, V2, V3, V7, V8, V12, V13 and V16.  
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in improving their capability levels (Paper III).  
In summary, lead firm competitiveness was substantially boosted within several years of 
the China shock. In Stage III, HVN emerged as a dominant actor, but local assemblers 
continued to claim a market share by improving their price- and non-price-based 
competitiveness. The domestic component supply base continued to expand but, in a 
divergence from the previous stage, there emerged a growing rift between those 
suppliers that attained sophisticated capabilities and grew rapidly, and those that 
underperformed. Even though local suppliers were exposed to mounting competition, a 
few dozen of their number held on to positions in the former group by successfully 
acquiring production capabilities and even basic innovation capabilities.  
4.5 Explaining the Changing Development Outcomes  
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the impact of the China shock on the 
development of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry indeed changed substantially over 
time. What seemed at first to be severely negative effects eventually brought about 
remarkable improvements in the market performance and productive efficiency of major 
lead firms within the industry — developments that nobody could have imagined in the 
late 1990s. The country’s component supply base also developed remarkably, initially 
assisted by the entry of a large number of local suppliers, and subsequently driven by 
growing competition between foreign and local suppliers. Then, why did the impact of 
the shock change over time?  
If we focus exclusively on the most immediate reaction to the shock, that is, HVN’s 
launch of its low-priced model, the answer is fairly straightforward: it can be explained 
in terms of HVN’s attempt to gain the competitive edge over Chinese imports – an 
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argument corroborated by the existing literature on import competition reviewed in 
Section 2. However, the analyses in the ensuing subsections uncovered more extensive 
dynamics encompassing a wider range of actors, including local assemblers, suppliers 
of different nationalities, and the Vietnamese government, which cannot be reduced to 
the incumbent lead firm’s response to the competitive effects of China. Explaining them 
requires a different perspective: industrial organisation.  
In the 1990s, the Chinese motorcycle industry rose to prominence due to its distinctive 
model of industrial organisation. Whereas the Japanese employed a captive 
organisational model to develop lead firm proprietary models and manufacture them to 
high quality standards for the sophisticated international market, the Chinese harnessed 
market-based organisation to achieve price-based competitiveness in producing copies 
or slightly modified imitations of Japanese motorcycles to meet the large demand for 
low-priced products in developing countries (Paper I). Vietnam was the first place 
outside China where the two models clashed and competed for supremacy. The 
transformation of the industry following the China shock can be explained in terms of 
the competition between the two organisational models.  
Figure IV-4 shows the changing chains of causation linking market competition, 
industrial organisation, lead firm performance and the formation of supplier capabilities. 
In short, competition drove HVN and local assemblers to adjust their organisational 
models, which in turn influenced the two industrial development outcomes: lead firm 
performance and the formation of supplier capabilities. However, the directions of 
causal relations between the variables changed over time. It is this changing direction of 
causation between the variables that is vital to explaining the changing impact of 
China’s rise.   
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Figure IV-4. Changing Chains of Causation in the Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry 
(a) Stage II(b) 
 
(b) Stage III 
 
Source: The author.  
In the immediate aftermath of the China shock, a combination of market competition 
and local content rules compelled both HVN and local assemblers to adjust industrial 
organisation so as to improve on their competitive performance. However, their 
attempts to adjust their respective organisational models only achieved partial progress 
at this stage because of the misalignment of relevant capabilities. Because the lack of 
supplier capabilities constrained the attempts of both HVN and local assemblers to 
make organisational adjustments, their market performance improved only partially. 
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Whilst HVN succeeded in achieving a radical one-off reduction in procurement costs, 
partial organisational transformation constrained sustainment of such a strategy. In 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains, the failure to attend the coordination needs surrounding de 
facto standard models ended up in local assemblers achieving low prices at the expense 
of low quality. 
Nevertheless, lead firm endeavours to achieve the intended organisational 
transformation in the absence of foreign-invested suppliers created ample opportunities 
for local suppliers to enter value chains and acquire new capabilities. In HVN chains in 
particular, perceiving the lack of supplier capability as a constraint to the intended 
adjustment of its organisational model, the lead firm sought to nurture the required 
capabilities providing technical assistance. Suppliers in Vietnamese–Chinese chains 
were provided with the chance to engage in new activities and attain new capabilities – 
primarily as a result of their own efforts to mobilise internal or external resources.  
In Stage III, further dynamics unfolded as the reverse causality came to operate; that is, 
the emergence of new supplier capabilities now increasingly drove the transformation of 
industrial organisation. The entry of Japanese and Taiwanese suppliers attracted by the 
growing market, as well as the improved capability levels of local suppliers, emerged as 
a key factor enabling HVN to take full advantage of ‘institutionalised competition’ to 
enforce challenging quality and price requirements on its suppliers. In the meantime, the 
emergence of Chinese and Vietnamese suppliers equipped with complementary 
competencies to conduct minor design modifications to existing models and to 
manufacture them in large quantities to reasonable standards gave rise to the 
‘coordination from below’, which effectively addressed the coordination requirements 
surrounding de facto standard models in Vietnamese–Chinese chains.  
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As a consequence, HVN was now able to employ ‘institutionalised competition’ to 
impose challenging quality and price reduction targets on its suppliers, which enabled 
the company to meet the gradual sophistication of market demand and expand its 
market share. Nevertheless, several local assemblers managed to stay alongside the 
Japanese as organisational transformation enabled them to capitalise on the 
supplier-driven coordination to realise low prices, high product variety, and reasonable 
quality and thrive in the low-income segment of the Vietnamese motorcycle market that 
even HVN’s budget model had not penetrated. 
Conversely, local suppliers were exposed to intense competition. Firms that continued 
to grow and upgrade were limited to those that had entered Japanese or 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains at the right time (i.e. Stage II, when competition between 
suppliers was not overly intense), and maintained their competitive edge vis-à-vis other 
suppliers in their respective chains by steadily building the capabilities required by lead 
firms. Accordingly, the few dozen suppliers that had taken full advantage of their 
participation in Japanese or Vietnamese–Chinese chains to acquire advanced 
capabilities emerged as core companies in the industry’s component supply base. 
4.6 Looking to the Future 
The Vietnamese motorcycle industry made significant headway within the decade 
covered by this study. Although the industry remains heavily protected, there are 
indications that it has steadily raised its performance, and the virtuous cycle of a 
growing market, the formation of a component supply base, and increasing productive 
performance has begun to turn.  
Can Vietnam become regionally competitive in the Southeast Asian motorcycle 
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industry? Although any answer to this question must remain speculative, developments 
after 2009 suggest that the growth of the industry is likely to be increasingly driven by 
the Japanese for the foreseeable future. In 2010, the three incumbent Japanese 
manufacturers (Honda, Yamaha and Suzuki) accounted for 76% of total motorcycle 
sales, while the share of local assemblers dropped to 8% (Industrial Research Institute 
2011). Japanese motorcycle manufacturers continued to make large-scale investment in 
Vietnam130 notwithstanding the government’s announcement in 2008 of the reduction 
of tariffs on imports of motorcycles from ASEAN countries to 60% by 2013.131  
Moreover, there are signs that the competitiveness of Vietnam’s component 
manufacturing industry has also been significantly strengthened. In an interview at the 
beginning of 2010, the President of Honda’s regional R&D base in Thailand pointed out 
that the growing competitiveness of suppliers in Vietnam was likely to make the country 
a promising ASEAN component supply base along with Indonesia (interview with 
Honda R&D Southeast Asia #1) – a scenario that could hardly be imagined 15 years 
ago. 
However, these new developments are giving rise to a new concern. While larger 
investment might make HVN even more efficient, its increasing dominance in the 
Vietnamese market could dissuade the company from making further efforts to improve 
its competitiveness. Given that the threat of local assemblers has weakened, the key 
question is whether there are alternative sources of competition strong enough to keep 
HVN’s market dominance at bay. This is likely to depend on whether Yamaha – 
currently the second largest foreign motorcycle manufacturer operating in Vietnam – 
                                                        
130 Honda is set to expand its annual production capacity in Vietnam to 3 million units by 2013 (The 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun Newspaper 8 January 2012). 
131 Decision of the Ministry of Finance 36/2008/QD-TTg dated 12 June 2008.  
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and other foreign motorcycle manufacturers are able to seize the growing Vietnamese 
market, and how fast Vietnam can move towards the further reduction of import tariffs 
vis-à-vis other ASEAN countries and, perhaps more importantly, China.  
5. Conclusion  
This paper began by asking the question, does China’s economic rise help or hinder the 
industrial development of its neighbours? The existing literature was found to be largely 
pessimistic about China’s less developed neighbours that competed head-on with the 
former in domestic and third country markets. This paper challenged such a view by 
engaging in an in-depth longitudinal analysis of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry, 
which was hit by massive low-priced imports from China in the early 2000s. This 
concluding section summarises the contribution of the paper, discusses its limitations, 
and suggests issues for future research.   
The key contributions of the paper are two-fold. First, it provides empirical evidence to 
show that the impact of China did change markedly over the decade. As expected, the 
China shock initially had a severe negative influence on the nascent domestic 
motorcycle industry. However, the detrimental effects were soon overcome and steadily 
turned into positive results. In the short term, domestic motorcycle production recovered 
as HVN significantly boosted its price-based competitiveness and the 
import-substitution production of low-priced motorcycles started to take root in 
Vietnam; but a series of interventionist government policy decisions imposed 
constraints on overall industrial development. However, this was also a period when 
ample space opened up for local suppliers – including small-scale private firms – to 
enter motorcycle production value chains and acquire new capabilities.  
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As policy constraints were removed in the medium term, the industry entered a 
qualitatively new development phase, with HVN emerging as an ever dominant actor. 
Yet, several very large local assemblers also clung on to their market share by catering 
to the lowest end of the market. The component supply base also continued to develop 
but this time, there was no longer a reserved space for local suppliers. As those of 
different nationalities competed intensely for orders, foreign-invested suppliers came to 
take on greater role in the country’s component supply base. Nevertheless, a few dozen 
local suppliers continued to grow and upgrade by acquiring increasingly sophisticated 
capabilities, emerging as core companies in the component supply base.  
The second contribution of this paper lies in its explanation of why the Chinese impact 
changed over time. The study reached beyond a narrow focus on the immediate 
response of incumbent firms to competitive effects – as was the case with the existing 
literature – and sought instead to explain how the impact of China’s rise on industrial 
development outcomes changed in the medium term. The key to understanding these 
dynamics was the competition between two contrasting models of industrial 
organisation, that is, the Japanese model that prioritised quality, and the Chinese model 
that concentrated on price. The transformation of these two models was critical in 
explaining relations between market competition arising from the China shock, supplier 
capability building, and lead firm performance.  
Faced with market competition, HVN and local assemblers sought to adjust their 
respective models of industrial organisation. However, such modification took time 
because intended changes were prevented from being made by initial inadequate 
supplier ability to support the sustained implementation of either organisational model. 
Nevertheless, in the medium term, a combination of policy change, attempts by lead 
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firms to nurture supplier capabilities, and supplier’s own learning initiatives paved the 
way for organisational adjustment that brought about remarkable changes in industrial 
development outcomes.   
The overall conclusion of this paper is that assessing China’s impact requires the tracing 
of changes over an extended period of time. What seem like negative effects on 
incumbent producers to start with might in the longer term be translated into a major 
boost to industrial development. However, such an outcome is clearly subject to strong 
entrepreneurship and the seizure of business opportunities by new entrants; the capacity 
on the parts of both incumbent firms and new entrants to invest in and build capabilities; 
and an environment (both domestic and international) that is conducive to strategic 
responses from all stakeholders.  
Although this paper demonstrated that the time frame under study, the scope of 
coverage, and the depth of investigation each had a substantial influence on conclusions 
reached in terms of the dynamics of China’s influence on its neighbours, the limitations 
of this research project should also be acknowledged. First, given that this study 
focussed on showing the direction of change and identifying critical junctures and 
mechanisms shaping the overall process of industrial development, further research is 
needed to explore the degree of change.  
Much of the analytical work for this study involved the integration of principally 
qualitative data collected from lead firms and their suppliers at different points in time, 
which proved useful in illuminating the direction of medium-term change. However, 
data on local assemblers were generally limited in breadth and depth compared to those 
on HVN. With the exception of a few indicators such as market shares and prices, the 
consistent application of quantitative measurements to different stages of industrial 
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development transpired to be unfeasible.  
Indeed, data on suppliers’ capability was limited to a purposefully selected sample of 
several firms, the analysis of which was designed to demonstrate the diversity of 
capability building trajectories, but did not indicate how prevalent emerging patterns 
were. To what extent did HVN’s suppliers (of different nationalities) improve their 
productivity? How did such outcomes compare with the performance of suppliers 
serving local assemblers? Future research would require quantitative analyses of 
systematically sampled suppliers to address these questions, although such attempts are 
likely to be possible only over short periods of time.   
Second, there are limitations in terms of the applicability of the overall findings to other 
contexts. The industrial dynamics that unfolded in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry 
had much to do with a combination of specific conditions, that is, (1) the presence of 
powerful TNCs that were strongly committed to seizing the emerging market and had 
the capacity to respond strategically to the Chinese challenge; (2) active 
entrepreneurship on the part of Vietnamese assemblers, without which repeated rounds 
of competition would not have taken place; and (3) a large pool of local and 
foreign-invested suppliers who actively exploited new transaction opportunities.  
These conditions may not be present in many other industries or countries. Indeed, the 
emerging body of research on Chinese investment in Africa suggests that the absence of 
such conditions in this context has resulted in a situation in which Chinese investors 
either depend on imported inputs or develop enclaves in the host economies, both of 
which create limited spillover benefits for local firms (Broadman 2007; Gu 2009, 2011). 
However, there are cases in which Chinese imports have triggered innovative responses 
amongst local producers, for example, the electrical fittings industry in Pakistan 
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(Sonobe and Otsuka 2010) and the Ethiopian footwear industry (Tegegne 2009; Sonobe 
and Otsuka 2010). Therefore, similar lines of research might be useful to these and other 
sectors in order to shed light on whether the impact of China’s growth on the 
development of local firms and industries has changed in the short and medium term.  
Third and lastly, while this paper focussed on China’s competitive impact, research is 
also needed on how and why China’s complementary impact changes over time. To date, 
complementarity between China and its neighbours has grown as the former has needed 
inputs for export production. However, complementary effects might diminish over time 
as China acquires the requisite technological capacity to produce the parts and 
components it currently imports. Nevertheless, scope for exploiting complementarity 
may persist if the neighbours continue to improve on their technological edge.  
Since complementary effects emerge from the regional production networks of TNCs 
extending to different countries in the region, research examining changes in such 
impact is most likely to benefit from applying the methodological approaches employed 
in the present study, that is, in-depth examination of key actors along the value chain; 
analysis of interaction between firms; and integration of firm-level and industry-level 
data. Although rarely adopted in research on China’s impact on its neighbours, these are 
useful tools for analysing the complex interactive processes of market change, strategic 
response, capability building, and industrial development.  
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 APPENDIX 1 LIST OF FIRMS, INTERVIEWS, AND SURVEYS 
 
1. Interviews in Japan (Paper I) 
Firms Code Interview details 
Honda 
Kumamoto 
Factory 
#1 
Managers of Operation Management Department and Motorcycle Factory 
Management Block; and Block Leader, Overseas Assistance Block, 
Motorcycle Factory on 27 July 2004 (includes factory visit). 
Supplier JJ1 #1 
President and four managers in charge of production, quality, and 
administration on 28 July 2004 (includes factory visit). 
Supplier JJ2 #1 
Director, Materials Department; Director, Technological Department; and 
Factory Manager on 26 July 2004 (includes factory visit). 
Supplier JJ3 #1 
Manager of Administration Department on 27 July 2004 (includes factory 
visit). 
 
2. Interviews in Thailand (Papers II, III, and IV) 
Firms Code Interview details 
Honda Thailand #1 
President and General Manager on 17 September 2004 
(includes factory visit). 
Honda R&D Southeast Asia #1 President on 11 January 2010. 
 
3. Interviews in Vietnam 
(1) Honda Vietnam (HVN) (Papers II, III, and IV) 
Code Interview details 
#1 General Director at the factory on 31 July 2001. 
#2 
Director of Production and Director of Administration/Chief Financial Officer on 21 
September 2004 (includes factory visit). 
#3 Director of Administration/Chief Financial Officer on 20 November 2007. 
#4 Director and Senior Manager of Purchasing Department on 19 September 2008. 
#5 Director, Senior Manager, and Manager of Purchasing Department on 7 March 2009. 
 
(2) Vietnamese Assemblers (Papers II, III, and IV) 
Firms 
Interviews 
Surveys 
Code Details 
A1 
#1 
Head of Administrative Department on 22 September 2004 
(includes factory visit). 2004/ 2007 
  
#2 
Head of Administrative Department on 1 August 2005 (includes 
factory visit). 
A2 
#1 
Former procurement manager (2002-2004) at a café in Tokyo on 
24 February 2009. 
– 
#2 
Former procurement manager (2002-2004) at the Institute of 
Developing Economies, Chiba on 27 February 2009. 
A3 #1 
Officer of Administrative Department on 23 November 2007 
(includes factory visit). 
2007 
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A4 
#1 Vice General Director on 23 September 2004. 
2004/ 2007 
  
  
  
  
#2 Vice General Director on 2 August 2005. 
#3 
Vice General Director and Factory Manager on 4 August 2005 
(includes factor visit). 
#4 General Director and Deputy Director on 22 November 2007. 
#5 General Director on 4 March 2009. 
A5 – (Requests for interviews were rejected in 2004 and 2007.) 2004/ 2007 
A6 #1 
General Director and Deputy General Director on 26 November 
2007 (includes factory visit). 
2007 
 
(3) Vietnamese Suppliers (Papers II, III and IV) 
Firm Code Interview details 
Paper* 
II III 
V1  
#1 Director of Planning Department on 17 October 2003. 
X X 
#2 Deputy Director on 3 September 2008. 
#3 
Chairman; General Director; and Manager of Planning Department on 
24 November 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#4 
Chairman; General Director; Deputy General Director; Factory 
Manager; and five other managers on 3 March 2009 (includes factory 
visit). 
V2  
#1 
President/General Director and Deputy manager of Personnel 
Department on 5 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
X X 
#2 
Director of Technical Department at the factory on 19 November 2008 
(includes factory visit). 
V3  
#1 General Director on 17 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
X X 
#2 Deputy Manager of Technical Department on 20 November 2008. 
V4  
#1 Vice General Director on 23 August 2002 (includes factory visit). 
X  
#2 Vice General Director on 3 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
V5  
#1 General Director on 16 October 2003 (includes factory visit). 
X X 
#2 
General Director and Director of Technology Department on 9 March 
2009 (includes factory visit). 
V6 #1 General Director on 17 November 2009. X X 
V7 
#1 
Director of Production and Director of Finance on 25 September 2004 
(includes factory visit). 
X X #2: General Director on 11 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#3 Two Vice General Directors on 11 March 2009 (includes factory visit). 
#4 General Director at VEAM’s office in Hanoi 13 January 2010. 
V8  
#1 General Director at the company's factory on 20 November 2008. 
 
X 
 
X #2 
General Director at the company's factory on 5 March 2009 (includes 
factory visit). 
V9 
#1 Deputy General Director on 16 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
X X #2 
Manager of Engineering Department on 21 November 2008 (includes 
factory visit). 
#3 General Director at the VEAM’s office in Hanoi on 13 January 2010. 
V10  
#1 Managing Director on 28 July 2005 (includes factory visit). 
 X 
#2 President on 15 November 2008 (includes factory visit). 
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V11 #1 
General Director and Director on 9 September 2008 (includes factory 
visit). 
 X 
V12 #1 
Manager of Finance and Deputy Manager of Sales on 12 March 2009 
(includes factory visit). 
 X 
V13 
#1 Deputy General Director on 16 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
X X 
#2 
Managers of Technical Department, Equipment Department, Manager 
of Quality Control Department, and Technical Department No.2 on 21 
November 2008 (includes factory visit). 
V14 #1 
Director and Manager of Technology Department at the company's 
factory in Ho Chi Minh City on 13 March 2009 (include factory visit). 
X X 
V15 
  
#1 
General Director at the company's factory in Hanoi on 3 August 2005 
(includes factory visit). 
X X 
#2 
General Director at the company's factory in Hanoi on 5 September 
2008 (includes factory visit). 
V16 
#1 General Director on 24 November 2008. 
X X 
#2 General Director on 5 March 2009 (includes factory visit). 
V17 
  
#1 
General Director and Director of Sales Department on 12 September 
2008 (includes factory visit). 
X X 
#2 
General Director and Manager of Accounting Department on 22 
November 2008 (includes factory visit). 
V18 #1 Director on 4 September 2008 (include factory visit). X X 
V19  
#1 General Director on 2 August 2005 (includes factory visit). 
X X #2 General Director on 8 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#3 General Director on 10 March 2009. 
V20 
#1 General Director on 15 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
X X 
#2 General Director on 10 March 2009. 
V21 #1 General Director on 4 March 2009.  X X 
V22 #1 
Managing Director and Factory Director on 14 March 2009 (includes 
factory visit). 
X X 
V23 #1 Deputy Director on 25 September 2004 (includes factory visit). X  
(Note) * This column shows papers in which data on the respective supplier is used for analysis. 
Paper IV synthesises the findings of Papers II and III. V10, 11 and 12 are second-tier suppliers in 
HVN chain and therefore beyond the scope of the analysis of Paper II. V4 and V23 could not be 
accessed for in-depth interviews on capability building trajectories for Paper III. 
 
(4) Japanese Suppliers (Paper II) 
Firms Code Interview details 
J1 #1 General Director on 1 August 2005 (includes factory visit). 
J2 
#1 General Director on 23 August 2002 (includes factory visit). 
#2 General Director on 26 November 2007 (includes factory visit). 
J3 
#1 General Director on 20 September 2004 (includes factory visit). 
#2 General Director on 19 November 2007. 
#3 General Director on 18 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
J4 #1 General Director on 22 May 2003. 
J5 #1 
General Director and Factory Manager on 11 November 2003 (includes factory 
visit). 
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J6 
#1 General Director on 20 November 2004 (includes factory visit). 
#2 
General Director, Director and Manager of Purchasing Department on 20 
November 2007 (includes factory visit). 
J7 #1 General Director on 4 September 2002. 
J8 #1 General Director on 27 July 2001 (includes factory visit). 
J9 #1 General Director on 26 November 2007 (includes factory visit). 
J10 #1 General Director on 17 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
J11  #1 General Director on 15 January 2010 (includes factory visit). 
 
(5) Chinese Suppliers (Papers II and IV) 
Firm 
Interviews 
Surveys 
Code Details 
C1 
#1 General Director on 23 November 2007 (includes factory visit). 
– #2 Manager of Sales Department at a café in Hanoi on 2 March 2009. 
#3 Manager of Sales Department at a café in Hanoi on 11 March 2009. 
C2 – – 2004/2007 
C3 – – 2004/2007 
C4 – – 2004/2007 
C5 – – 2004 
 
(6) Taiwanese suppliers (Paper II) 
Firm Code Interview details 
T1 
#1 Japanese Technical Advisor on 26 July 2005 (includes factory visit). 
#2 Deputy General Director on 28 November 2007. 
T2 #1 Sales and Import Assistant Manager on 27 November 2007. 
T3 
#1 General Director on 3 August 2005. 
#2 General Director on 6 March 2009 (includes factory visit). 
T4 #1 Deputy General Director and Manager of Sales Department on 27 November 2007. 
T5 #1 Deputy General Director on 29 July 2005. 
T6 #1 Director of Finance Department on 10 September 2004 (includes factory visit). 
T7 #1 Deputy General Director on 28 July 2005 (includes factory visit). 
 
(7) Korean Supplier (Paper II) 
Firm Code Interview codes and details 
K1 
#1 Chief of Financial Department on 10 September 2004. 
#2 General Director on 29 November 2007. 
#3 General Director on 13 March 2009. 
 
(8) Industry Experts 
Organisations Code Interview details 
Vietnam Association of Bicycles 
and Motorcycles (Vinacycle) 
#1 Specialist on 23 September 2004. 
#2 
Chairman and Chief of Administrative Office on 21 
November 2007. 
#3 Chief of Administrative Office on 15 January 2010. 
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(9) Motorcycle Retailers (Paper II) 
Organisations Interviews  
Hanoi 
Several motorcycle retailers on Hue Street, Hanoi interviewed on 27 August 
2002. 
Several motorcycle retailers on Hue Street, Hanoi interviewed on 13 January 
2010. 
Long An Province Several motorcycle retailers in Tan An, Long An on 25 July 2005. 
Ho Chi Minh City Several motorcycle retailers in Ho Chi Minh City on 11-12 September 2004. 
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 APPENDIX 2 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR LOCAL SUPPLIERS 
 
Date:               
Company Name:                                                        
Address:                                                        
Phone Number:                                                        
Interviewee (name, title & department, length & experience of working for the firm): 
                                                                       
 
I. Basic Information about the Firm 
1. When was the firm established? Who were the founders, and how was the firm established? 
                                                                              
2. What is the company’s legal status? Who owns the firm?                            
                                                                             
3. Production Facilities/Factories: Please describe the firm’s production facilities/factories  
Address (IZ) Year 
Constructed 
Land Area Items produced Production 
capacity 
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
4. Number of Employees  
 Current (2008) 2003 2000 
Administration    
Production of 
Motorcycle Parts  
Engineers    
Supervisors    
Operators    
Others    
Designing & Manufacturing Mold     
Other production…………………..    
Other sections ……………………………    
Research & Development     
 
5. Trend of Sales: What is the trend of the firm’s performance (sales and profits) over the past 10 
years? What is the current structure of sales in terms of products? How have the firm’s main 
products changed over the past 10 years? 
 2007 2002 2000 
Total sales (mil. VND)    
Of which (%):  
Motorcycle components 
  for: Japanese assemblers:                      
 
………… 
……………
 
…………...
……………
 
…….………
…….………
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     Foreign suppliers:                                    
     Vietnamese assemblers:                   
     Others:                                 
Replacement Parts 
Other products & services  
……………
……………
……………
……………. 
…………….. 
...…………
…...………
……...……
………...…
…………...  
…………..…
…………...
…………….
…………….. 
…………….. 
 
6. Production processes: Which production processes does the firm undertake? Please write the 
year in which the firm started to undertake the production process in the parenthesis? 
(1) Engine Assembly (    ); (2) Die-casting (    ); (3) Machining (    );  
(4) Cutting (    ); (5) Stamping (    ); (6) Welding (    );  
(7) Forging (    ); (8) Plating (    ); (9) Heat Treatment (    );  
(10) Plastic injection moulding (    ); (11) Painting (   ); (12) Others      (    ) 
Do you design/produce moulds in-house?  
Yes [Type of moulds:              Year started:                 ]   No 
 
7. Product structure 
 Names of products 
 
Year 
Started 
Names of Main 
Customers 
In case of Japanese 
assemblers: Which models? 
Motorcycle 
parts 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
Products other 
than 
motorcycle 
parts 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
8. Please summarise the firm’s business overall strategy over the past 10 years (e.g., focus in terms 
of products, customers, and investment). 
                                                                                      
 
II. Key Customers of Motorcycle Components and Value Chains Governance 
9. Name of Customer                                                           
10. How has the relationship with this customer developed? Please describe the process, referring to 
different phases if necessary.  
                                                                                        
11. How difficult would it be for this firm if the relationship stopped tomorrow? 
                                                                            
12. For this customer, is the firm the only supplier of the type of the components you supply?  
                                                                             
13. Please describe the process through which this customer chooses components suppliers for new 
models and signs contracts with them. 
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14. How are product specifications defined by the customer, and how are they given to you? Does 
the customer provide specifications other than product specifications, such as specifications on 
materials, machinery and equipment, or production process to be used?  
                                                                             
15. How often, via what channels, and how intensively do you communicate with this customer? 
                                                                             
16. How often did the staff of this customer visit your firm (at different phases)? What did they do at 
your firm? 
                                                                             
17. What does the customer provide you apart from the opportunity to sell (e.g., financial assistance, 
machinery and equipment, technical assistance)? 
                                                                             
18. How often and regarding what issues do you consult with this customer? How do they help you? 
                                                                             
19. What does this customer demand most from you? What is the most important factor in 
sustaining relationship with this customer? 
                                                                             
20. How are the prices decided? Are they reviewed regularly? How? 
                                                                             
21. Have you ever made any investments specifically for this customer (e.g., factory, machinery and 
equipment, human resources, and dies and moulds)? What motivated you to make the 
investments? Had the customer given you assurances of the future contracts, orders, or 
relationships?  
                                                                             
 
III. Identification of the Most Important Learning Incidents  
Since the firm started to produce motorcycle components, when did the methods of introducing new 
products, engaging in equipment-related activities, or conducting production management change 
the most? What was the firm able to do as a result of these incidents? [Identify up to three most 
important learning events, using the Capability Matrix (Table III-1) to assess the degree of 
improvement in capability levels.] 
Event 1:                                                                 
Event 2:                                                                 
Event 3:                                                                 
Event 4:                                                                  
 
IV. Details of Learning Incidents 
22. Name of Event                                                              
23. Start & End dates                                                                  
24. Who took the lead of this event in this firm? What was his/her role? Who else were involved? 
What were their respective roles? What was your role? 
                                                                         
288 
 
 
 
 
25. Was the event related to the following dimensions? What was the firm able to do as a result, and 
how was it different from what the firm had previously been able to do? 
(1) Product development/design  
                                                                         
Evaluate the firm’s new product introduction capability at this stage:                  
(2) Organisation of production 
                                                                             
Evaluate the firm’s production process capability at this stage:                           
(3) Levels of precision; design and improvement of production processes; maintenance and 
manufacturing of dies, moulds, tools and jigs  
                                                                             
Evaluate the firm’s equipment capability at this stage:                                  
                                                                             
 
26. Did you do any of the following prior to or during the event?  
☐Investment in machinery/equipment  
☐Recruiting new staff  ☐Trainings staff 
☐Other efforts                                                                
                                                                            
27. Are any external parties involved in the event, such as suppliers of components and materials, 
subcontractors, suppliers of machinery/equipment, design drawings, dies/moulds, competitors, 
consultants, advisors, related companies, banks, universities or research institutes, government 
or international organisations, donors, or industrial associations? Please describe how they were 
involved.  
                                                                             
28. What types of problems or challenges arose during the process, and how were they resolved? 
                                                                             
29. Of various actors involved in the event, who played the two most important actors? Please 
evaluate their importance in terms of percentage of efforts involved.  
Most important actor:                                    
Second most important actor:                              
30. How was the new knowledge utilised for the firm’s business? How important was it for the firm 
in differentiating itself from the competitors? 
                                                                             
31. Was this learning incident subsequently followed by further improvements in new method of 
product introduction, maintaining, equipment-related activities, or organising production 
processes? [Try to identify the chains of learning incidents/ process.] 
                                                                             
* Repeat the sections in IV. for the number of learning incidents identified.  
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 APPENDIX 3 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SURVEY OF LOCAL ASSEMBLERS  
 
Vietnam Institute of Economics 
Vietnam Academy of Social Science 
 
Questionnaire for Motorcycle Assemblers 
 
 
The purpose of this survey is to better understand the current situation of motorcycle industry in 
Vietnam. Information of your company will be treated as strictly confidential and the information 
you provide will be used for research only. Neither you nor your company’s name will be used in 
any document prepared based on this survey.  
 
Part I: General Questions  
(Questions to be answered by the Manager of the Administrative Section) 
 
Date of Interview:                           
Interviewee’s Name:                           
Interviewee’s Title & Department:                                  
Contact Phone Number:                              
Interviewer’s Name:                           
 
1. Company’s General Information 
1.1 Company information  
Company Name                                                        
Name for international transaction                                
Establishment year          Registered Capital                mil. dong 
Address                                                              
Phone number                            Fax number                        
 
1.2. Legal status of company (mark x in appropriate cell) 
 At establishment At present 
a) Central SOE   
b) Local SOE   
c) Belonging to social organization   
d) Cooperative   
e) Share holding company   
f) Limited liability company   
g) Collective company   
h) Private company   
i) Joint venture   
j) Foreign invested company (100%)   
k) Other (specified):    
1.3. If legal status of company has changed, please indicate the year of completion:      
1.4. If a foreign invested firm, please fill in:  
Name of mother company                             Country                
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1.5 Please indicate the details of your factories (including motorcycles and others). 
Address Items produced Production capacity 
(units/year) 
Operating since (year) 
    
    
    
    
 
1.6 Please indicate the details of your company’s subsidiaries in or outside of Vietnam, if any. 
Name of 
company 
Address 
(district, 
province) 
Activities Operational Status (Please tick X) 
Not yet 
operating 
Operating Stopped operating 
      
      
      
 
1.7 Please let us know some information on Management Board 
Job 
title 
Nationality Age Male/ 
Female 
Education (codes 
under the table) 
Working for 
company since 
(year) 
In this position 
since (year) 
       
       
       
       
       
(Graduate/Post-graduate = 1, College/technical school = 2, High school = 3, Technical worker = 4, 
secondary school = 5, other = 6 
 
1.8 Please list all the business associations your company belongs to.  
                                                                             
 
1.9 Employment  
A. How many workers were employed on average in the past two years? 
 2006 (persons) 2007(persons) 
Admnistrative Section   
Motorcycle Section   
Other manufactring section: Please specify …………………   
Other Sections (e.g., services)   
   
   
Total   
B. Average wage for engineers:               dongs/month 
C. Average wage for workers:              dongs/month 
 
2. Finance and Overall Performance 
Enterprise’s Income in 2007:                         dongs 
Structure of income: 
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 2006 2007 
Sales: motorcycles % % 
Sales: motorcycle parts % % 
Sales: other manufactured products % % 
Income from service % % 
Other source of income % % 
Total 100% 100% 
 
2.2 Outsourcing ratio 
What are the shares of (A) materials, (b) components and parts, and (C) payment to subcontractors in 
your total production cost? 
 2007 
(A) Materias  % 
(B) Components and parts  % 
(C) Payment to Subcontractors % 
(A)+(B)+(C): Outsourcing Ratio % 
 
2.3 Evaluation of Overall Performance 
What has happened to your company during 5 years from 2003 to 2007? Please circle “+” if it 
increased, “-“ if it neither increased nor decreased, or “-“ if it decreased. 
Output of motorcycles 
(Volume) 
-- - = + ++ Unit price of your company’s 
motorcycles 
-- - = + ++ 
Sales of motorcycles 
(Value)  
-- - = + ++ Variety of your company’s 
motorcycles 
-- - = + ++ 
Net profits from 
motorcycle sales 
-- - = + ++ Ratio of Net Profits to Sales from 
motorcycle business 
-- - = + ++ 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation!! 
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Part II: Questions on Product Development, Production and Sourcing 
(Questions to be answered by Manager Responsible for Technology and Production) 
 
Date of Interview:                           
Interviewee’s Name:                           
Interviewee’s Title & Department:                                  
Contact Phone Number:                              
Interviewer’s Name:                           
 
1. Production 
1.1 Which production processes does your company undertake? (Please circle all the numbers that 
are appropriate.) 
1.Motorcycle Assembly;  2.Engine Assembly;  3.Diecasting;  4.Machining;  5.Cutting;   
6.Pressing/Stamping;  7.Welding;  8.Forging;  9.Plating;  10.Heat Treatment; 11.Grinding 
12.Plastic injection moulding;  13. Painting;  14.Others                              
 
1.2 Production Level: motorcycles, parts and others 
Do you produce the following products? 
Please write the names of products. 
Year 
starting 
production  
Do you 
export this 
product? 
Actual 
production 
(2006) 
Actual 
production 
(2007) 
Motorcycles Motorcycles 
□Yes □No 
 □Yes 
□No 
  
Scooters 
□Yes □No 
 □Yes 
□No 
  
Parts 
(Fill in names of 
parts) 
 
 
 □Yes 
□No 
  
 
 
 □Yes 
□No 
  
 
 
 □Yes 
□No 
  
Other products   □Yes 
□No 
  
  □Yes 
□No 
  
 
1.3 If you produce motorcycle components, do you sell them to other firms? 
□ No (i.e., all components are used for assembly in our factory only). 
□ Yes. We sell approximately       % of the components we produce to other firms. 
 
2. Products and Product Development 
2.1 Please fill in the number of motorcycle models your company launched in each year. 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Number of new 
models launched 
     
Production (units)      
2.2 How many models do you currently produce?                  models  
2.3 What is the average retail price of your products now?                  dongs 
2.4 Please let us know your product development process. 
A. Do you develop new products by copying and modifying the existing models of other companies, 
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or by developing a new model from scratch?  
□We copy and modify existing models. Please go to Question B.   
□We develop a new model from scratch. Please go to Question C. 
 
B. Whch specific components do you mainly modify? 
                                                                        
- Who designs the modified components? (Please tick the appropriate box.) 
□ Your company  Please go to Question D.     
□ The supplier  Please go to Question C. 
□ Your company cooperates with the supplier.  Please go to Question C. 
□ Others                    
 
- Who prepares the mold for the modified components? (Please tick the appropriate box.) 
□Your company;    □The supplier  
□Your company buys from another company. 
□The supplier buys from another company. 
 
     C. Do you make requests to the supplier regarding how the components should be improved?  
       □ Yes.     □ No. We completely leave the design to the supplier.                                                                 
 What do you provide the supplier when you order the components? (Please tick the 
appropriate boxes.) 
□Sample  □Drawing  □Mold  □Requests about appearance 
□Documents on technical specifications □Khác                             
 
How many times on average do you exchange ideas with the supplier in the process of 
developing a certain model? 
 □None (Your company accepts the component as designed by the supplier.) 
□Once (Your company gives comments on the sample once.) 
□Twice   □Three times or more   
 
How has the frequency of interaction with suppliers changed during the past 5 years? 
 □Increased    □Has not changed     □Decreased 
 
    D. How do you collect information about market demand for your product development (from 
what sources, by which method, and how often)? 
                                                                        
                                                                        
 
2.5 On average, how long does it take for your company to develop a new model (from start of 
planning to launching of the new product)?               weeks / months  
 
How has the period of product development changed compared to 2-3 years ago? 
 □Has become longer □Has not changed □Has become shorter 
 
3. Sourcing & Relationship with Suppliers 
3.1 Please list the types of components and parts that you manufacture in-house. 
                                                                          
Approximately how many percent do these components and parts account for in the total value of the 
motorcycles?             % 
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3.2 Currently how many suppliers (in Vietnam or abroad) do you use in total? 
Total number of suppliers:             
Of which: Suppliers in Vietnam:            Suppliers abroad:             
Approximately how many of them did you start transaction with in the last one year?          
In the last two years?                    
 
3.3 Between 2003 and 2007, how has your company’s sourcing of components changed? Please 
indicate “++” if the share (in terms of value) increased substantially, “+” if it increased, “=” if it 
neither increased nor decreased, “-“ if it decreased, and “--“ if it decreased substantially. 
 
In-house production of components --   -   =   +   ++ 
Sourcing from Vietnamese firms --   -   =   +   ++ 
Sourcing from Taiwanese firms in Vietnam --   -   =   +   ++ 
Sourcing from Chinese firms in Vietnam --   -   =   +   ++  
Imports: Which countries?                         --   -   =   +   ++ 
 
3.4 The following are questions about the relationship with the suppliers of parts that are 
specifically designed for each of your models (see your answer to Question 2.4B). Please answer 
the questions about your relationship with suppliers of the most important component in this 
category.  Name of component:                            
 
A. Currently how many suppliers do you source this component from?         
How many suppliers have you ordered this component from over the past two years?  
           
 
B. What is the share of the largest supplier in the total value of procurement for this 
component?            %  The share of the three largest suppliers?          % 
 
C. What are the nationalities of the three largest suppliers? (Please tick appropriate boxes.) 
 Vietnamese 
firms 
Chinese firms in 
Vietnam 
Taiwanese firms 
in Vietnam 
Firms abroad (Pls 
specify the country.) 
The largest 
supplier 
    
The 2nd largest 
supplier 
    
The 3rd lagest 
supplier 
    
 
D. How long have you had transactions with the largest supplier?       years/ months  
With the second largest supplier?       năm / tháng  
 
E. If your largest supplier suddenly stops supplying components to your company for some reason, 
is it easy for your company to find alternative suppliers?  □Yes □No 
 
F. Is there a written contract with the largest supplier? □Yes □No  
If yes, for how long?                
Does the contract specify the following? (Please tick only if applicable.)  
□Price □Quantity of order  
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G. On average, how frequently do you place orders to the largest supplier?  
            time(s) a day / week / month (Please circle the appropriate unit.) 
 
H. On average, how frequently do you receive deliveries from the largest supplier?  
            time(s) a day / week / month (Please circle the appropriate unit.) 
 
I. Do you inspect the quality of the incoming parts from the largest supplier?  
□We inspect all. □We inspect only a portion. □No inspection. 
 
In case you conduct inspection, by what method? 
□By sight □ By testing machine  □Other                         
 
J. What do you do if you find quality problems with the components after they were delivered from 
the largest supplier?  
□We inform the supplier what is wrong with the product and ask them to fix the problem.  
□We ask the supplier to replace them with products of satisfactory quality, but do not report to them 
about the details of the problem.  
□We discard the defect components, and order from another supplier. 
□We have not had any cases like that.  
□Others                                                             
 
K. Do you provide your largest supplier with the following assistance? (Please tick as many as 
applicable.) 
□Advance payment  □Share the cost for mold production (     % of the total cost) 
□Share the cost of investment in machinery/equipment  (     % of the total cost) 
□Technological assistance (e.g., quality control or production process)  
□Training □Consultancy □Others                      
 
L. How often do the staffs of your company visit the largest supplier?                 
 
M. How often do the staffs of the largest supplier visit your company?                
 
3.5 The following (A to H) are questions about your relationship with the suppliers of general parts 
that are used in common for your models.  
 
A. On average, how many suppliers do you use for each type of components? 
□One   □Two to three  □Four or more 
 
Why is it advantageous for you to have one/two to three/many suppliers for each component, as you 
just answered?  
                                                                         
 
B. Do you switch suppliers of general parts often? Under what occasions do you switch suppliers?                                                                                                                       
 
C. When you place an order, how do you specify the components? If you have different answers for 
different types of parts, please tick all the boxes and specify the examples of parts for each answer. 
□Just by the type of the component (e.g., “clutch”) Type of parts:                    
□The types of models (e.g., “Wave” type): Types of parts                           
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□Other method. Please specify.                                                 
 
D. If your supplier suddenly stops supplying components to your company for some reason, is it 
easy for your company to find alternative suppliers? If there are any types of components for which 
it is difficult to find an alternative supplier other than your current supplier(s), please specify the 
names of the parts.                                                                    
 
E. Is there a written contract with your suppliers? □Yes □No  
If yes, for how long?                
Does the contract specify the following? (Please tick only if applicable.)  
□Price □Quantity of order  
 
F. Do you inspect the quality of the incoming parts from the suppliers? If it depends on the type of 
parts, please tick all applicable asnwers and write examples of the types of parts after each answer. 
□ We inspect all:                                                  
□ We inspect only a portion.                                         
□ No inspection.                                                 
In case you conduct inspection, by what method? 
□By eyes □ By testing machine  □Other                       
 
G. What do you do if you find quality problems with the components after they were delivered from 
the suppliers?  
□We inform the supplier what is wrong with the product and ask them to fix the problem.  
□We ask the supplier to replace them with products of satisfactory quality, but do not report to them 
about the details of the problem.  
□We discard the defect components, and order from another supplier. 
□We have not had any cases like that.  
□Others                                                             
 
H. Do you provide your suppliers with the following assistance? (Please tick as many as applicable.) 
□Advance payment  □Share the cost for mould production (     % of the total cost) 
□Share the cost of investment in machinery/equipment (     % of the total cost) 
□Technological assistance (e.g., quality control or production process)  
□Training □Consultancy □Others                      
 
 
The following (I to N) are questions specifically about your relationship with the suppliers of the 
general components that are most important to ensure the quality of your products.  
Name of component:                         
 
I. What is the share of the largest supplier in the total value of procurement for this 
component?            %  The share of the three largest suppliers?          % 
 
J. How long have you had transactions with the largest supplier?       years/ months  
With the second largest supplier?      years/ months 
 
K. On average, how frequently do you place orders to the largest supplier?  
            time(s) a day / week / month (Please circle the appropriate unit.) 
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L. On average, how frequently do you receive deliveries from the largest supplier?  
            time(s) a day / week / month (Please circle the appropriate unit.) 
 
M. How often do the staffs of your company visit the largest supplier?                 
 
N. How often do the staffs of the largest supplier visit your company?                
 
4. Source of Technology and Knowledge 
If you have ever collaborated with, or received assistance from any foreign partners on designing or 
production of motorcycles or parts, please answer the following questions. 
 
4.1. How many partners have you had?          
 
4.2 What are the nationalities of the partners? (Please tick as many as applicable.) 
□Chinese □Taiwanese □Korean □Japanese □Others 
Nationality of the main partner (in case of multiple partners)                       
 
4.3 Length of relationship with the main partner.               
 
4.4 Form of collaboration or assistance 
□Joint Venture  □Technology Licensing Agreement   
□Purchase of Machinery or Equipment □Purchase of Mold □Others                
 
4.5 How did the main partner assist your company? Please tick as many as applicable. 
□Dispatch of engineers and/or staffs for training.  
How many engineers and/or staffs were dispatched?            
How long did they stay at your company?                
□Provision of molds: For which components?               
□Provision of design drawings: For which components?               
□Provision of machinery or equipment: Type of machinery:                        
□Others.                                          
 
5. Future Prospects 
Please comment on the future prospects of the motorcycle business of your company. 
                                                                          
                                                                        
 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation!! 
 
